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ABSTRACT
This study introduced the framing theory, Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical
model, and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions into a cross-cultural comparative analysis of
news coverage of the Internet in China from 2000 to 2004 in selected newspapers in
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States and the United Kingdom.
Significant differences were found to exist across the societies in both the salience
of Internet-related issues and the usage of generic news frames. The issue of Internet
diffusion and use was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers from China,
Singapore, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the
issue of Internet censorship and regulations; whereas the issue of e-commerce and
Internet business most frequently appeared in the newspapers from Hong Kong. In terms
of generic news frames, the newspapers from China were significantly more likely to use
the human interest, morality and leadership frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong
mainly relied on the factual and economic consequences frames to report the Internet in
mainland China. The U.S. and U.K. newspapers were distinct for their highly frequent
usage of the conflict frame.
This study also investigated how much variations in media framing could be
explained by such national-level factors as freedom status and cultural dimensions across
societies. Logistic regression models indicated that the patterns of influence varied across
the societies with different types of news frames and their associations with different
types of Internet-related issues. The cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation
was found to be a general factor influencing the presence of different types of news
frames.
vii

In addition, a literature review of the changing Chinese media suggests that the
Chinese press has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function.
Therefore, another goal of the study was to test the influence of extramedia-level factors
within a society by examining whether the framing of the Internet in the leading Party
organ newspaper, the People’s Daily, would differ from the Beijing Youth Daily, a local
newspaper with national influence and more financial and operational autonomy. They
differed from each other in presenting the politically sensitive issue, Internet censorship
and regulations.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the Internet, and in particular the World Wide Web, has
attracted a number of research interests across disciplines. Although China, the 71st
country to join the Internet, embraced the so-called fourth medium later than did most
developed countries, the Internet has penetrated China at an exponentially rapid rate since
the end of the last century. According to statistics provided by the Chinese Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC), the population of Internet users reported in
January 2006 is 111 million, which is 179 times as much as that in November 1997
(Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China).
Such a leapfrog development has drawn intensive interests from researchers both
in China and abroad, with particular attention to such issues as Internet diffusion and use,
the government’s cyberstrategies, particularly its control of the Internet, and the
implications of the Internet for freedom of expression and China’s democratization. Only
one study has been found to provide a rough picture of the Internet in China portrayed in
news stories. McMillan and Hwang (2002) compared an English-language newspaper
published in China and four U.S. newspapers to see how such Internet-related topics as
business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions
were covered in the newspapers. No specific theories of media content directed the
descriptive presentations, and no explanations were given to the differences in coverage
between the newspapers in China and the United States and how the underlying political
and cultural factors might affect coverage, thus leaving areas for further research. The
current study aims to systematically conduct multicultural comparisons of framing
1

China’s Internet 1 in selected newspapers in mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, during the time period from 2000 to 2004, to see
how the differences of political systems and cultural dimensions across the societies
might affect issue selections and news frames in stories.
Chapter 2 provides information about the origin and history of the Internet in
China, with attention paid to the incentives for the Chinese government to promote
Internet development, while a political and cultural understanding of the Chinese
government’s attempts to control the Internet is also given. Previous scholarly research is
briefly integrated into the descriptions and interpretations of China’s Internet.
Chapter 3 introduces research on media content and influences on media content,
such as Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, and media framing that provides a
theoretical framework for the current study, which focuses on the socio-political,
ideological and cultural factors at the macro level that shape media content. The seminal
work of Hofstede (1980) and subsequent studies in cultural dimensions lays the
conceptual foundation for relating the variants of frame to the impacts of culture.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a review of the changing role of the media in China,
including the Party organ press’s struggle in the commercialized media market. Such an
investigation serves as a proper rationale for a comparison of the differences between the
People’s Daily, the leading Party organ newspaper in China, and the Beijing Youth Daily,
a local newspaper with national influence, to see whether the newspapers might be

1

The phrase China’s Internet is used in the paper in a general way, referring to any aspects of the Internet,
from Internet growth to Internet use to Internet regulation, in China. It does not imply there is a separate
Internet specifically belonging to China.

2

different in news coverage of the new medium with the dynamic of structural change of
media and the fast diffusion of the Internet in China.
The other chapters inform readers of research questions/hypotheses, methods, and
results. Chapter 5 addresses the research objectives and research questions/hypotheses.
Chapter 6 details the methodological steps and the reasons for undertaking the steps as a
process of answering the research questions and testing the research hypotheses. Chapter
7 presents the results of the current study. Chapter 8 offers discussion about the findings,
the contributions and limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.
While exploring the frames constructed in the new stories of the examined
newspapers and providing a dynamic picture of the Internet in China as painted in the
newspapers, this study also attempts to test empirically the predictability of the assumed
factors in the literature, that is, the underlying political and cultural differences in
societies. It examines how those factors might affect news frames of the Internet in
China, and the integrated influences of those factors on news frames building. Such tests
are mainly based on a quantitative content analysis. In addition, the quantitative
comparison between the selected Chinese newspapers aims to see the effects of
organizational and extramedia of factors as represented by the Shoemaker and Reese
model.

3

CHAPTER II.
BUILDING A REGULATED NETWORKED EMPIRE:
A REVIEW OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA
On September 20, 1987, Professor Qian Tianbai sent China’s first e-mail titled
“Crossing the Great Wall to Join the World” (yueguo changcheng, zouxiang shijie), after
the China Academic Network (CANet), the first computer network in China, was set up.
The network provided e-mail access and support for academic and science research in
computer science (Evolution of Internet in China; Tsui, 2001). On March 2, 1993, a 64K
dedicated circuit to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), built by the Institute
of High-Energy Physics under the Chinese Academic of Sciences (CAS), was opened
officially. China was not accepted to directly and fully connect to the Internet until April
1994 (Evolution of Internet in China). Since then, the Internet has penetrated China at an
exponentially rapid rate. The tremendous progress of telecommunications in recent years
has provided a matrix for the development of Internet in mainland China.
The Chinese government has actively encouraged and invested in the growth of
the Internet to capture the Internet’s vast commercial potential. The central government
has encouraged the competing state-owned telecommunications providers, China
Telecom (zhongguo dianxin), China Unicom (zhongguo liantong), China Mobile
(zhongguo yidong tongxun), China Netcom (zhongguo wangtong), JiTong
Communciations Company (jitong tongxun gongsi), and China Railway Telecom
(zhongguo tiantong), to build their own networks. Government-funded technology parks
provide low-cost homes for Internet start-ups, and Beijing offers tax breaks for high-tech
firms. On the other hand, China has also exerted state control over the Internet and its
4

use, preventing this commercial gold mine from becoming political quicksand. Faced
with an entirely new networked society, and potential political or social challenges that
the new medium may bring, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized a multiplepart network control strategy to create the maximum possible scope of official authority.
It includes blocking certain websites’ IP addresses through a national firewall, acquiring
and developing software and hardware to filter out certain information, producing
legislation to control the Internet, and fostering a culture of self-censorship.
The rapid development of the Internet in China has drawn much attention both in
China and abroad. There is an extensive amount of literature on the Internet itself, which
talks of how the Internet has a culture of its own. Particularly, the past 15 years have seen
numerous scholars keeping their eyes on China’s Internet. Much of the attention in
discussions and studies among both professionals and academia has been paid to the
physical infrastructure and diffusion of China’s Internet (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee,
1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), the government’s cyberstrategies, particularly its
control of the Internet (e.g., Hachigian, 2001; Hartford, 2000; Harwit & Clark, 2001;
Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Qiu & Zhou, 2005; Tsui, 2001; Wu, 1996), and the implications
of the Internet for freedom of expression and China’s democratization (e.g., Hong &
Huang, 2005; Marsh & Whalen, 2000; Peters, 2002).

2.1. Informatization and Modernization Strategies
It may be more useful to place the Internet development into a wider economic
and political context in China to better understand the country’s Internet policies and the
whole picture of Internet development in China.
5

The big Internet boom in China did not grow out of throwing the Net open to the
private sector – as was the case in the United States – but out of a state-centric strategy
for comprehensive “informatization (xinxihua),” envisioned as essential to China’s future
growth and international competitiveness. The key lies in the Party’s commitment to
modernize China, and to strengthen modern China as a global economic, military and
political powerhouse. One of the macro-level forces was the shift in China Ninth Five
Year Plan (1995-2000) from an economy fueled by capital goods development to one
fueled by consumer goods development. The shift was heralded by the revisions to the
Eighth Five Year Plan (1990-1995) when the service industry was given a planned annual
growth target of over 10 per cent (Li, 1991). China’s leaders hoped to skip certain stages
in the development process and integrate information technology into all sectors of
society, with the understanding that at some level modernization would help consolidate
popular support for the current regime. The simple rationale here was what Confucius
said, “Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the common people will have
trust in you” (Analects 12:7). They used the concept of “informatization” to describe the
process, using information technology to modernize the economy and help decentralized
decision-making, yet also make the administrative process more transparent for better
control at the center.
Informatization goes hand in hand with decentralization. In fact, China’s
leadership has held out the vision that information technology will allow the country to
decentralize decision-making, while allowing the central government to monitor and
control the economy. Since 1993, the central government has launched its own “National
Information Infrastructure” projects, known as the Golden Projects, to introduce
6

information technology into various sectors of government and society. For example,
projects have been initiated to utilize information technology to transform the way the
state handles taxation, customs, and other transactions.
In 1993, the National Joint Conference on Economic Informatization, replaced by
the State Council’s Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure2 in 1996
(China Internet chronology 1), was created under the chairmanship of former VicePremier Zou Jiahua. The first national meeting of the National Informatization Work
Conference, held in Shenzhen on April 18, 1997, was opened with an address by Zou
Jiahua, who set out the “24-character direction for China’s informatization: Overall
planning (tongchou guihua), state dominance (guojia zhudao), unified standards (tongyi
biaozhun), joint construction (lianhe jianshe), link up to supply each other (hulian
hutong), and shared resources (ziyuan gongxiang)” (China information chronology 2).
Development of the Internet was put on the top of the Chinese government’s new policy
agenda for creating a national information infrastructure and developing economy.
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the annual growth rate of China’s information
equipment manufacturing and service industries was over three times as much as that of
the GNP. The information industry emerged “prominently as a new growth point of
China’s national economic development” (China’s IT develops at tremendous pace).

2

Also called the Information Leading Group, a cross-ministerial coordination group reporting directly to
the State Council, was responsible for the first attempt to establish regulatory guidelines for Internet
development in China. It was in charge of overseeing the Internet in China based on Article 5 of the State
Council’s Order No. 195. The Steering Committee served before the Ministry of Information Industry
established in 1998, as the final decision-maker on Internet regulations by coordinating relevant
government agencies/regulators. The temporary/transitional status of the Steering Committee was similar to
an Administration’s Task Force in the United States.
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In November 2001, China’s State Economic and Trade Commission published the
“Tenth Five-Year Plan of Industrial Structure Adjustment.” One of the six major
adjustments was “to promote industrialization by information” (Du, 2001). The Fifth
Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly
pointed out that:
Informatization is an important tendency in today’s global economy and social
development. It is also a key link for enterprise upgrading, industrialization, and
modernization in our country. We should prioritize the informatization of the
national economy and society, comply to the development trend of global
information technology, meet the terms of market demands, and move toward
with institutional innovations, trying to leap-frog in our information industry
(Recommendations from the CCP Party Center on the Tenth Five-Year Plan for
national economic and social development).
As the Internet boom hit the United States, Chinese policymakers concluded that linking
with the global network of networks was essential to the overall strategy. The Internet
was a vital factor in China’s transformation from a developing country to a superpower
(Sinclair, 2002).

2.2. Building a Networked Empire
Widely recognized as critical to the modernization strategy of the CCP has been
the development of telecommunications, computers, and communication networks. China
has invested heavily in its information infrastructure at the same time encouraging
foreign investment in key information-related sectors (Hachigian, 2001). Starting from
the ground up, China has quickly built a vast information infrastructure. China’s Internet
backbone began by building the telecom system. Historically, China’s telecom provision
was a bottleneck in the national economy in the 1960s and 1970s when telecom
8

availability was very poor. At the outset of the reform era, for instance, almost no private
households had telephones. In the 1980s, China changed its telecom policies to speed up
telecom development. As a result, the growth rate of telecom traffic from the early 1980s
to the mid-1990s had dramatically increased, with 1994, the highest year of the value in
the telecom industry, about five times higher than GDP (Wang, 2001). Telephone lines
have been laid by the state telecommunications monopoly, China Telecom, at a
skyrocketing rate. In 1990, there were fewer than 10 million telephone lines in China; by
June 2001, the total number of telephone users hit 281 million (Li, 2001). Many
advanced technologies have been incorporated into the Chinese telecommunication
infrastructure, including digital microwave, satellites, program-controlled exchange,
movable telecommunication and data telecommunication. China has also increasingly
seen the type of cross-media convergence common in Western countries whereby mobile
and wireless communications devices are made Internet accessible, increasing the
penetration and depth of the Internet (Wang, 2001).
The Internet has been one of the cornerstones of the information technology
explosion in China. As in other countries, China’s early computer networking efforts
came from the research and education communities. The CANet, established in 1987, is
generally recognized as the first computer network in China. Since China realized a fullfunction linkage to the Internet on April 20, 1994, the Chinese Internet has rapidly
expanded throughout many sectors of Chinese society. From 1997 to 2005, computer
hosts, Internet users, domain names registered under the top level “.cn,” Web sites and
total bandwidth capacity of leased international connections respectively increased by
over 150 times (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1. Internet Growth in China

Nov. 1997
July 1998
Jan. 1999
July 1999
Jan. 2000
July 2000
Jan. 2001
July 2001
Jan. 2002
July 2002
Jan. 2003
July 2003
Jan. 2004
July 2004
Jan. 2005
July 2005
Jan. 2006

Computer
Hosts

Internet
Users

Domain
Names (.cn)

Web Sites

299,000
542,000
747,000
1,460,000
3,500,000
6,500,000
8,920,000
10,020,000
12,540,000
16,130,000
20,830,000
25,720,000
30,890,000
36,300,000
41,600,000
45,600,000
49,500,000

620,000
1,750,000
2,100,000
4,000,000
8,900,000
16,900,000
22,500,000
26,500,000
33,700,000
45,800,000
59,100,000
68,000,000
79,500,000
87,000,000
94,000,000
103,000,000
111,000,000

4,066
9,415
18,396
29,045
48,695
99,734
122,099
128,362
127,319
126,146
179,544
250,651
340,040
382,216
432,077
622,534
2,592,410

1,500
3,700
5,300
9,906
15,153
27,289
265,405
242,739
277,100
293,213
371,600
473,900
595,550
626,600
668,900
677,500
694,200

Bandwidth for
International
Connection
18.64 Mbps
84.64 Mbps
143.00 Mbps
241.00 Mbps
351.00 Mbps
1,234.00 Mbps
2,799.00 Mbps
3,257.00 Mbps
7,597.50 Mbps
10,576.50 Mbps
9,380.00 Mbps
18,599.00 Mbps
27,216.00 Mbps
53,941.00 Mbps
74,429.00 Mbps
82,617.00 Mbps
136,106.00 Mbps

(Source: CNNIC’s semiannual reports, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm) 3

3

The table was created based on the information provided in the CNNIC’s reports from 1997 through
2006. The Chinese Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), located in Beijing’s Haidian district,
was established in June 1997 and was authorized by the government to be a domain name management
entity. It operates under the leadership of the Ministry of Information Industry and the Chinese Academic
of Sciences. Its responsibilities include registering domain names, distributing IP addresses, and conducting
statistical surveys on the development of the Internet in China. The CNNIC has issued sixteen reports.
Although these statistics are challenged by several other companies that specialized in market research,
such as IAMAsia and NetValue, the enormous growth of the Internet in China is undeniable.
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age. Two state ministries construct the optical backbone of China separately – the
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the State Administration of Radio Film and
Television (SARFT). By the end of 2001, MII had deployed 1.46 Mkm of optical
network mainly for voice and data communication services covering all provinces and
cities. SARFT had deployed 30,000 Km of optical cable mainly for cable-TV delivering,
which covered over 30 major provinces and most cities, and the switch capacity at main
segments reached 1,600 Gbps. Fiber optic cable networks now cover across the country.
By 2000, China had established more than 300 ISP companies and more than 1,000 ICPs
(China’s IT develops at tremendous pace, 1995). Unlike some authoritarian governments
that exert larger control over the Internet by limiting bandwidth, the amount of data
traffic per second the network can process, the Chinese government instead chooses to
continue expanding bandwidth. The total Internet bandwidth is listed in the latest CNNIC
report at 136.1 Gbps, which is almost 388 times as much as six years ago (see Table 2.1).
Also, as a part of the strategy for driving the information economy, thus fostering
economic growth and further increasing legitimacy of the government, Chinese officials
have focused on ways that the Internet can be used to enhance government performance,
to reduce tension between the government and the citizens. For instance, the central
government demanded in the early 1990s that all government offices throughout the
country move online, starting minimally with information carrying websites as the first
step towards more complex and comprehensive interactive services (Zhou, 2004a). The
Government Online Project (GOP), launched on January 22, 1999, interconnects
government offices of every province, autonomous region and municipality, and is to
establish the basis for the development of e-government in China, provide more effective
11

coordination between and across governments at different levels, so that the public can
have more access to government information and procure specific government services
via the Internet (Lovelock & Ure, 2002; Zhou, 2004a).
As identified in a series of surveys directed by Guo (2003b), the government,
which encourages people “to access the ‘healthy’ Internet,” is one of the four key players
in the fast growth of the Internet in China. 4 For instance, the survey in Nanhai,
Guangdong Province, reported that the Internet development in the city is typical of the
“government driven model.” The Nanhai municipal government, which has invested a
vast amount of money in its informatization endeavors, has realized its goal of connecting
“every village” to an optical cable, and “every family” to the Internet (pp.3-9). As a
matter of fact, the Chinese government is “actively promoting the Internet” at all levels
(Hachigian, 2002a, p.49).

2.3. Shaping the Internet within a Regulatory Framework
However, all of this significant effort to promote the wide application of the
Internet in China does not mean that the Chinese government is prepared to relax its
control over the Internet. As the Internet takes hold in the country, many international
observers have begun to suggest that the technology poses an insurmountable threat to
China’s authoritarian regime. The Chinese government has responded with a number of
restrictions designed to counter potentially challenging uses of the Internet, as well as a
range of proactive measure designed to reap the technology’s benefits. State strategies
toward the Internet have addressed the balance between economic modernization and
4

The other three players are competitive Internet companies, Internet cafés, and Internet users.
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political control. In fact, Internet control has become more systematic and comprehensive
in China, both on the statute books and in real life.
From the very beginning, the Chinese government has successfully controlled
Internet access in terms of both infrastructure and legislation. On February 12, 1996, the
State Council issued Order No.195, “PRC Interim Regulations Governing the
Management of International Interconnection of Computer Information Networks”
(Zhongguo renmin gongheguo jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang guanli zanxing
guiding, Ministry of Information Industry a), signed by former Premier Li Peng on
February 1, 1996, later modified by PRC State Council’s Order No.218 on May 20, 1997.
Article 3 of the order separated networks into Interconnecting Networks (IN, hulian
wangluo), defined as those networks directly connecting into the global Internet through
international leased circuits, and Access Networks (AN, jieru wangluo), which were
required to obtain the connection through one of the four authorized INs. 5 The order
(Article 7) further specified that such four organizations would operate INs for the first
backbone networks: two offering access to business and the general public, ChinaNet
and GBNet, which can Internet access (on commercial terms) to other ISPs 6 , and two

5

The authorized nature of INs could also be seen from a perspective that diversity and competition have
been recognized by the Chinese government. There were four administering organizations of INs rather
than one. The number of telecom players, which were allowed to link their networks with those abroad,
rose to nine in December 2000. The State Council recognized existing stakeholders instead of forcing
Internet activity into one centralized organization. This is an important indication that China’s political
process is not monolithic and that policy is a product of contending interests, not simply the political
interests of the CCP. Further, the regulations permit authorization of new INs in the future, which may
intensify the competition. There is no specific effort to centralize the ownership of ANs. Many different
ANs can exist and compete.
6
ChinaNet (China Public Computer Network, zhongguo gongyong jisuanji wang), which was originally
based on the National Computing & Networking Facilities of China (NCFC), the first high-speed network
funded by the State Development Planning Commission and the World Bank, and now is featured as tiered
structure, high speed Internet connection, and multi-homing. ChinaNet was first operated by the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). After the merging of the MPT with the MEI into the Ministry of
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reserved exclusively for educational and research institutions, CERNet and CSTNet 7 .
All these networks are state-owned, in line with the government’s insistence that
the country’s communications infrastructure remain solidly under government control.
Their overall structure reveals the attempt to create a “designer” competition cut to
patterns set by state specifications. Which company may offer what services in which
markets has been the subject of a great deal of bureaucratic politicking. Government
moves to restrict the competitors of China Telecom, 8 the state-owned monopoly, are
more likely to be economically motivated than what some foreign observers suggest as
being ideologically inspired.
In addition to the control of Internet access, China has promulgated numerous
pieces of Internet-related legislation for the last five years, covering a variety of areas. In

Information Industry (MII), the operator of China’s national public telephone network, China Telecom,
which is under the jurisdiction of the MII, has run ChinaNet. Often referred to as the 163 Network after the
number users dial to gain access to it, ChinaNet, covering across the country, linking with more than 600
cities, and embracing a registered collection of 3 million users (System integration – Merging of 163/169
Network), is also the effective international gatekeeper by virtue of the fact that all networks must go
through China Telecom’s international telecommunications access. ChinaGBN (Golden Bridge Network,
zhongguo jinqiao wang), provides the commercial alternative to ChinaNet. Currently run by JiTong
Communications, a state-owned company formerly linked with the now abolished MEI, ChinaGBN has
focused primarily on the corporate market.
7
CERNet (China’s Education and Research Network, zhongguo jiaoyu he keyan jisuanji wang,
http://www.net.edu.cn) is the principle academic network centered upon Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua
University and links together the universities, schools and education and research institutes via
CHINAPAC (X.25). Its link to the Internet was primarily through the NCFC, and switched to Sprint 128k
bps line in May 1995. CERNet plays an indispensable role in connecting the Chinese education system to
the outside world and facilitates exchange and communication among academics and educators in China
and their counterparts overseas. It is still technically distinct from the main public network such that
websites blocked by the government on ChinaNet will often be accessible from CERNet. CSTNet (Chinese
Scientific and Technology Network, zhongguo keji wang, http://www.cstnet.net.cn/gb/index.html) is
similar to CERNet, but significantly smaller in scale: it connects subsidiaries of the CAS. It is also based on
NCFC backbone.
8
Since 1994, China Telecom has made enormous investments in developing two national networks,
namely, 163 Network and 169 Network, also called China Public Multimedia Network, is more often
known by its dial-up access number, 169, like 163 Network. It is an attempt by the government to build a
China-specific content platform for domestic users. Effectively, an American Online style platform, it does
not provide direct access to the Internet, but rather creates a Chinese intranet, allowing the government to
provide cheaper access and Chinese-language content.
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2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online business operation,
information and news services, and Internet security were issued (Cheung, 2003, pp.7982). 9 The rules issued since 2000 fall into four following major categories such as
regulations governing the Internet infrastructure, regulations dealing with crimes related
to the Internet, regulations monitoring Internet Services Providers (ISPs) and Internet
Content Providers (ICPs), Internet users and online content, and regulations dealing with
domain names. Although computer crimes and Internet security, 10 and the issues of
domain names are also two of primary concerns on the list of China’s cyber agendas 11 ,
regulations monitoring ISPs and ICPs, Internet users and online content have drawn
particular attention from observers outside China, and have been widely criticized by
Western commentators, journalists and politicians who are concerned with the issues of
9

For example, the Regulations on Secrets Management for International Networking of Computer
Information System (jisuanji xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding), issued on January 25,
2000 but applied retroactively from January 1, 2000, should be considered as legislation that specifically
and most comprehensively addressed problems of prohibition of disclosure of state secrets through the
Internet in China (China Legal Change, 2002). The Article 1 set the issue of security protection on the
Internet under the broad umbrella of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of State
Secrets (State Secrets Law), “in order to strengthen the administration of maintenance of secrets in the
international networking of computer information system,” which was defined as interconnection between
computer information systems inside China and foreign computer information systems in order to achieve
international exchange of information, and “to ensure the security of state secrets.” The regulations further
clearly distinguished the responsibilities of secrecy authorities at two levels. The national secrecy
authorities are in charge of secrets preservation work for the international networking of computer systems
on a nationwide basis. The secrecy authorities at country level and above are in charge of the work within
their administrative districts. Central national organs are in charge of, or should guide, the secrets
preservation work falling within the scope of their authority.
10
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the number of computer crimes has risen dramatically. According to
the People’s Daily, hacker crimes in China increased at an annual rate of 30% by 1998 (12 October, 1998).
In March 1997, the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the country’s criminal code, Criminal Law
of the People’s Republic of China, with three articles, Article 285, Article 286, and Article 287, that
included computer hacking and fraud as serious crimes. The information warfare involving international
security, called “the smokeless war” (Hughes, 2003), between China and other countries, such as the
United States, Taiwan and Japan, has become a central theme in the Chinese military.
11
China entered the Domain Name System (DNS) at a comparatively late stage. It was not until 1990 that
the system of “country code Top Level Domains” (ccTLD) “.cn” was delegated by Jonathan Postel to
Professor Qian Tianbai, then manager and administrator of the CANet. In recent years, cybersquatting
cases have emerged in China, forcing the Chinese government to put more efforts to strengthen its
management of Chinese domain name disputes. As a result, the Provisional Rules for Chinese Domain
Name Dispute Resolution was adopted on November 7, 2000.
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censorship and human rights. The attempts of the Chinese government to interfere with
network communications have frequently been viewed as an infringement on the freedom
of information considered a basic human right in Western societies (e.g., Woesler, 2002).
China’s regulations on Internet content involve such two major concerns as
political and social stability and culture values, apart from the restrictions relative to state
security. As early as in 1996, as mentioned above, the PRC Interim Regulations
prohibited individuals “to produce, retrieve, duplicate, and disseminate information
prejudicial to public order or pornographic materials” (Ministry of Information Industry
a). The Internet content boundaries in China were clearly and systematically marked
since the PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information
Networks and the Internet was promulgated in 1997. 12 The statute, criticized as
“repressive” (Freedom of expression and the Internet in China), has become one of the
major sources used to accuse China of restricting freedom of expression.

2.4. Internet Censorship and Scholarly Concerns
The major noticeable turning point implied in the Regulations on Secrets
Management for International Networking of Computer Information System (jisuanji
12

The Article 5 of the 1997 statute stated nine forbidden zones of information that “no unit or individual
may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit,” including:
1. Inciting to resist or violate the Constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative
regulations;
2. Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;
3. Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
4. Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of nationalities;
5. Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society;
6. Promoting feudal superstitions, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terrorism, or
instigating others to criminal activity;
7. Openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people;
8. Injuring the reputation of state organs;
9. Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations (Feiyu Net).
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xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding) issued in 2000 was that the Chinese
government strategically encouraged Chinese ISPs, ICPs, and individual persons to
censor themselves. This mode of self-regulation and self-censorship (Tsui, 2001) at each
level is said to be a characteristics of China’s cyberspace (Hachigian, 2001; Hartford,
2000; Sinclair, 2002). Article 8 stipulates that the principle of “responsibility is borne by
the person who placed it on the network” as a basis for regulating the revelation of state
secrets on the Internet. This did not, however, exempt each ISP’s obligation to monitor.
Information provided to or released on Web sites must undergo a security inspection and
approval. Inspection and approval should be carried out by related departments. Units
that provide the information should establish a security system for information
examination and approval in accordance with certain work procedures.
Under Article 10, ISPs, BBS, chat rooms or network news group organizers were
required to set up their own management mechanisms to assist in ensuring that no state
secrets were transmitted on the Internet by their users. The regulations also demanded
that Internet access providers should provide instruction about protecting secrets as an
important part of the Internet related technical training. Agreements and user rules signed
between the controllers of national trunk lines and Internet access providers, and between
Internet access providers and users should stipulate clearly that “state laws on protecting
secrets must be obeyed and that state secrets shall not be leaked.” Internet access
providers and users should assist department in charge of protecting secrets in
“investigating illegal actions that divulge state secrets on the Internet.” Under such legal
restrictions and driven by economic incentives, Internet-related companies in China
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practice “a high degree of self-censorship” (Tsui, 2001, p.27), 13 which is perceived as
“the most effective way” for the Chinese government to control the information flow on
the Internet (Hachigian, 2002a, p.48).
In addition to extensive regulations, the Chinese government has also
implemented various technical measures to achieve its goal of Internet censorship. For
instance, the Beijing Telecom servers are known among Chinese Internet users as the
“Great Firewall” (fanghuo qiang, a direct translation from English). 14 The function of the
“firewall” is not only to block unauthorized access to Chinese government or corporate
websites but also to block access by Chinese citizens to “undesirable” foreign websites.
As the Chinese proverb says, “walls have ears!” This centralized approach has made it
possible for the government to censor the Internet broadly. In 1996 alone, the government
blocked access to more than 100 websites outside China. 15 By the end of 2005, Chinese
police had closed 598 websites in a crackdown on pornography launched in March 2005
(China reins in pornographic websites, 2005). With somewhat random choices of

13

For example, news portals such as Sina, NetEase, Sohu and Yahoo try to stay clear from politically
sensitive issues in general. American companies also keep in the same line to gain the trust and cooperation
of the government. At the government’s request, Microsoft Corp. shut down the Internet journal of a
Chinese blogger that discussed politically sensitive issues in December 2005. On the one hand, noncompliance with the government means no business in China; on the other hand, there is a big demand for
filtering software to filter out a wide range of sensitive materials, from pornography to websites containing
content related to Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political
parties, or a variety of ant-Communist movements (See OpenNet Initiative, 2005, for the detailed
information on the websites that have been filtered out during the period of 2004-2005), and the market for
such kind of software was expected to become a billion dollar industry in 2004 (Silva, 2001). It is ironic
that, as Wacker (2003) pointed out, while the Western media frequently criticize China for Internet
censorship, “it is Western firms that are supplying the technological means which enable China to carry out
surveillance” (p.69).
14
A more popular phrase for it is wangguan, literally “NetWall” – a name harking back to an earlier effort
to repel foreign invaders.
15
The sites of some American news media, such as the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Post, the Voice of America, and CNN, the Taiwan Government Information Office, and some
human rights groups, the US-based China News Digest (CND), and pornographic sources, such as Playboy,
were blocked. See http://amarillonet.com/news/china9996.html for more information.
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blocking certain websites and setting up examples to intimidate the public, 16 the
government has been able to reach the effect of “killing the chicken to scare the
monkeys,” as the Chinese proverb suggests (Tsui, 2001, p.29), and nurture an attitude of
“voluntary” self-censorship among users, a “firewall within one’s head,” as the People’s
Daily puts it (Wacker, 2003, p.68).
Scholars frequently link the censorship practices of the Chinese government to the
political implications of the Internet. They point out, those who are computer literate and
Internet users belong to the well-educated group, “with its better than average ties to
foreign people and information sources,” and represent “a potentially dangerous source of
opposition and dissent” (Mueller & Tan, 1997, p.95). The Chinese government might
lose its information monopoly on the Internet, a mass medium that can challenge state
hegemony over the distribution of information and ideologies (e.g., Kalathil & Boas,
2001; Taubman, 1998; Woesler, 2002). With new technology means, ordinary people are
able to be more exposed to the Western ideas and information that was banned by the
government before (e.g., Hong & Huang, 2005), and have more freedom of speech and
more access to platforms for discussion of the issues regarding policies and public good,
thus constituting a threat to the authoritarian regime and weakening the state power (e.g.,
Hachigian, 2002b). Especially with the number of Internet users and criticisms of a
variety of subjects increasing, the demands for a more competent political system will be
also increasing, and an “Internet-driven political revolution” is expected (Peters, 2002,
p.106).
16

An increasing number of individuals have fallen victim to the government’s crack-down on “illegal” use
of the Internet. The cases of Lin Hai, Qi Yanchen, Huang Qi, Du Daobin, and Li Dawei are several good
examples of intimidation at work.
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Yet, such arguments overlook the other side of the statistics of Internet users in
China. To put things in perspective, Internet users are not representative of China on the
whole. 111 million Internet users still only account for about 8.5 percent of the whole
Chinese population. Users aged under 35 account for 81.3 percent of all the Internet users
(Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China). Moreover, political
use of the Internet has not been reported so far as the mainstream in the Chinese cyber
society. For example, in a recent survey conducted in the five major cities of Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha, 90 percent of young adult reported that
they go online mainly for games, although reading online news was overall the most
frequently mentioned usage of the Internet, accounting for 65.9 percent of the survey
respondents (The Chinese Academic of Social Sciences, 2005). In addition, some
scholars also have suggested, it is possible that “stability may be further reinforced” if
online content helps with consensus building within the parameters set by the authorities
(Harwit & Clark, 2001, p.406)
A few scholars approach the issue of Internet censorship in China from a
perspective other than a politically-preoriented one. Wang (1999) pointed out, the reasons
for taming the net in Asian countries “are not merely because of its ‘polluting influence,’
but also because it is full of decadent ‘Western’ values, something the leaders of former
colonies are eager to keep out in order to maintain their own cultural integrity and
autonomy. Simply put, it is a matter of gaining control of what is coming into and
happening within a nation’s territory; or more briefly, a matter of sovereignty” (p.283).
Foster and Goodman (2000) also acknowledged such concerns of Chinese leaders who
fear that “massive exposure to Western culture and language will undermine China’s
20

culture and language, particularly among its youth” (p.32). In addition to political
considerations, the policy-making process in China, a country with a cultural tradition
that values human community and order more highly than individual rights, is also
directed by cultural concerns (Wu, 1996, p.707). “In fact, social (and cultural) norms play
a major part in explaining Chinese attempts to regulate the internet” (Ang, 2003).

2.5. Culture Matters: An Alternative Perspective
Exploring the deep-rooted cultural and social backgrounds upon which the
Internet regulations are built may provide us a thorough understanding of Internet content
restrictions in China.
Traditionally, China’s cultural beliefs associate with its own dimensions of power,
authority and legitimacy. Confucian culture, the dominating one in China, is a typical one
of collectivism in that the interests of the collective must not be challenged by lesser
groups and individuals. In such a culture, intermediate and ultimate ends are closely
connected, and conceived of as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without
threatening the whole. Associated with it, the government has to proceed on the basis of
harmony rather than conflict. Rulers should be paternalistic in a political system. Most
Chinese start with the ideal that all power should emanate from above, from the center,
from a single supreme power (Pye, 1985). Most Chinese leaders believe that diversity
and a pluralistic power structure lead to social disorder and do not foster more creativity
or ensure faster modernization (p.183).
Since 1949, the CCP has reinforced collectivism in the belief that collectivism is
the highest noble moral of communist ideology. This ideology sees humans as social
21

beings. Social historical conditions and social relationships constrain an individual’s
needs. Only through maintaining public order, safety and benefits, can one receive a true
personal benefit – a country’s public and personal benefits are fundamentally the same.
The Party inherited, consciously or unconsciously, the traditional administrative style,
whereas the majority of Chinese comfortably accepted Party authorities as in the past.
Using propaganda and organized study, the Party has spread the collectivist spirit by way
of real life models, such as Lei Feng in Mao’s time, Li Xiangqun and Li Suli in the
reform age. Whether culturally or politically, Chinese collectivism inhabits a hierarchical
structure; thus it appears vertical. To maintain the system, social stability on the grounds
of collective interests and harmony is the key. The preoccupation with preserving social
stability is a perennial aspect of one-party rule. The Party slogan “one hand soft, one
hand hard (yi shou ruan, yi shou ying)” after the reform and open door policy typically
mirrors the CCP’s strong desire to simultaneously build two sides of socialist civilization
– socialist materialistic civilization, which ensures its credibility by promoting economic
reforms and market openings, thus getting people prosperous, and socialist spiritual
civilization (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe), 17 which is aimed at preserving the
quintessence of traditional culture and maintaining the social stability, thus safeguarding
the Party’s grip on political power.
Reformers are giving up the effort to unify idea, instead, encouraging greater
intellectual and cultural freedom under the slogan of “let a hundred flowers blossom and
17

The socialist spiritual civilization concept is vague and complex, but one high-ranking propaganda cadre
explained in the interview with the author, working as a journalist with the Xinhua News Agency, in 1996
that its basic components include putting the collective good above individual self-interest, esteeming
education and science, and supporting the production of such public goods as a clean environment, social
order, and refined art.
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let a hundred schools of thought contend (baihua qifang, baijia zhengming)” (Harding,
1987, p.225; White, 1993, p.152). In Deng Xiaoping’s China (1978-1997), 18 great new
things had been happening: the emergence, and expansion of the scope, of tolerance, the
decline of ideocracy, the advocacy of “plural truths” by intellectuals, skepticism of
unanimity and praise of plurality and dissidents, the emerging competing ideas (new
constructed humanist Marxism, neo-Confucianism and Liberalism), the state’s neutral
attitude towards different life-styles, and the reinterpretation of the traditional Chinese
culture as being of a plural nature.
Unlike in Mao Zedong’s time (1949-1976) when ideology was a major means for
maintaining political and social integration, the Chinese leaders in post-Mao era
introduce a legal line: any dissident who uses ideas or values to mobilize people will be
prohibited in public; otherwise, dissenting views are tolerated in the private sphere, which
has become an implicit rule of the Chinese government. There have been limitations on
tolerance. As Deng said clearly:
Can we permit such an open call for intervention in China’s internal affairs? Can
we tolerate the kind of freedom of speech which flagrantly contravene the
principles of our Constitution? (Deng, 1983, p.181)
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Since Deng had made valuable contributions during the long revolutionary years, had waged a resolute
struggle against the Gang of Four and had already achieved notable success in his efforts to restore order,
he had earned enormous prestige in the Party and among the people. In July 1977, at the Third Plenary
Session of the Tenth Central Committee, Deng was reinstated as Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee,
Vice-Premier of the State Council, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General
Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. In March 1978 he was elected Chairman of the Fifth national
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In December 1978, the Third
Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee was convened, marking a fundamental turning
point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. At a working conference of the Central Committee
held before the Session, Deng delivered a speech which turned out to be the keynote of the Third Plenary.
In this speech he explained in detail that people should emancipate their minds and seek truth from facts.
Deng stressed that the Chinese people should be dedicated and steadfast in pursuit of socialist
modernization and not let themselves be hindered by interference from any quarter. This was a fundamental
rectification of the political line, and it ushered in a new era of reform and opening to the outside world.
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The downfall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Europe in the
1990s convinced the Chinese intellectuals that a “shock therapy” or “big bang” was not
applicable to China, a clear example of reflexivity at work. The Chinese were convinced
that democracy and a free-market economy could not be introduced without having the
proper institutions in place, otherwise changes would result in chaos as was apparent in
Russia and Eastern Europe. Rather, a safe and stable authoritarian government is
preferred, signifying the Hobbesian state where personal freedom is exchanged for a
sense of safety and security of the greater whole. Meanwhile, the open door policy 19 and
Westernization also have brought on some negative consequences, such as the moral
maze of “money worship (baijin zhuyi),” in the Chinese society. The Chinese leadership
and intellectuals point to the moral decline of the West as manifested by drug
consumption, suicide, divorce, and increasing crime. The impacts could bring the country
down. Asian values were the antidote to all that was wrong with Westernization. As some
scholars have pointed out, traditionally based Chinese values, such as the morally
autonomous individual, the absolute just ruler, the responsibility of the government for
people’s welfare, and the ordinary person’s responsibility for the fate of the nation, have
served as the positive elements in Confucian culture (Nathan, 1990, p.308-11, 384).
Faced with social and political problems brought by the reforms, the reformers
insisted on a socialist spiritual civilization that is very much traditional in the sense that it
appeals to Confucian ideas of family, general love and loyalty. Also, they emphasized the
19

Unlike Mao Zedong, who promoted the radical politics-oriented and self-sustained policy, Deng started
his economic reforms in 1978 by advocating China to open her door to the rest of the world, which is called
the “open door policy,” including earmarking four southern cities as Special Economic Zones (SEZs),
which were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, to take advantage of their geographic proximity to
overseas Chinese communities such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau and for their vast overseas
connections. Foreign investment was encouraged and new factories were established in these SEZs.
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balance between the necessity of plural ideas and of discipline. These ideas are believed
to play a part in integrating political life. One of the important parts of building socialist
spiritual civilization strongly promoted by the CCP is to rebuild “public morality
(gongde),” which has two meanings in Chinese. One refers to the general moral
requirement in the public life such as the rules of no smoking on bus or at a gasoline
stand. Another meaning refers to the “Five Lovings (wu’ai),” which are counted as loving
motherland, loving people, loving science, loving work, and loving socialism. In the
1980s and 90s, the “Five Lovings” were considered as the most basic guideline in
Chinese spiritual civilization reconstructions. As Huntington (1991) wrote, in Confucian
societies, “[h]armony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition.
The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central value” (p.24).
While being committed to rebuild and promote the morality norms with some
political flavor, the central government has gone to great efforts to protect the Chinese
society from the negative social and political impacts from outside the country. Its two
major concerns are “bourgeois liberalization (zichan jieji ziyouhua),” such as assertions
of the superiority of capitalism over socialism, of democracy over the “people’s
democratic dictatorship,” and of foreign countries over China, and “spiritual pollution
(jingshen wuran),” such as excessive sex, violence, and superstition in the symbolic
environment, which are perceived in the view of the Chinese leadership as big threats to
the social stability and its legitimacy in China. This can be clearly reflected in the
injunction that Deng Xiaoping issued to the Twelfth Central Committee of the CCP on
October 12, 1983:
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Don’t think that a little spiritual pollution doesn’t matter much, that it’s nothing to
be alarmed at. Some of its ill effects may not be immediately apparent. But unless
we take it seriously and adopt firm measures right now to prevent its spread,
many people will fall prey to it and be led astray, with grave consequences. In the
long run, this question will determine what kind of people will succeed us to carry
on the cause and what the future of the Party and state will be (Deng, 1987, p.36).
In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, apparently apolitical communications can be
loaded with subtle political implications whose consequences are only visible in the long
run. In the March 1996 issue of Qiushi – the Party’s authoritative ideological journal –
one theorist argued against more lax and liberal comrades that the arts can be equally as
important as news in the formation of people’s political attitudes, even if the arts
typically are less centrally concerned with politics:
When ideology is mentioned, some people always fix their eyes on the core,
naively thinking that nothing serious will come of it so long as the core is not
touched upon. We cannot but say that this is ossified point of view. Content and
form, and contents and levels can infiltrate and transform one into the other … In
this regard, certain, Western political bigwigs are much wiser than some of our
comrades. They said: As long as the youth of the country to be overturned have
learned our language and dances and have a weakness for our movies and
television programs, they will, sooner or later, accept our concepts of value.
Unfortunately, this remark has been proved by what happened in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe (Liu, 1996).
Obviously, the Chinese leadership has clearly recognized the dialectical
relationships between quantitative change and quality change, and does not want the
country to be overturned, politically and culturally, under the influence of Western pop
culture and political propaganda. With the exponential growth of the Internet, the new
multi-medium, the Chinese government has been more and more concerned with the
potential problems that the Internet may generate. The question regarding the restrictions
on Internet content is not “whether,” but rather “how.” The leaders decided that the
nation needs to retain a singular course, not affected by unpredictable factors. The
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collective social order and behavior are superior to individual thoughts, which stems from
the Confucius tradition. The state controls the media generally “in order to foster the
values of group and hierarchy” (Winfield, Mizuno & Beaudoin, 2000).
As the history of any kind of media in China has indicated, China’s Internet
content regulations have strong traditional cultural backgrounds, and current social and
political needs, which are reflected in the strong moralistic orientation and political
utilization of the regulations. The nine boundaries of Internet content 20 have been
reiterated in a series of subsequent regulations formulated by different departments in
China, which implies the uncompromising standpoint of the Chinese government on
some principle issues. 21

2.6. Conclusion
Overall, Internet growth, rather than simply control, is the Chinese government’s
primary objective, as has been demonstrated through the early 1990s in basic
telecommunications. Clear evidence of this is, for example, the fact that in 1999 to
expand access to the Internet, Chinese authorities twice cut the fees that ISPs pay to
access telecommunications lines. The Internet development is the key to China’s

20

Refer to Footnote 12.
Refer to the Article 57 in the Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dianxin tiaoli), the State Council’s Order No.291 issued on October 11,
2000, signed by the former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry
b); the Article 15 in the Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (Hulianwang xinxi fuwu
guanli banfa), the State Council’s Order No.292, signed by former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25,
2000 and issued on October 11, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry c); the Article 1, 2, 3, 4 in the
Decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Safeguarding Internet Safety
(Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu weihu hulianwang anquan de guiding, Guoxin China Law Net); and
the Article 9 in Regulations for Managing Internet Electronic Bulletin Services (Hulianwang dianzi
gonggao fuwu guanli guiding), the Order 3 of the MII, approved on October 8, 2000 and issued on
November 6, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry d).
21
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informationzation and economic modernization, through which the government wants to
build a powerful socialist country. The promotion of Internet-driven economic
development has become another proactive strategy to increase the regime’s popularity
and political legitimacy, in that the state responds to the challenge of economic
liberalization by preemptively allowing certain forms of political liberalization while
taking credit for economic prosperity.
Yet, the picture of China’s Internet is of a rather mixed character, showing that
the Chinese government is struggling with walking on a balance beam, which requires a
balance between economic benefits and political challenges, between maximizing the
gain from the flow of economic information and protecting China’s networks and
national security from attack, between opening to the outside world and maintaining the
independence of Chinese nationality and preserving its own culture and values, between
collective harmony and individual interests, and between freedom of expression and the
need to protect the public from harmful materials, such as pornography. To the Chinese
leadership, the situation of Internet development in China is just like what the Chinese
word for “crisis” (weiji), literally meaning “crisis and opportunity.”
Hartford (2000) pointed out, “Smart authoritarians do not try to control
everything; they focus on controlling what really matters … keeping the vast majority
from politically sensitive areas, and preventing the nonconforming small minority from
organizing enough to mount a challenge.” To meet the political and social challenges, the
Chinese government has been committed to building a coherent regulatory regime and
formulating systematic regulations to better control the Internet. In general, China’s
Internet policy and regulation follow precedents set by its treatment of other media,
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which can be described as an attempt to balance gradual commercialization and
modernization with controls protecting the CCP’s political dominance and the general
guideline that “stability is the topmost priority” (Foster & Goodman, 2000, p.26). The
policy is designed to allow development to proceed while maintaining a residual capacity
to prevent the use of media to mount direct, organized threats to the regime. As what Lin
Quan, secretary-general of China’s State Science and Technology Commission told a
conference: official censorship would not be allowed to stop the growth of net use
(FlorCruz, 1998). The key here is how to handle the scope and scale of control.
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CHAPTER III.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:
FRAMING AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS
The past 15 years have seen numerous studies regarding the Internet in China.
Yet, as stated earlier, only one study has been found to provide a preliminary
investigation of newspapers’ treatment of China’s Internet by looking at the coverage in
the China Daily, the only national English newspaper in China, and four U.S. newspapers
(McMillan & Hwang, 2002). The researchers categorized their descriptive investigation
based on three topics drawn from the literature of studying the Internet in China, such as
business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions.
Such categorization, which reflects scholarly interests in China’s Internet from
various disciplines, is meaningful to sort out the topics of related news stories in a general
way. Yet it might be too general for a framing analysis, for the core idea of framing is
selecting and highlighting certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, while leaving
out others (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). In addition, although the authors
acknowledged the importance of the media framing of an international story in terms of
people’s understanding the world outside their own countries, the study did not
theoretically interpret how framing is related to media content construction, and why
differences in news coverage may exist across the countries in question.
The current study hopes to fill this gap by introducing framing and media content
theories into a cross-cultural analysis of newspaper treatments of China’s Internet in
mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Some cultural concepts are also introduced from the work of Hofstede and subsequent
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cross-cultural research in the field of social behavior. Instead of looking at general
aspects of China’s Internet, this study centers around the specific issues frequently
addressed in scholarly discussions, such as the Internet diffusion and development in
China (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), Internet use
(e.g., Bu & Guo, 2001; Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Zhou, 2004a; Zhu & He, 2002), issues of
Internet censorship, regulation and policy (e.g., Cullen & Choy, 1999; Hachigian, 2001,
2002a, 2002b; Hartford, 2000; Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Lacharite, 2002; Tan, 1999; Tsui,
2001; Wu, 1996; Zhou, 2004b), hackers and Internet security (e.g., Deibert, 2002;
Hughes, 2003; Thomas, 2001), and the political, economical, cultural and social
consequences and impacts of the Internet (e.g., Bu, & Guo, 2001; Chen, 1999).

3.1. The Hierarchical Model of Shoemaker and Reese
Research exploring various forces shaping media content has identified a broad
array of sources, ranging from news professionals and gatekeepers (e.g., Bass, 1969;
Bleske, 1991; Donohew, 1967; Epstein, 1973; Gans, 1979; Lewin, 1947; Peterson, 1979;
Sigal, 1973; White, 1950), to corporate ownership (e.g., Campaine, & Gomery, 2000;
Einstein, 2004; Herman, & Chomsky, 1988), to cultural and ideological factors (e.g.,
Fishman, 1980; Peterson, 1979; Shoemaker, & Reese, 1991, 1996). Scholarship in media
content analysis assumes that multiple and varying realities are constructed through
discourse (e.g., Berger, & Luckmann, 1966; Gieber, 1964; Goffman, 1974).
Summarizing previous studies, Shoemaker and Reese (1991, 1996) suggested a
multi-level hierarchical model of influences on media content. The model consists of the
following five levels: individual, media routines, organization, extramedia, and ideology
31

Ideology
Extramedia
Organization
Media Routines
Individual

Figure 3.1. The Shoemaker and Reese Hierarchical Model of Influences
on Media Content 22

(see Figure 3.1). They argued that each level has its own effects on content, which is
limited by each hierarchically superior level. In their model, the authors placed
“individual communication workers” at the center, which includes such influences as the
personal attitudes and orientations of media workers. Then the circle expands outward in
concentric rings with the next level being the routines of media work (i.e., deadlines, the
beat system, notions of newsworthiness, official sources). The next circle includes
influences on content at the organizational level (i.e., corporate policies, political
endorsements, editorial positions). The next broader category in the model is extramedia
influences, like the effect of the economic environment, the marketplace, cultural and
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Figure was recreated based on Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p.64.
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national variables, and public relations activities. The broadest level includes influences
that occur due to ideology and societal level factors, such as societal definitions of
deviance and normalcy or the influence of power centers within society.
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) proposed building a more cohesive theory of media
content, one that synthesizes “what is already known about the influences on media
content into a more systematic set of interrelated statements about the relationships
between media content and the influences on it” (p.261). They also suggested analyses
that offer multiple perspectives of the influences of content, such that each level of
influence is linked to or combined with another level of influence. They argued that
combining the influences on content in media studies research offers a richer, more
complete picture of the role of mass media in society (p.271).
A few years later, Shoemaker, along with several colleagues, tested one
hypothesis suggested by the “hierarchy of influences model” – the effects of individual
influences versus media routine influences (Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, & Wrigley,
2001). The study examined whether newspaper gatekeeping is influenced more by forces
on the media routine level, or by forces or “characteristics” of individual staffers. The
authors expected that routines would exert more control on content than individual
forces, based on Shoemaker and Reese’s suggestion that unless individuals hold
significant power within the organization, they exert minimal influence on content (1996,
p.102). The study found that characteristics of individual journalists had no effect on how
prominently Congressional bills were covered in the newspapers, but the routine force of
newsworthiness had a positive effect on the amount of coverage. The data showed
consistency with the Shoemaker and Reese hierarchical model, in that influences on
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media content occur on more complex and interwined levels than Lewin (1947) and
White’s (1950) more simplistic notion of gatekeeping as a series of individual decisions.
The tests in the study of Shoemaker et al. remain at the lower levels in the
hierarchical model. Few studies have been found to empirically test the significance of
the factors at the higher levels, although they may be more important in shaping media
content, especially when comparisons across different societies are involved. One of the
major difficulties to deal with is how to measure and test the relationships between the
factors at the macro levels and media content. Therefore, one of the purposes of this
study is to further this aspect of this research stream by focusing on the influence of
factors in Shoemaker and Reese’s model at the ideological level, which vary with
political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, on news coverage and frames.

3.2. Media Framing
3.2.1. An Overall Review
The concept of framing has been developed as a tool for analysis in various fields,
including psychology and sociology (e.g., Gonos, 1997; Taylor, 2000), business
management (e.g., Goldratt, 1990; Watzkawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), decisionmaking (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and negotiation (e.g., Neale & Bazerman,
1985; Pinkley, 1990). The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman’s work (1974),
which defined frames as embodiments of “the principles of organization which govern
[social] events.” Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) were two of the earliest scholars who
introduced framing to American media studies. They used the concept of framing as a
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tool to understand, in Tuchman’s words, “news as a social construction and a social
resource” (Tuchman, 1978, p.14). From the late 1980s onward, with Entman’s (1993)
leading promotion, framing research has been transformed from a method of media
content analysis to a theoretical concept or even a theory in the making. However, the
concept is still not clearly conceptualized. The concept seems to be, as Smith (1997)
pointed out, “many different things to different researchers because of the variety of
potential locations and level of specificity” (p.2). 23
A large scholarship has qualified framing in a variety of ways. Yet the core idea
of the concept is related to the fundamental process of meaning construction in which
certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, or certain ideas, themes and experiences
are highlighted or drawn attention to, and others are left out. As Entman (1993)
suggested, framing entails selection and salience. “To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52, emphasis in original). Recently,
Reese (2001) provided a synthesized definition, that is, “Frames are organizing principles
that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully
structure the social world,” and framing is concerned with “the way interests,
communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding
the world” (p.11). Carragee and Roefs (2004) pointed out that most studies in framing
have focused on the ways news stories articulate frames. “Although specific

23

See Yioutas and Segvic (2003) for discussions about the sources that cause conceptualizing framing
problematic.
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characterizations of frames differ, meaningful definitions emphasize the ways in which
frames organize news stories and other discourses by their patterns of selection,
emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion” (pp.215-6. See, for example, Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Reese, 2001).
Scheufele (1999, 2000) identified four distinct processes, which may be examined
in framing research: frame-building, frame-setting, individual-level outcomes of framing,
and a feedback loop from audiences to journalists. The middle two processes, in which
media frames are usually taken as the independent variable, are related to the effects of
media frames. A majority of framing studies have focused on these two processes, in
which the impacts of media frames on audience frames, and the links between audience
frames and individual information processing or political action are examined (Scheufele,
2000, pp.307-8). Researchers have shown intense interests in examining framing in terms
of audience effects (e.g., Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Iyengar, 1987, 1991; Iyengar &
Simon, 1991; McLeod, & Detenber, 1999; Pan, & Kosicki, 1993; Price, Tewksbury, &
Powers, 1997; Rhee, 1997; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 2001; Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach,
Zubric, 2004; Shen, 2004; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999; Zillmann, Chen,
Knobloch, & Callison, 2004), leading to Carragee and Roefs’(2004) criticism that
framing has been reduced to the study of media effects.
In contrast, the other two processes identified by Scheufele -- frame-building and
feedback loop from audiences to journalists -- have largely been marginalized in framing
research, although researchers have conceptually recognized and examined extrinsic and
intrinsic factors influencing the production and selection of news, as discussed above.
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Issues, such as why certain frames dominate news texts or discourses and others do not,
are virtually ignored (Carragee, & Roefs, 2004, p.220).
Based on previous research, Scheufele (1999) suggested “at least five factors may
potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue: social norms and values,
organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic
routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists” (p.109). Yet framing
studies have not clearly related media frames to those factors in terms of empirical tests,
or as Scheufele (1999) put it, “no evidence has yet been systematically collected about
how various factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing” (p.109).
Methodologically, researchers also tend to ignore the possibilities that these factors can
have combined and interactive effects on media content.

3.2.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process
Concentrating on the process of frame building, I propose an interactive model, in
which the interplaying roles of the major elements are considered (see Figure 3.2). Media
place in the center of the model, in which journalists, as primary actors, build a variety of
media frames. In the process of journalists’ building media frames to present and
interpret objective reality, the factors at the different levels summarized in the Shoemaker
and Reese model are assumed to play major roles. Through the presentations of media
frames, objective reality is translated into constructed reality, which is assumed to have
an influence on taking shape of individual frames cognitively in the long term, while
individual frames would in turn adjust and modify constructed reality with the synthetic
effects of individuals’ direct observation on objective reality and the factors that the
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Figure 3.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process

circles represent. In the other direction, individual frames formed in the long term, in
which ideological, cultural backgrounds, prior knowledge of constructed reality, and
personal experience come into play, are assumed to play a role in how individual
journalists working for media perceive objective reality and build media frames, and their
further perceiving and understanding media frames. In the long term, both media frames
and individual frames would influence how individual journalists perceive and construct
objective reality.
The reasons I propose such a model here are twofold. First, in previous research
on frame building, the interactions between media frames and individual frames, and the
roles of constructed reality, such as its direct influence on individual frames and its
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indirect influence on media frames, have more or less been ignored. Second, I would
assume that the Shoemaker and Reese model, if examined alone, could explain only a
certain portion of variations in media frames. With the interactions between media frames
and individual frames and the roles of constructed reality added in, the residuals might be
explained more, although the current study may not be able to address all the elements in
the model.
The current study only looks at a part of the process of frame building, from
objective reality through media, which are under the overarching influences of multiple
factors posed in the Shoemaker and Reese model, to media frames. Attention is paid
particularly to the factors at the higher levels, by looking at the relationships between the
framing of the Internet in China and such factors as ideology and political system, social
norms and cultural values, which theoretically should be examined and tested at a crosscultural level. The study aims to determine to what extent the variants of media frames
could be explained by the combination of effects of political and cultural factors.
Specifically, objective reality in this study is the Internet in China, which consists
of many issues such as Internet use, Internet censorship, Internet business, Internet
security, and the impacts of the Internet in China. The term framing refers to the selection
of various issues related to the Internet in China and the process of presenting those
issues. Different types of news frames are the results of the process.
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3.2.3. Types of Generic News Frames
Accordingly, news frames, as a result of framing, refer to the generic ways to
present certain issues concerning China’s Internet in news stories (see Table 3.1), 24
consisting of actors, operational processes and evaluations on actors and what have been
done. A frame in this context is an interpretative tool that journalists use to make sense of
the Internet in China. Previous framing studies (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Luther & Zhou,
2005; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000) have identified at least six of what de Vreese, Peter, and Semetko
(2001) term generic news frames, such as human interest, responsibility, morality,
economic consequences, conflict, and leadership. Such generic news frames might not be
determinative in attaining a detailed and thorough understanding of media interpretations
of subjects or issues in question. Yet they can help framing researchers get around the
limitations brought by the ad hoc frames, referred to by McCombs and Ghanem (2001) as
“frames defined specifically for a single study with little or no attention to explicating
either their basic characteristics or theoretical context” (p.79). This will make it possible
to compare across cultures and generalize into different contexts.
A human interest frame, as Valkenburg, Semetko and de Vreese (1999) put it,
“brings an individual’s story or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue,
or problem” (p.551). Therefore, to personalize, dramatize, and emotionalize the news is
one way for journalists to present and interpret the issues of China’s Internet.
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It might not be feasible to find all of the frames in a particular newspaper. Yet the absence, if any, still
can illustrate the tendency of journalists to frame China’s Internet, especially for some issues.
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Table 3.1. Typologies for Analyzing the Frames of the Internet in China
Issues
Factual Human Responsibility Morality Economic
Conflict Leadership
related to
Frames Interest Frames
Frame
Consequence Frames Frames
China’s
Frames
Frames
Internet 25
Internet
diffusion &
development
Internet use
Internet
censorship &
regulations
Hackers &
Internet
security
E-commerce
& Internet
business
Consequences
and
implications
of the Internet
26

Other(s)

25
26

These issues are not mutually exclusive; therefore more than one of them could appear in the same story. See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for details.
See the coding forms (APPENDIX B), in which this category is broken down by political, cultural, commercial, and other aspects.
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Responsibility frames present an issue or problem “in such a way as to attribute
responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or
group” (Semetko, & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). In the context of the Internet in China, for
instance, journalists might attribute the responsibility for the social problems brought by
wangba (Internet cafés) to different targets, e.g., governments, or business operators, or
individual customers.
Morality frames interpret an issue, event or problem in terms of “moral
prescription,” such as presenting moral messages, or offering “specific social
prescriptions about how to behave” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). Taking
wangba as an example again, journalists in different societies might frame the stories in
terms of either responsibility or morality. Specifically, the media in China might have
framed the regulation of wangba, in which there have been a lot of teenagers playing
online games all day long and visiting pornographic Web sites, from the perspective of
educating youths to be civilized Internet users.
With regard to economic consequence frames, the actual or potential economic
impact or consequences of an event, issue, action or problem on individuals, societies, or
nations are emphasized (Luther & Zhou, 2005; Neuman et al., 1992; Valkenburg et al.,
1999).
In terms of conflict frames, journalists rely on “conflict between individuals,
groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interests” (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000, p.95). Luther and Zhou (2005) have observed that researchers have
acknowledged the primary role the conflict frame plays in storytelling in Western media.
They have also identified a new generic frame, the leadership frame in which the story is
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centered on the activities, actions or speech of a leader of a nation, group, government
agency, or an institution, or the discussion and assessment of leadership are highlighted.
Besides these frames, scholars have proposed another type of news frame
“without indication of implications,” that is, a factual frame presenting events or issues
“in a straightforward fashion” (Zillmann et al., 2004, p.66). 27
In the current study, framing will be conceived in terms of the different sets of
values in the socio-political and cultural environment of various countries, which provide
the underlying rationale for particular issue interpretations in news stories. Although
journalists, trying hard to be objective, do not deliberately insert values into the news
(Gans, 1979), some overarching sets of values, as what Haider-Markel and Meier (1996)
termed deeply held values, or as what Gans (1979) proposed as enduring values, are
associated with reality judgments and included in the news, which also contains ideology
(Gans, 1979). It is assumed that such values influence journalists, directly and indirectly,
to frame the Internet, the medium itself, and its story in China. Thus cultural comparisons
are given more attention in this study.

3.3. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions and Subsequent Cross-Cultural
Projects
Culture can have many meanings. De Mooij and Keegar (1991) took culture to
mean “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”(p.74).
According to Hofstede (1980), culture is the “collective programming of the mind which
27

See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for detailed information on how to determine the presence of
each type of generic news frames based on a series of questions.
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distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (p.260). For
the purpose of this study, it is referred to in terms of shared values that symbolize a
society and thus the thinking, feeling, and behaviors of members of that society. Or, it is
what Srikandath called cultural values, “the governing ideas and guiding principles for
thought and action” in a given society (1991, p.166). Values – judgments of good or bad,
right or wrong – are often viewed as central tenets of a society’s culture (Kluckhohn &
Strodtbeck, 1961). The underlying assumption is that general cultural characteristics
within a particular society contributes to people within that society thinking and behaving
in similar ways, with similar perceptions, mind sets and, indeed, expectations. So, it is
understandable how different countries are associated with or characterized by different
cultural traits. In the current study, using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, how such
general cultural values embodied in a society, together with the political system in the
society, influence framing and news frames will be examined. Such political and cultural
factors are located at the broadest level in the Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model.

3.3.1. Hofstede’s Original Work and Cultural Dimensions in Cross-Cultural
Research
The mapping of culture has usually been made by using values. The most widely
known value mapping is the seminal work of Hofstede (1980). Before Hofstede, culture
had been referred to as a residual explanation, because other factors or variables are more
easily measured and allowing for a cause and effect relationship to be identified. In
contrast, Hofstede concentrated on culture itself, mainly with “national cultures” (i.e.
those cultural characteristics that are kindred to a particular nation). He conducted a
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research project with a very large sample of IBM Corp. employees, involving 116,000
questionnaires across 50 countries and three regions at two points in time, which makes
Hofstede’s framework most useful in both academic and business settings (Cutler,
Erdem, & Javalgi, 1997), to develop a way of describing culture according to similarities
and dissimilarities among countries. 28 He derived four dimensions of national culture:
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/ collectivism, and masculinity/
femininity.
As Han (2003) pointed out, there has been no research effort with such a huge
sample size in conducting cross-national comparisons; and no conceptual foundation as
powerful as Hofstede’s has been yet established in the area of cross-cultural research.
Hofstede’s original work has been used as organizing and explanatory constructs in many
disciplines. In a number of publications (for example, Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1998;
Hofstede & Bond, 1984, 1988), these dimensions have been thoroughly described and
their correlates presented. By locating cultures on a four-factor map, this groundbreaking
work has enabled cross-cultural psychologists to select cultures for comparison on an a
priori basis (e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985). Later,
tapping values salient to Chinese people, Hofstede (1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988) added
one additional dimension, long- versus short-term orientation, also know as “Confucian
work dynamism,” to his cultural dimensions. All five dimensions of culture-level values
have provided the conceptual impetus for numerous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Hofstede,
& Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1994).
28

See Hofstede and Bond (1988) for discussions about indirect and direct measures of culture, and how
matched samples of respondents from a number of different countries are crucial for direct measures of
culture. They provided strong arguments regarding the IBM samples, which “represented extremely wellmatched subsets from each country’s population.”
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In short, the studies have demonstrated that national cultures vary substantially in
a variety of dimensions. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are one of the most frequently
cited frameworks for understanding culture, although concern over his methodology has
also been expressed (e.g., Goodstein, 1981; Roberts & Boyacigiller, 1984). His typology
has been greatly influential in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Albers-Miller & Gelb, 1996;
Cutler et al., 1997; Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997; Frith & Sengupta,
1991; Moon & Franke, 2000; Triandis, 1990). Scholars have shown that Hofstede’s
research effort still provides a well-tested framework for analyzing cultural differences in
multinational communication. After reviewing 61 studies using Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions, Sondergaard (1994) found that these dimensions were stable across
populations and time periods. According to several studies replicating Hofstede’s country
classification in the late 1990s, findings were generally consistent with Hofstede’s
original report (Cutler et al, 1997; Fernandez et al, 1997; Wildeman, Hofstede,
Noorderhaven, Thurik, Verhoeve, & Wennekers, 1999), although some shifts in value
classifications were found in some countries (Fernandez et al, 1997).
The present study will introduce cultural dimensions to media content analysis.
They will be taken as independent variables to see to what extent culture variations would
influence the construction of media content and the framing of news stories. The
underlying assumption is that journalists, the primary producers of media content, work
in an overarching system of cultural values in which the way they perceive and interpret
the world is shaped. The dimension of “masculinity versus femininity” will be excluded
from the study because it mainly addresses gender roles in a society, and is not relevant
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to the focus of the study; thus, the following brief descriptions of cultural dimensions will
not cover it.

3.3.2. The Dimension of Individualism versus Collectivism
The dimension of “individualism vs. collectivism” has been suggested to be the
most prominent dimension of cultural variability identified by scholars (Cutler et al,
1997; Taylor, Wilson, & Miracle, 1994; Triandis, 1990), 29 and has been considered an
appropriate choice for cross-cultural research, thus being most frequently used across
disciplines (e.g., Belk & Bryce, 1986; Cho, Kwon, Gentry, Jun, & Kropp, 1999; Cutler et
al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Han & Shavitt, 1994). Scholars have also warned
researchers of the incorrectness to think of them as “end points at a continuum” (Cho et
al., 1999), by noting that “the tendencies toward collectivism and individualism can
coexist” (Triandis, 1990).
Generally, the dimension pertains to the importance of the group versus the
individual. Collectivism is where the members of a society operate within a close knit
social framework, with a high emphasis on loyalty to members of that social framework,
and “emotional dependence of members on their organizations” (Hofstede, 2001, p.212).
In contrast, in individualistic societies, where the family in its nuclear form is the most
common set up, “the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look
after himself or herself”(Hofstede, 1991, p.51), rather than to function on the basis of a
shared loyalty to society. Social ties are tighter in collectivistic countries, where “one

29

Taylor et al. (1994) drew such a conclusion from their reading of more than 75 articles and books in the
area.
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owes lifelong loyalty to one’s ingroup, and breaking this loyalty is one of the worst things
a person can do” (Hofstede, 1991, p.50). Under individualism, “laws, rules and
regulations are institutionalized to protect individual rights” (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi,
Choi, & Yoon, 1994, p.8), whereas “morality among collectivists is more contextual and
the supreme value is the welfare of the collective” (Triandis, 1995, p.77).
In all, the emphasis in individualistic cultures is on a person’s initiative and
achievement. Collectivistic cultures, in which attitudes toward others depend upon their
group members, seek group harmony and consensus, and confrontations are to be avoided
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Zandpour, Campos, Catalano, Chang, Cho, Hoobyar, Jiang, Lin,
Madrid, Scheideler, & Osborn, 1994). Reflected in communication, for instance,
individualistic cultures are more likely to put more emphasis on individual differences or
strength in argument and to put less emphasis on shared feeling and consonance among
persons when they process persuasive messages such as advertising; and collectivistic
cultures are the opposite (Zandpour et al, 1994).
The existence of cultural differences in the individualism vs. collectivism
dimension has generally been accepted by scholars (Cutler et al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta,
1991). There is a tendency to relate individualism to the West and collectivism to the
East. As Hofstede put, “in the United States there has been and still is a strong feeling
that individualism is good and collectivism bad” (Hofstede, 2001, p.213). Work by Lodge
and Vogel (1987), led to the recognition that the major difference between the West and
East lies in their different emphasis on communitarianism and individualism. Scholars
tend to link Confucian ethic and thus the East to the notion of collectivism. For example,
Gerth (1968) and Andreski (1983) noted how in Weber’s study, religion was found to
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impinge on economic behavior, leading Weber to look at the Confucian ethic and
Confucianism, which do not advocate individualism.

3.3.3. The Dimension of Power Distance
Power distance, to some extent addressing human inequality or the issue of
whether status is important, involves the extent to which people accept unequal
distributions of power in society and organizations (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Bond,
1988). A high power distance index (PDI) reflects the notion of knowing one’s place and
accepting inequality. High PDI societies, such as China, are more tolerant of hierarchies
(Fernandez et al., 1997). In such a society, where status consistency is supported,
inequality is seen as the basis of societal order, and there is a preference for a dictatorial
autocratic style of management. Thus decisions are taken from the top and dictated
throughout the organization. The public tends to leave issues of public interest to the
authorities, waiting for action by the government. There is a latent conflict between the
powerful and the powerless. The underdog is to be blamed for anything wrong in the
system, whereas no denouncement is against power abuse by superior (Hofstede, 2001,
pp.97-121).
Conversely low power distance does not readily accept inequality, leading to
attempts to minimize positions of status and to eliminate inequality, seen as a necessary
evil. It can be said that those nations with a high power distance place great emphasis on
status and positions of power, whereas those with a low power distance, tend to place
more emphasis on personal competence rather than status, put value on independence,
and stress reward, legitimate and expert power. Freedom is seen in as important. The
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society’s system is to be blamed if something goes wrong. In addition, unlike high-PDI
societies, where the use of force is seen as the essence of power, in low-PDI societies, it
is a sign of the failure of power (Hofstede, 2001, pp.97-121).

3.3.4. The Dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance
This concept is concerned with the extent to which a society attempts to avoid
uncertainty and puts measures in place to reduce uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001, pp.145146). Such measures may include: 1) life long employment; 2) adherence to rules and
regulations; 3) refusal to tolerate deviant ideas or behavior; 4) resisting innovation;
ignoring concepts; and 5) high power distance (Hofstede, 2001, pp.148-159). In strong
uncertainty avoidance societies, its members are encouraged to anticipate the future,
create institutions establishing and reinforcing security and stability, and avoid or manage
risk. Members in such a society, as Japan and Korea, tend to avoid attitudes and
behaviors that could increase anxiety, such as doing away with rules. Employees are
more likely to feel that “company rules should not be broken – even if the employee
thinks it is in the company’s best interests” (Hofstede, 1991, p.112). Loyalty is a virtue,
and there is more resistance to changes in such a society (Hofstede, 2001, p.160). In
contrast, members in a weak uncertainty avoidance society are encouraged to take risks,
take each day as it comes, and perhaps have low expectations and a fatalistic outlook.
Individuals in countries low in uncertainty avoidance, such as Singapore, are relatively
comfortable with ambiguity and are tolerant of others’ behaviors and opinions. To them,
truth is relative; the need for legislation in such a society is less than uncertainty-avoiding
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countries (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 2001, pp.160-174). 30

3.3.5. The Dimension of Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation
To examine culture from an Eastern perspective, a group of researchers known as
the “Chinese Culture Connection” developed the so-called Chinese Value Survey (CVS)
based on Chinese values. 31 This instrument revealed a fifth cultural dimension, long/short-term orientation, which was taken by Hofstede in his later research. The dimension
presents the opposite poles of Confucian thinking: perseverance and thrift that are
oriented towards future rewards, and saving face, respect for tradition and fulfilling social
obligations that stress more past-oriented values (Hofstede, 2001, p.354, 359). 32 Cultures
with a long-term orientation, or a high score on a Long Term Orientation Index (LTO),
are concerned with the demands of “virtue” – what one does (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede
& Bond, 1988). Members in such a country believe less in universal guidelines for what
is good and evil, and tend to make judgments by considering the circumstances
(Hofstede, 2001, p.363). This is a pragmatic approach that emphasizes Confucian
principles, such as respect for the unequal status of individuals. Cultures with a shortterm orientation, or a low score on LTO, are more concerned with “truth” – religion-

30

Hofstede (2001) also pointed out that such a need does not imply a greater trust in the legal system
(p.174).
31
See Chinese Culture Connection (1987). Specifically, Michael Harris Bond developed an instrument in
Hong Kong from values suggested by Chinese scholars. The group conducted the survey among students
from 23 countries around 1985.
32
According to Hofstede (2001), the missing of the dimension from the original IBM data can be seen as a
result of the thinking of Western minds that differ from Eastern minds. For instance, such a concept as
“filial piety,” which is explained as “honoring of ancestors and obedience to, respect for and financial
support of parents,” in the CVS seem unfamiliar to a Western mind, even though some values would be
clearly recognized by the Eastern mind. A Westerner would not normally find them important. Hofstede
also pointed out that cultural bias could be minimized by well designed and conducted “decentered
research” and the dynamics of the research team (pp.351-355).
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based issues of right and wrong involving what one believes. Tolerance and respect for
others are seen as a matter of principle. People are expecting quick results in such a
society (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 359-365).
In general, East Asian countries scored highest on LTO, with China, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea on the top five of the Hofstede’s list including 23
countries. 33 In contrast, Western countries were on the low side (Hofstede, 2001). Such a
listing is consist with the findings in other studies, showing that people from East Asian
countries such as China, Japan, and Korea tend to have a past orientation, while
Westerners such as Americans and Northern Europeans have more of a future orientation
(Hall, 1976; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Yau, 1988). After the pioneering study of
Chinese Culture Connection, replications of their measurement were conducted by a
U.S.-Hong Kong team of researchers who collected responses to the CVS from different
organizations in China, Hong Kong, and the United States (see Ralston, Gustafson,
Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993; Ralston, Gustafson, Elsass, Cheung, & Terpstra, 1992). This
led to similar results. China scored on top, Hong Kong in the middle, and the United
States last (as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p.355).

3.4. Conclusion
The literature review suggests that there is much room left for researchers to
examine the construction of media content and the factors influencing such a process.
Ideological and societal factors at the broadest level in the hierarchical model of

33

This list is mainly based on the one generated by Bond and his colleagues (Chinese Culture Connection,
1987).
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Shoemaker and Reese have appealed to scholars in terms of theory and cultural studies.
Yet, few studies have empirically tied such factors to media production, particularly in
terms of framing, which concerns the selection and salience of issues and the way to
present those issues, or news frames. Since the factors at the macro levels vary with
political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, a cross-cultural study would fit
into such examinations. Scholars have suggested several types of generic news frames,
which are free from the limitations brought by individual news stories with different
topics and cultural backgrounds in terms of generalization across studies. Their generic
nature may make it possible to compare across cultures, although under such a
framework detailed information cannot be obtained.
Cross-cultural studies have benefited from cultural dimensions since Hofstede
published his seminal work (1980). With the contributions of later studies, cultural
dimensions have demonstrated their strong practical values in cross-cultural studies
across disciplines. Yet, few studies have been found to apply the dimensions to news
content research, particularly in terms of framing, although numerous studies comparing
advertising across countries have adopted the framework since the 1990s. The current
study is exploratory to see whether such a framework suits to framing research; and if so,
to what extent. The cultural dimensions, together with freedom status, were taken as
independent variables to see to what extent cultural variations might affect the
construction of media content and the framing of news stories.
Such effects were also examined with the influence of factors at the extramedia
level in Shoemaker and Reese’s model within a society, specifically China, to see the
variations of newspapers’ treatment in the same overarching political and cultural
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systems. In their model, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) detailed two primary factors at this
level, government control and the marketplace (pp.199-215). The next chapter will
address the unevenly developed Chinese media under the influence of the interaction
between the party/state power and the market power and the structural differences
between the two Chinese newspapers sampled in the current study, the People’s Daily
and Beijing Youth Daily.
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CHAPTER IV.
FROM IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA
TO COMMERCIAL OPERATION:
THE CHANGING MEDIA IN CHINA
Since the mid 1980s, particularly the 1990s, the Chinese media have been
undergoing the multifaceted transformation full of what Lee (1994) indicated
“ambiguities and contradictions,” as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s moving China’s
priorities from ideology to economic growth and embracing market-oriented
socioeconomic reforms. The changing process is unique in that it is taking place in an
authoritarian society within the general framework of the “commandist system” (Lee,
1990).
The “inherent paradox between political control and economic liberalism”
manifested in the Chinese media (Lee, 1994, p.12) may suggest that the extramedia
influences at the fourth level in Shoemaker and Reese’ hierarchical model would
particularly contribute to differences in news framing patterns within a transitional
society, thus being worth a close examination. Therefore, another goal of this study was
to see whether the framing of the Internet in China would vary with the level of financial
and operational autonomy enjoyed by individual Chinese newspapers. Accordingly, this
chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the media transformation, with an
emphasis on newspapers, from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater
relative autonomy from the Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multilevel structure with media liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu,
2002; White III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). This is followed by introductions to the People’s
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Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily, two newspapers selected as the representatives of
Chinese newspapers.

4.1. Propaganda, Media Control and Power Dispersion in Reform
China
The Chinese media in Mao Zedong’s era had been analyzed within the dominant
framework of a mass propaganda and persuasion model (Chang, Chen, & Zhang, 1993).
In such a model, the media functioned as a mouthpiece of the central government and an
ideological apparatus of the state, and were tightly controlled to meet the needs of
political indoctrination and mass mobilization so that the state could impose ideological
hegemony on the society (Edelstein & Liu, 1963; Lee, 1990; Siebert, Peterson, &
Schramm, 1956). Many studies showed how the Party used the press to propagate its
party line and party policies, and promote changes in the attitudes and behavior of the
people in the early 1950s and early 1960s (e.g., Bishop, 1989; Houn, 1961; Liu, 1971).
Today, while the Party still insists that the press is its mouthpiece and continues to
employ different mechanisms of media control and censorship, 34 the role of media as a
propaganda tool has shifted in reform China. Thus, many scholars have expressed
dissatisfaction with the propaganda model (e.g., Chang et al., 1993; Cheek, 1989; Huang,
2003; Lee, 1994; Sun, 1995, 1996), which is seen as “inadequate in the increasingly
multifunctional and multi-level media in China” (Sun, 1995, p.195). The use of media to
maintain political control is now coupled with the dissemination of information to
34

See Polumbaum (1990) for detailed descriptions of the mechanisms of press control used by the Chinese
government, such as regulatory control, financial controls, personnel management, prepublication review,
news suppression, and self-censorship. Also see Chan (1995) for the pendulum-like pattern of the Chinese
Communist Party’s ideological controls of the media from the early of 1980s to the mid-1990s.
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promote the benefits of economic reform to the Chinese people (Pan, 2000; Wu, 2000).
Scholars have found tremendous changes occurring in the Chinese media since late
1970s, both structurally and functionally (e.g. Chan, 1993; Chang, et al., 1993; Chu,
1994; Huang, 2001; Robinson, 1981; Sun, 1996; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 1998, 2000).
Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in 1978. Taking the first step, Deng rejected the
notion that political legitimacy could stem from the charismatic personality of one man,
and institutionalized the political process, such as restoring the Secretariat of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1979 and promulgating a new CCP
charter in 1981. Following it, Deng initiated an unprecedented discussion on whether
Mao’s policies centered on class struggle should be rectified, later known as “Great
Debate Concerning the Criterion of Truth” (gunyu zhengli biaozhun de dataolun). As a
result, Maoist ideology was replaced with pragmatism and empiricism, and the country
shifted its national policy from class struggle to economic construction with a new central
policy goal, that is, to satisfy the material aspirations of the people without sacrificing
CCP leadership (Kuan, 1991, 1.3). The phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics”
(you zhongguo tese shehui zhiyi), coined by Deng and officially proposed at the 12th CCP
Congress in 1982, was used to justify the economic imperative (The theory of building a
socialism with Chinese characteristics). On the other hand, the pace of political reforms
has far lagged behind enthusiastic economic reforms. Although the 13th CCP Congress in
1987 proclaimed that political reforms were important, it narrowly defined political
reform in the official report of then-Premier Zhao Ziyang as improving government
efficiency, strengthening the vitality of the CCP, fighting bureaucracy, and promoting
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enthusiasm among people (Zhao, 1987). 35 Both economic and political reforms were
carried out within the context of the CCP’s overall goal of retaining power.
The Chinese media, which began developing rapidly after the reforms, have both
contributed to this shift and formed part of the re-orientation within this context. At the
center of the media growth has been the Chinese government’s focus on reconfiguring
the control and propaganda modalities of the domestic media system to promote
economic reforms and growth through the introduction of a “competitive” environment,
while the party-state still owns all mass media organizations in principle to ensure the
control of information as a key to political and social order, an idea originating in years
of history of a hierarchical society. 36 From late 1989 to the immediate post-1992
period, 37 the dominant role of the media was to promote Deng’s agenda and champion

35

Even so, reformist journalists still took heart and got a moral boost because in the report Zhao also
accentuated the importance of “supervision (of government) by public opinion” (yulun jiandu). When the
author discussed such issues with her senior colleagues at the Xinhua News Agency in late 1990s, they all
appraised it, seeing it as a new cast to the journalism reform. Zhao did not actually use the phrase
“journalism reform” in this speech; he did so for the first time in a commemorative message published in
Chinese Journalist (1988, no.1.1), a journal published by Xinhua.
36
See Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin (2000) for more discussion about the idea of maintaining the social
order of unidirectional flow of information within the five filial relationships, which was borrowed from
Confucianism. A typical example of such a hierarchical system of information control is that the
publications published by the Xinhua News Agency fall into two major categories, publicly circulated
(gongkai baokan) and internally circulated publications (neibu baokan). The internal publications are
available only to Party cadres at different levels. The readers of the publication at the top level, which is
delivered only by Xinhua personnel, include only the members of the Politburo of the CCP. The People’s
Daily also publishes such internal reference publications. Through the internal reporting, which is almost
by definition investigative, negative and problem-orientated, journalists identify flaws in current policies
and serious social problems, and highlight the need for disciplinary actions against delinquent officials,
which are usually not available to the public. Instead of the mouth, such publications function as “ermu,”
the eyes and ears of the central leaders for policy decision-making, by providing feedback in the
implementation of particular policies and directives, and borrowing examples from foreign countries.
37
In 1992, when visiting Shenzhen, one of the first Special Economic Zones in reform China, Deng gave a
talk urging officials to forget about the “socialism versus capitalism” debate and focus, instead, on
accelerating marketization. Newspapers in Shanghai and Shenzhen publicized his talks, subsequently
leading to a media campaign, which marked the marginalization of the orthodox left. In the same year, the
Ministry of Culture released ten policy guidelines on reforming cultural institutions, which included the
policy allowing cultural organizations to form joint-ventures with foreign capital. Since then, ideological
control has relaxed somewhat (Chan, 1993). Scholars recognize that the year of 1992 marked a more
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market-oriented government officials and successful business operations. While
advocating the ideology of the market, the Chinese media have found themselves to be
involved in a process of commercialization, which is perceived by some scholars to
represent a “peaceful evolution” or a “quiet revolution” toward establishment of a market
system (e.g., Chun, 1993; Huang, 1994). The process started in 1978, and was accelerated
after 1987 when the State Science and Technology Commission listed newspaper
publishing and broadcasting as “information commodification industries” (Huang &
Ding, 1997, as cited in Zhao, 2000). For instance, in the newspaper industry, the number
of newspapers published from January 1, 1980, to March 1, 1985, across the country was
1,008, which means there was one newspaper coming out every two days (Fang, 1999,
p.504). The total number of newspapers reached 2,235 by early 1996, a 91.7 percent
increase above the 1979 level, 186 (Rosen, 2000). 38 A majority of newly published
papers were market-oriented, such as Shopping Guide and Stock Exchange Herald, which
increased their market share dramatically.
Although the CCP continues its commitment to political control of mass media, 39
the macro-environment of media operations is seen to be moving away from the

visible mass commercialization in terms of both policy and reality (e.g., Chan, 1993; Zhao, 2000; See more
information in the next section).
38
The number has run back to 1,926 by the end of July 2005 (Interfax China, 2006), after the process of
press conglomeration speeded up and the so-called No.19 Document was issued in 2003 to clean up the
press industry.
39
The post-Mao leadership continues to stress the mouthpiece theory. Hu Yaobang, widely considered one
of the most enlightened post-Mao leaders, in a widely publicized speech in 1985 stated, “The Party’s
journalism is the Party’s mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people’s government, which
is led by the Party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves” (Hu, 1985). In November 1989,
former President Jiang Zemin gave a speech on the Party’s leadership in journalism, stressing, “Party
Committees at various levels should frequently discuss and study news work. Issues such as propaganda
policy, guiding ideas, focus of news reporting, effects of propaganda in each period must be discussed in
Party Committee meetings” (Jiang, 1990, p.199). Interestingly, Guo Chaoren, who had suffered the longtime denial of Party membership but took over the directorship of Xinhua News Agency in 1992 and sat on

59

propaganda-led model toward a loosening of political controls and a relaxing of
ideological orthodoxy (Chan, 1993, 1995; Huang, 2001; Zhang, 1993). Unlike the Mao
era when state influence and ideological control were secured to pervade every domain of
social life, as Lee (1990) pointed out, the post-Mao regime has not imposed “an allencompassing ideology,” which has made it possible for various cultural genres and less
ideologically oriented content to flourish in the media.
Wu (2000) analyzed two ways, decentralization and socialization, in which the
Chinese media have become structurally diversified; that is, the Chinese media have been
dispersed from the national and provincial capitals to localities, from the power center of
the state system to different branches, departments and bureaus of the government, and
from the state to some social sectors. For instance, the percentage of centrally located
newspapers dropped drastically from 24.6 percent in 1979 to the bottom 5.2 percent in
1984; it then climbed with difficulty to 9.6 percent in 1997 (Wu, 2000), 40 after the Party
started the market consolidation campaign and the process of press conglomeration. Zhao
(2000) asserted that they were mechanisms aimed at “enhancing political control, on the
one hand, and facilitating press capitalization, on the other” (p.5). Due to the increasingly
fierce competition from the local popular press, the major nationally circulated papers
have declined on average 30 percent (Rosen, 2000, p.153). 41 In fact, such structural

the Party Secretariat as an observer, published a book Houshe Lun (The theory of being a mouthpiece) in
1997, voluntarily advocating the role of the press as an instrument of the Party at a time when most
journalists in China loathed the notion of being a mouthpiece. Because of its slow-selling, each staff in the
newsrooms at the agency was given one copy paid by different departments affiliated with the agency,
which caused complaints in every newsroom. Most journalists, including the author who worked with the
agency at the time, simply put the copies aside or threw them away after receiving them.
40
Also see Lee (1990) for the diversity of newspapers’ structure and content genres in 1987 as an example.
41
Refer to Tong (2003) for detailed descriptions of strong competitions among Chinese newspapers, which
are represented as various “big wars (dazhan),” such as “big wars of news,” “big wars of expanding pages,”
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diversification occurred across all media types. 42
Dispersion of power to run the press from the national center to peripheries
carried important political implications, due to the fact that it has brought difficulties to
the central government to unify voices of the media run by the local government. 43 Also,
various social or non-official organizations, such as the All-China Writers’ Association
(Zhongguo quanguo zuojia xiehui; ACWA), and the All-China Federation of Women
“big wars of weekend versions,” “big wars of circulations,” “big wars of quotations,” “big wars of
advertising,” and so on.
42
A typical example is that the China Central Television (CCTV), the only national television station in
China, has lost its monopoly over the television industry because numerous television stations have been
set up at provincial and subprovincial levels of the government. See Chan (1995) for the television
competition across the national, provincial and city levels; and see Lee (1990) for broadcasting
regionalization.
43
Scholars have also recognized the bureaucratic hurdles of inefficiency brought by the structural
weaknesses of the Chinese administration system in a vertically-organized hierarchy and the not-well
defined responsibilities of different administrative entities (e.g., Ding, 1994; Wu, 1996). The
dismantlement of the central command economic system is freeing local governments and entrepreneurs
from the control of central government. This is leading to highly dynamic and diversified developments in
many provinces, especially in those remote areas, such as Guangdong Province. While all the state lawenforcement bodies and the CCP’s discipline inspection commissions in an area help to achieve the
“ultimate control,” the unified leadership may not keep a close eye on every operational detail of the
organizations within its jurisdiction on a daily base (Ding, 2002). In China, there is a popular saying,
“Shang you zhengce, xia you duice (Policy from the top will be met with counter-measures at the bottom),”
which suggests the possibility of deviations, comprises, and even opposition to the policies issued by the
political center, especially in the remote local workplace. The following is an interesting example to see
how a policy from the central government is executed locally. The author emailed a friend of hers in
Shenzhen, Guangdong, regarding the “PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer
Information Networks and the Internet” issued in 1997 (refer to Note 12 in Chapter 1), which required new
users to sign a Net Access Responsibility Agreement in which they swore not to threaten state security or
reveal state secrets or do anything that endangered the state, obstructed public safety, or was obscene or
pornographic. She sent me two messages in English as follows:
1) “for internet setup in my home: 1. call the local LAN company for setup broadband network and
leave the home phone number; 2. the network company come[sic] to set up the LAN, installation
fee RMB ¥200.00 (about $23.00) and they send network card for free; 3. Sign the payment
contract by means of bank account deduction; 4. the fee rate per month = RMB ¥120.00 /month
(less than $15).
Note: if ADSL/cable is installed, the similar steps. The remarks u [sic] quoted is bullshitting
(emphasis added by the author).”
2) “in 94/95, the users had to sign the agreement with China Telecom, one of the terms is not to
threaten … blahblah …”
In terms of traditional media, it is not uncommon that editors play “an edge ball (caibianqiu),” a reference
to journalistic practices that Chinese journalists sneak in their own ideas to stretch the editorial boundaries
of the CCP’s tolerance, in their daily news treatment. He (2000a) mentioned four tactics frequently
employed by Chinese journalists. See also Chan (1995) for the example to show how the Beijing Youth
Daily broke the news about the event of Hongze Lake and escaped punishment.
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(Zhongguo quanguo funü lianhehui; ACFW), have established their own media
organizations, printing less ideological news and taking a more relaxed editorial line.44
As Lee (1990) noted, such pluralistic semi-autonomous groups have gradually sought to
articulate their self-interests within the system (p.5). With the loosened controls and the
introduction of market mechanisms into media operation, the press has started pushing
the ideological limits, thus eroding the commandist-commanded relationship between the
Party and the media operations (Zhang, 2000). 45

4.2. State Power and Market Power: Uneven Patterns of Liberalization
There is no doubt that much of the observed changes in China’s press are
commercially driven, which is one of the least contested understandings shared among
scholars of the country’s media. 46 Two interlocking steps have mostly contributed to the
dispersion of power to run the press: the reduction and gradual termination of state
44

In the mid-1990s, the author had personal experiences with a Beijing-located culture and lifestyle weekly
newspaper, contracted out from the ACWA with a “publication number” (kanhao) from the Beijing Press
and Publications Administration. To profit, the ACWA leased its kanhao to several individuals who had
media experiences and were interested in running media operations. In return, the ACWA got paid in the
form of annual fee within the contract duration for authorization to publish under its name. The actual
editors-publishers were held responsible for the editing, printing, distribution, taxation and all other
expenses, such as hiring staff. All the pages of the newspapers were further sub-contracted out to individual
experienced editors or journalists in Beijing. This is one form of what is called the “contractual system”
(chengbao zhi). Thanks to its content genre, and financial and personnel autonomy, the newspaper enjoyed
no censorship from the authorities, even the ACWA. Yet, as Zhao (2000) noted, editors and publishers
under such a system tended to focus on nonexplicit political content to avoid political troubles because of
the dubious policy base upon which the contractual relationships were built. The highly controversial
Shanghai-based World Economic Herald, who obtained its license from the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences and the World Economists Association, was one of the few exceptions (see Shen, 1995, for the
information on the role of the independent newspaper in fighting press control and promoting economic
and political reform in China during the 1980s). This contractual system applies also to the movie,
television and other audio-visual media (see Chan, 1993, for more information).
45
See his detailed comparisons of the Maoist Party-press system and the present market-based Party-press
system.
46
Liu and Jin (2006) stressed the dual attributes of government behavior in the commercialization process
of the Chinese press. They held that the root cause of the process is the relatively loosening of government
control. Using Howard Aldrich’s theory, the resource-power model, they argued that the Chinese
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subsidies and “the return of advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao &
Shen, 1995). The reduction and termination of subsidies applied to almost all media
organizations except the People’s Daily, the Economic Daily, and the Qiushi (Seeking
Truth), starting in 1992, “the year of commercialization.” That is the year when the
National Working Conference on Press Management (NWCPM) recognized the
“commodity nature” of the press, and formalized the policy to commercialize
publications (Chan, 1993). 47
With the progress of economic reforms, the central government could not afford
subsidizing the old media, let alone the new ones. 48 To meet the needs of economic
reforms, the central government promulgated a new policy at the 1992 NWCPM with a
specific schedule for the transformation of the Chinese press. The press could no longer
use state money to pay for wages and fringe benefits, to defray any deficit in operating
costs, or to acquire and maintain fixed assets. Based on the schedule, the first batch of
newspapers with subsidies terminated were local or non-official publications that mainly
carried information about consumption and daily life (Chan, 1993). Coming next was the

government has provided the main resource, “permission,” for the media to achieve the goal of
transformation. They further noted that the government is still the principal part of fostering and adjusting
the market. Their views represent the views of some scholars in mainland China.
47
In fact, as early as in December, 1949, the NWCPM proposed the policy of commercializing the
management of the newspaper industry: “Newspapers should be managed as production enterprises,
gradually realizing the business accounting system” (Liang, 1999, as cited in Yuan, 2006). In 1950, the
Central Propaganda Department released “Guanyu baozhi shixing qiyehua jingying qingkuang tonggao”
(the Announcement on the Situation of Newspapers’ Implementing Business Management), clearly stating
that the policy of commercializing the management of newspaper industry was “completely right and
realizable” (Yuan, 2006). The policy suffered serious setbacks in the Cultural Revolution era, when
newspapers entirely lost their functions of commercial development.
48
Press subsidies were implemented in 1949. Until 1992, the state had provided almost guaranteed
revenues to the press through subscriptions and direct financial assistance, which had been one of the
important mechanisms to control the media.
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national or official press. Both the central and local governments adopted the new
financial policy during 1992 and 1993, which is later known as the “weaning plan,” to
reduce and finally end media subsidy. 49
Consistent with the plan to increase the media’s financial autonomy was the
Chinese government’s decision to separate the Party press from its mass-appeal
counterparts, and liberalize Party control over publications traditionally considered to be
at the lower political ranking. Greater autonomy was granted to: (1) afternoon and
evening publications; (2) news digests; (3) papers specializing in culture and lifestyle, as
well as (4) trade journals. They were not required to carry ideological propaganda,
although political control still applied to Party mouthpieces, army papers and national or
municipal general papers (Chan, 1993).
Under these new policies, more and more Chinese newspapers have found
themselves operating as business organizations, either financially relying on advertising
revenue, 50 or sponsored by business organizations (Chan, 1993; Yu, 1994; Zhao, 2000).

49

The author joined the Xinhua News Agency at the time when it started going through such a process and
decided to change the Reference News, a digest newspaper enjoying the largest circulation in China, from a
classified publication to a publicly circulated one, and expand from four pages to eight so as to increase
profits. As a matter of fact, the newspaper has been the leading profit-making machine for Xinhua, with
more than RMB ¥120 million (about US$14.5 million at the time) per year, accounting for a majority of the
newspaper’s annual net profits, turned over to Xinhua since the mid-1990s. The number will be increased
to RMB ¥250 million (about US$31million) for the year of 2006, according to a confidential source. See
Chen and Lee (1998) for more detailed information on the numbers of papers at the central and provincial
levels which reported to be partially subsidized or self-supporting by 1997. The reduction of state subsidies
was companied by the provision for financial incentives, including tax breaks, performance-based salary
supplements, and operational freedom (Zhao, 2000).
50
Advertising has become an increasingly significant feature of the Chinese media. From 1990 to 1995, the
advertising revenue of newspapers increased by 28% (Chan & Qiu, 2002). Total advertising revenue in
China was reported in 1992 to have exceeded RMB ¥5 billion (about US$575 million at the time), an
increase of about 43% over 1991. In some places like Beijing, Jiangsu and Shanxi, the growth rates had
been almost as high as 100% (Chan, 1993). With media operation becoming more commercialized,
divisions for advertisement, public relations, and other market-related activities are increasingly influential
within media organizations (Chen & Lee, 1998). Some scholars viewed it as the “renaissance of press
advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao & Shen, 1995).
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The high ranking Party organs continue to juggle between the role of media in both
functioning as the Party’s mouthpiece and serving the public life, between indoctrination
and readability (Chan, 1993). 51 The mid-1990s saw a large number of provincial organs
jumping into the waves of city newspapers and evening newspapers, which are highly
commercialized and urban-reader oriented (Huang, 2001), to release the “dual pressure”
(shuangchong yali), that is, playing games within ideological restrictions while being
financially independent (Wei, 2005). 52 Most major Party media had expanded as large
press conglomerates with a “one-Party organ many subsidiary media” scheme (Huang,
2000). 53 The past years have also seen the phenomenon of “one city, many newspapers”
emerging in a number of cities across the country. In Beijing alone, according to statistics
in 1999, there were 10 titles of local daily newspapers and 82 titles of central daily
newspapers. This did not even include those non-daily newspapers (Zhongguo xinwen
tongji ziliao huibian, 2000, as cited in Ming, 2002).

51

This antagonism, which does not sound every appropriate, suggests an example to see how unique the
development of the Chinese press is. Under the pressure of commercialism, journalists are driven to
conceptualize the news as a commodity in the pursuit of readers. “Kedu xing” (readability) has become a
savvy word in newsrooms with a desire to feed readers with “soft,” entertainment-oriented and sensational
material without forgetting the media function of indoctrinating the masses as suggested in traditional
Chinese journalism principles. Such a paradox becomes part of “the irony of commercialisation” (Yu,
1994, p.35), a situation in which the practice of professionalism might be undermined, and Chinese
journalists have been forced to search for balance in their every day practices (e.g., Zhou, 2000). This is
also part of the difficulties for Chinese journalists with dual missions to serve two masters, the leaders and
the masses (see more discussions in Polumbaum, 1990).
52
Faced with the increasing competition of so-called “xiaobao” (small papers, referring to those tabloids
which mostly fall into the last three categories mentioned above and are market-oriented local newspapers
usually with a small size of pages in terms of physical measurement), provincial Party organ papers have
experienced a sharp decline in circulations since the 1990s. By 1996, among 30 of such newspapers, there
were 23 reporting that their circulations had dropped more than 30 percent. The highest one was the Anhui
Daily at 59.8% (Liang, 1996, pp.185-186, as cited in Wei, 2005).
53
See Zhao (2000) for the example of the Guangzhou Daily Group. She viewed the nationwide press
conglomeration as a redistribution of organizational resources and a means to enhance press control and
strengthen party organs, to balance the fragmentary power of commercialization for optimal integration
between propaganda and business.
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Because of the interplay of the two forces of state power and market power, the
Chinese media, although all have more or less bureaucratic affiliations, have transformed
from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater relative autonomy from the
Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multi-level structure with media
liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu, 2002; Chen, 1996; White
III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). According to Chan and Qiu (2002), such uneven patterns of
liberalization are embodied in three factors: content genre, media type, and the media
location. Politically sensitive content (vs. less sensitive genres like entertainment, sports,
and art), newspapers and television (vs. film, advertising, and the Internet), and the media
organizations located in Beijing and/or the center areas (vs. other cities and/or the
periphery) are more subject to ideological control by the CCP than their counterparts.
Unlike before, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the CCP’s central
administration of media censorship, focuses its control on just eight institutions (the
Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, the Qiushi, the Economic Daily, the
Guangming Daily, CCTV, Central People’s Radio, China International Radio) and in
important areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, and
Liaoning (Gong, 1994, as cited in Chan, 1995).

4.3. A Scheme of the Uneven Structures of Chinese Newspapers
Scholars who recognize the interaction of ideological control and market force
and the diversity of function becoming a key feature of the Chinese press have
categorized Chinese newspapers into distinctive groups (e.g., Chen & Lee, 1998; Chen &
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Guo, 1998; Fang, 1999; Guo, 2001; Huang, 2000; Lee, 1990; Sun, 1994; Zhao, 2000). 54
Although the categories differ across studies, the literature has seen a common way to
separate Party papers, or Party organ papers (dangbao, or dang de jiguanbao), 55 from
the others. Based on the discussions in the literature and the understanding of this
author’s experiences with the Chinese press, a schematic representation was created to
show different types of current Chinese newspapers operating in the Party-state sphere
and the market sphere with two different powers, the pluralistic nature of the press
structures, and the unevenly developed liberalization of the Chinese press (see Figure
4.1).
Instead of embracing a simplistic state versus market dichotomy, as Zhao (2000)
suggested, the interaction between the press and their complicated institutional and
financial relationships is recognized. Therefore, the Party-state sphere and the market
sphere in the schema should not be understood as operating in two completely separated
levels. The dashed line between the two spheres is vague because interactions,
negotiations, and compromises of two forces, the state power and the market power, are
more or less involved at various administrative levels and among all types of
newspapers. 56 Through administrative agencies, such as the CPD at the pinnacle of the
administrative pyramid of the press control and its provincial and subprovincial

54

For example, Chen and Lee (1998) classified the newspapers in China into five types, such as the Party
press, the target press, the enterprise/industry press, the mass press and a variety of digests.
55
In this dissertation, the terms, Party papers, Party organ papers, and the Party press, are interchangeable,
all referring to newspapers directly run by the CCP committees at given administrative levels. The
capitalized term “Party” in this dissertation restrictedly refers to the CCP only.
56
Refer to Guo (2001) He (2000b), Lee (1994, 2000), and Xue (1995) for the use of a political-economic
perspective to explain the dynamics of the changes in the Chinese press, in which the two forces,
Communist politics and market forces are involved.
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Figure 4.1. Chinese Newspapers in Party-State and Market Spheres
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administrations, licensing, centralized allocation of resources, preferential policy
treatment and regulatory constraints, the state continues to intervene in the operation of
the media market, thus blurring the boundaries between the state and the market (Pan,
2000). Yet the state power is decreasing with the press sectors being closer to the market
sphere, while the market power is increasing; and the vise-a-versus is also true. The
market dynamism (as granted by the state) has allowed different types of press various
scopes in pursuing managerial autonomy and operational liberalization. In the figure, the
closer a group box is to the market sphere, the more autonomy and liberalization that the
newspapers in the box enjoy.
As shown in Figure 4.1, three primary groups of Chinese newspapers, Party
organ papers, other organ papers, and non-organ papers, 57 distinguish themselves from
each other because of their different bureaucratic affiliations, organizational practices,
market share, and content appeal. Bureaucracy takes place at all administrative levels of
the Chinese press. Yet compared to the other types of newspapers, the first group Party
organ papers, which are directly controlled by the CCP’s propaganda departments at
different levels and represent the orthodox party-line voice in the central government,
various provinces and autonomous regions, and municipalities, have traditionally been at
the highest political ranking and are subject to the tightest political control in any given
political administrative region (Chen & Guo, 1998; Guo, 2001), while enjoying the
higher preferential policy treatment and editorial priority and privileges. 58 Such political
57

Ideas were partly drawn from Pan’s (2000) work to categorize Chinese newspapers into such three
groups.
58
For instance, central and provincial Party organs enjoy tax privileges. In terms of editorial priority, Party
organs generally have mandatory propaganda topics to cover. Coverage of the Party and important national
affairs always appears on front pages and pages ahead of international news pages. For example, during the
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ranking decreases from the national to the provincial and to the municipal levels of
administration. 59 Despite individual variations, Party organ papers at the provincial and
municipal levels tend to be more dependent on advertising and outside business than
central-level Party papers (Chen & Lee, 1998); 60 therefore, they are closer to the market
sphere than central-level papers. Regardless of their differences in terms of administrative
hierarchy, all Party organ papers heavily rely on state-subsidized office subscriptions
rather than private subscriptions. 61 Because of their emphases on policy guidance and
ideological propaganda, the readership of Party organ papers is mostly in the officialdom
(Chen & Guo, 1998). Party members, government officials, and intellectuals get a sense
of the prevailing political climates by paying particularly close attention to who and what
time from 1942 to 1986 when the People’s Daily discussed journalism reforms, international news had
never appeared in its front pages. Until now, international news seems still not to be allowed as the top line
in a front page, although it may occasionally appear in front pages (Chen, 2005). Compared to other levels
of Party organs, central Party organs enjoy most editorial privileges. All important reports and documents
of the central government can only be first printed in central Party organ papers, such as the People’s
Daily, and usually on front pages, and then further copied verbatim by other newspapers. The author
personally experienced how editorial privileges work at the Xinhua News Agency, a monopoly in the
provision of international news in China. The story happened in the late 1990s. Two high-ranking managers
of the commercial website, Sina.com, one of the largest news portals in China, came to the agency to
apologize for using news stories printed in foreign newspapers without getting advice from the agency. One
of the deputy editors-in-chief of the Reference News told these two guys, “We actually could sue you
because the central government has only authorized the agency with such rights.” The Sina guys promised
never to do it again. For now, Internet news portals in China, like mass appeal newspapers and tabloids,
bend these rules by rewriting politically safe and commercially attractive international agency stories or
Internet reports (Zhao, 2000). This seems to come from one of the work traditions of Party papers before
China’s reforms. As one of the Party disciplines, Party organs could use only wire news provided by the
Xinhua News Agency. The underlying logic was that the fundamental task of Party papers is to guide the
Party’s work instead of being voluntary spokespersons for foreign news agencies. In addition, to use wire
news provided by bourgeois news agencies would be misleading to the Party’s work (Chen, 2005).
59
In China’s political and economic system, rank always constitutes a determinant of occupational status
and reward. Media organizations, especially the Party press, are absorbed into the national administrative
rank system which consists of the ministerial level (bu), the district or bureau level (ju), and the county or
division level (chu). For instance, the central-level organs, such as the People’s Daily and the Economic
Daily, are at the bu level, whereas the provincial Party organ newspapers, which are usually named after
the province, such as the Hunan Daily, are at the ju level. See Pan (2000) for more information on the
administrative ladder.
60
Zhao (2000) has particularly seen the rising market power of municipal Party organs.
61
According to Chen and Guo (1998), for example, more than 80 percent of the subscription funding for
provincial level Party newspapers are directly subsidized by the state. Zhao (2000) named central and
provincial Party organs as “losers in the press market” (p.9).
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get reported in high-ranking newspapers (Guo, 2001). Compared to the other two groups,
this group of newspapers is most subject to the state power, thus staying far inside the
Party-state sphere in Figure 4.1.
The second group of other organ papers in the schema refers to those organ
papers (jiguan bao) published by official, semi-official or non official organizations,
bureaucratic authorities, and/or large state-own enterprises. This group of newspapers is
still in the name of “organ” because of its bureaucratic nature. Yet unlike Party organ
papers, the newspapers in this group are NOT directly led by the CCP committees at
various levels. They function as the institutional voice of a given organization, institution
or enterprise aimed at promoting its policies and the operational goals while serving
specialized readers based on occupational backgrounds and/or socio-economic interests.
Because of their more social ties and less tints of Party ideology, the degree that they are
subject to the state power is less than Party organ papers. On the other hand, the
newspapers in this group are more self-financially supported because they do not have
the privileges of resources that their Party organ peers enjoy. Therefore, they are farther
away from the Party-state sphere but span more over the market sphere in Figure 4.1.
These papers mainly include professional newspapers published by government organs or
professional organizations for certain fields (e.g., the Procuratorial Daily published by
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, and the China Post News published by the
China State Post Bureau), target newspapers (e.g., the Worker’s Daily owned by the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions, and the China Women’s News published by the
ACFW), and enterprise/trade newspapers (e.g., the Chinese Petroleum Daily owned by
the China National Petroleum Corporation and aimed at promoting the Party’s
71

ideological propaganda within the corporation). 62 This group of newspapers also
includes those published by satellite parties other than the CCP (e.g., the Unity News, the
national organ paper of the China Kuomindang Revolutionary Committee 63 , and the
organ papers of provincial committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC)). Like Party organ papers, most of these kinds of organ papers are
rarely seen on the streets. They are mostly subscribed to with public money and for
consumption in offices and factory workshops.
The third group in Figure 4.1 is non-organ papers, which are now the majority of
newspapers in China in terms of circulation and advertising revenue. The newspapers in
this group differentiate themselves from the first two groups because they are not set to
be the mouthpiece of a given Party or a work unit. Their main functions are not
promoting the Party’s line or the policies of a given institution or enterprise. Instead, they
are more targeted to mass audiences. They may or may not belong to the major Party
organ unites, government departments, or semi-official organizations. This group
primarily comprises of city newspapers, evening and morning newspapers, digest papers,
special-subject papers (e.g., sports newspapers), and others that are less ideologically
oriented than the Party mouthpieces. Among them, city newspapers (or metro papers) and
evening newspapers, together with some newspapers published by semi-official
organizations, such as the Beijing Youth Daily, 64 and some popular professional and
enterprise papers and special-subject papers, constitute what scholars often call “mass62

In China, the conventional hierarchy of power units at the same jurisdictional level is the Party, the
government, the trade union, the Youth League, the Women’s Federation, and enterprises. According to
Chen and Lee (1998), Fang (1999), and Guo (2001), these types of newspapers also include those more
market-oriented tabloids specifically targeting certain audiences.
63
One of China’s eight democratic parties.
64
See more information about the newspaper in the fifth sector.
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appeal” papers or the mass press, and depend primarily on private subscriptions and
newsstand purchases by individuals to attract advertising. 65 They are grouped into
official or semi-official papers, since they have more or less official backgrounds or are
tied with Party organ papers at various levels of jurisdiction. Among them, city
newspapers are all subsidiaries of provincial Party organ papers (Zhao, 2000). For
example, the famous Southern City Newspaper (Nanfang Dushi Bao) is published by the
Southern Daily (Nanfang Ribao), the Party organ paper of the CCP Committee of
Guangdong Province, and belongs to the Southern Daily Group. Scholars in mainland
China acknowledge the parental relationships between Party-organ and city newspapers,
holding that city newspapers are the agents of Party papers at the provincial level to
capture the market benefits (e.g., Wei, 2005; Yuan, 2003). History has also seen the
institutional ties of evening and morning newspapers with the Party press, in that Chinese
evening and morning newspapers are usually published by municipal Party organ papers
(Fang, 1999). 66 After being pushed into the market, these newspapers have found
themselves striving for maximum readership and profit (Guo, 2001). Although they all
are more or less institutionally tied with state authorities at different levels, they are
distinct from Party organ papers in terms of ideological control, financial management,
social influence, and editorial content. They also differ from other organ papers because
65

See Zhao (2000) for the example of comparing the municipal Party organ, the Beijing Daily, and one of
its subsidiaries, the Beijing Evening News, and the shrinking office subscriptions of Party papers. Chen and
Guo (1998) also reported that in 1992, evening newspapers in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Shaanxi
surpassed their parental Party organ papers both in advertising dollars gained and net revenue growth rate.
According to Huang (2000, 2001) and Rosen (2000), the most popular newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Chengdu, based on consumer spending, are all mass-appeal papers. For example, by 1995,
there were 128 officially registered evening papers. 90 percent of their subscribers are individuals, not work
units (gongzuo danwei) (Rosen, 2000).
66
See more discussions about the differences and the institutional relationships between Party newspapers
and mass-appeal newspapers, such as city newspapers and evening newspapers, in Zhao (2000).

73

they are more intensively market-driven. Among the three groups, this group of
newspapers is most subject to the market power, thus standing furthest inside the market
sphere in Figure 4.1.
Within the group of non-organ papers, non-official newspapers separate
themselves from official or semi-official papers by their being independent from
institutions, organizations, or enterprises with Party-state backgrounds. The examples
include those papers with non-Party backgrounds from the very beginning of their
launching (e.g., the Xinmin Evening News, which is an unofficial paper originally
published by capitalists before the New China was established), and industry-involved
newspapers (e.g., the Computer Weekly).
Generally speaking, non-organ papers are more accessible to advertisers but less
reliant on centralized allocation of resources with the dramatic expansion of advertising
volume in the process of market maturity. Therefore, they enjoy less control from the
central authorities, greater autonomy in management, and more popularity among
residents in large- or medium sized metropolitan areas. With increasing financial
autonomy, these newspapers have seen more human-interest oriented and increasingly
diversified content (Pan, 1997; Chen & Lee, 1998; Guo, 2001).

4.4. People’s Daily: The Flagship Mouthpiece of the CCP
Two influential newspapers both published in Beijing were selected as
representatives of Chinese newspapers for this current study. One is the People’s Daily,
the national mouthpiece of the CCP; and the other is the Beijing Youth Daily, one of the
most influential mass-appeal newspapers in China. In addition to the newspapers’ nature
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in terms of their positions in the Party-state sphere and the market sphere, the two papers
were selected to minimize the influences of regional differences.
The People’s Daily was launched on June 15, 1948, as a regional Party organ
paper of the CCP’s North China Branch, and was changed to the Party’s central organ
paper on August 1, 1949. In 1952, its circulation increased from about 40,000 as a
regional paper to 480,000, becoming the most influential and authoritative newspaper
with the largest circulation (Fang, 1999, p.3). The leading status of the People’s Daily in
Chinese newspapers did not meet any challenges until the 1990s. As the discussions
above suggest, the share of Party organ newspapers in the market had dramatically
declined by the mid-1990s. 67 Despite some attempts at expansion, newspapers like the
People’s Daily were unable to compete with mass-appeal papers for individual
subscribers or advertising revenues (Bacani & Law, 1996). During the period from 1982
to 1996, the circulation of the People’s Daily plunged sharply from 5.2 million to about 2
million (Chinese Journalism Yearbook 1997, as cited in Huang, 2001; Zhongguo xinwen
chuban tongji ziliao huibian, 1998, as cited in Wu, 2000). 68 With the largest circulation
among all the publicly circulated daily newspapers, 69 the People’s Daily had always
dominated the advertising market and headed the list of top ten newspaper advertising
revenue earners (Chen & Guo, 1998; Lee, 2000). From 1990, however, the paper’s
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According to Rosen (2000), as late as 1988, there were 407 party-organ newspapers, constituting 25
percent of the publicly circulated papers. Yet with more than 600 new papers entering the market during
the late 1980s to 1996, a perceptible shift appeared.
68
Based on the author’s observations as a journalist in China and the confidential interview conducted by
the author, the circulation figure of the People’s Daily has been about one million since the late 1990s,
although it claims to have a three-million circulation on its website. See its website, “Introduction to the
People’s Daily,” http://www.people.com.cn/GB/1018/22259/2220957.html [in Chinese].
69
This does not take into account of the Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi), which had been seen as an
internal publication even though it became a publicly circulated paper in 1985. In fact, this newspaper has
been heading the list of circulation among all Chinese newspapers.
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advertising revenue plummeted and the paper had dropped out of the nation’s top 10
revenue list by 1995 (Chen, 1996; Chen & Guo, 1998).
While continuing to be a tool of Party propaganda, the People’s Daily has
continuously taken steps to increase its revenues, such as expanding pages, allotting more
coverage to economic news, publishing regional editions and increasing its satellite
publications, which are mostly market-oriented (e.g., the Securities Times (Zhengquan
Shibao), the International Finance News (Guoji Jingrong Bao), the Market (Shichang
Bao) and the Satire and Humor (Fengci yu Youmo)). Currently, the People’s Daily prints
16 pages during weekdays. 70 The first four pages reports breaking news. The next eight
pages, from Page 5 to Page 12, cover in-depth reports. The other pages are special
sections and/or weekly sections, 71 mainly publishing non-politically oriented content
such as coverage of culture, science and technology, and essays. Currently, there are
eight daily newspapers, including two regional editions and one overseas edition, five
weekly newspapers, and 11 magazines published under the People’s Daily, which also
operates a website, People’s Daily Online, one of the most influential and authoritative
websites with the largest volume of updated databases in China (Ye, Gan, Xia, Zheng,
Tan, Pu, & Hu 2001).
Under the jurisdiction of the CPD, the People’s Daily with a political rank at the
ministry level 72 is one of the primary elements of the propaganda system (xuanchan
xitong). It acts as the chief conduit of official interpretations of important political,
70

The first and fourth pages of the copies printed in Beijing are in color. Only eight pages are printed on
Saturdays and Sundays. Its two regional versions of East-China and South China publish 20 pages per day.
71
There are three weekly sections, such as Economics Weekly on Mondays, Society Weekly on
Wednesdays, and Mother Earth Weekly on Fridays.
72
Refer to Footnote 59 for the administrative ladders of media organizations in China.
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economic, social and cultural events to Party members and ordinary people across the
country (Lynch, 1999). CCP leaders have consistently used the paper to give Party guides
and/or political directives, explicitly and implicitly, on important occasions. 73 As one of
the four major national media agenda-setters (Zhao, 1998), the People’s Daily enjoys the
highest editorial priority and privileges. 74 Government documents and important
editorials in the People’s Daily are aired on the national radio and television and
reprinted by local news media, especially provincial Party organs (Zhao, 1998). Local
newspapers, while enjoying some level of autonomy in terms of news selection, usually
scrutinize the People’s Daily for signs regarding coverage of important issues or events
with political implications (Lynch, 1999).
The central concept that underlines the practice of the People’s Daily is the “Party
principle” (dangxing yuanze), which comprises three basic components: “that the news
media must accept the Party’s guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the
Party’s programs, policies, and directives; and that they must accept the Party’s
leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational principles and press policies” (Tong &
Cheng, 1993, as cited in Zhao, 1998, p.19). Although Chinese journalists and scholars
have been discussing the issue of reorienting Party organs in a commercialized society, 75
the CCP has never changed the foundation of the Party-control system and loosened its
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For instance, Mao himself wrote a number of key editorials. Some famous pieces include “Press Du
Yuming to Surrender,” “Carry the Revolution through to the End,” and “Five Criticisms White Paper.”
Even today, editorials regarding policies or important issues are usually conceived and drafted by a special
group, and then modified under the instructions from the CCP Central Committee. One of the examples is
the editorial on April 26, 1989, which defined the student demonstrations as “counter-revolutionary
turmoil,” and was widely believed to have been written by Party officials (Zhao, 1998).
74
Refer to Footnote 58.
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See, for example, Liu and Sun (2005), Peng (2004), and Wang (2004),
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tight control over its flagship mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. 76 In 1996, then- President
Jiang Zemin visited the People’s Daily and emphasized the need to maintain political
loyalty (Li, 1998). In 1998, when the paper celebrated its 50 anniversary, Jiang wrote a
piece of dedication, “Adhere to taking the correct lead of public opinion, enthusiastically
propagate the Party line, theories, and policies, and fully play the role as the leader of
national newspapers (Jianchi zhengque yulun daoxiang, jiji xuanchuan dang de lilun
luxian fangzheng zhengce, fahui quanguo baozhi paitoubing zuoyong)” (The memorabilia
of the People’s Daily). Within the ideological framework, the People’s Daily still closely
follows the Party line, selecting news and editorials often on the basis of their relevance
to the central theme of the Party. Its fundamental role is “to inform the public after an
authoritative decision has been reached” (Rosen, 2000, p.155, italic original). The
national importance of the People’s Daily to the CCP means its fortune should be subject
to the market power at minimum.

4.5. Beijing Youth Daily: An Example of Transcending Its Official
Origin
The Beijing Youth Daily was founded on March 21, 1949, originally as an official
organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League Beijing Committee. When it resumed
publication on March 7, 1981, the newspaper was a weekly four-page tabloid only
available in the Beijing region with a circulation of 29,000 copies and an official subsidy
of RMB ¥260,000 (about US$30,000 at the time, Zhao, 1998, p.141). Soon after its third
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In the scheme I posed in the last section, the People’s Daily is at the top rank in the group of Party
organs, mostly in the Party-state sphere and under the strong influence of the state power. In He’s (1996)
three-tier system, the People’s Daily is in the first tier tightly controlled by the Party’s central leadership. It
is not unusual for the paper’s staff to receive phone calls of condemnation from the central leaders. See Liu
(1990) for examples.
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resumption of publication in July 1987, 77 the Beijing Youth Daily, along with many of
other Chinese media, recognized “news is also commodity,” and started packaging
(baozhuang) its news in an entirely new way on January 3, 1989, when the name of the
layout designer for the first time appeared on its front page. 78 Since then, the Beijing
Youth Daily has been a pioneer in experimenting with new operational and editorial
measures, such as contracting the paper out to its staff, 79 eliminating lifetime tenure and
disregarding the official wage system, using large and sensational headlines and huge
eye-catching photos, and creating various special sections and pages, such as “News
Weekly” (on Tuesdays, beginning in 1993), 80 “The World of Literature, Culture, and
Sports” (on Thursdays) and “Youth Weekend” (on Saturdays, beginning in 1992). These
special sections and new journalistic practices created a journalism shock wave, from
form to content, in the early of 1990s (Qiu, 1995), during which time other official organ
papers were limiting their reforms to discussion rather than implement (Zhao, 1998). 81
Thanks to the efforts of a group of “most energetic and reform-minded” news
people (Zhao, 1998, p.141), the Beijing Youth Daily has risen as an influential popular
daily newspaper proclaiming “Provide One Thing Only – News” as its logo (Huang,
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In this research, although an effort was made to search for explanations as to why the interruptions
occurred, none could be found.
78
The newspaper assigned responsibility for individual pages to subeditors, who then planned the layout of
the entire page (Rosen, 2000).
79
The newspaper voluntarily cut its financial connection with the government by signing a four-year
contract (1991-94) which had made the paper become financially independent without receiving any
subsidy from the city who in return allowed it to keep all of its profits (Zhao, 1998).
80
See Zhao (1998) for detailed information on how the newspaper uses this edition to “make the most out
of news values” (p.143).
81
Zhao attributed its ability to experiment with all kinds of reforms mostly to the obscure status and
relative lack of direct control from authorities of the newspaper with one of the lowest official rank (chu,
the county or division level), compared to many of other newspapers in Beijing, and its relative lack of
vested interest in the Party media system. Its innovations were to a great degree based on “selfdetermination, self-development, self-financing, and self-restraint” (1998, p.141).
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2000; Zhao, 1998). Currently, this broadsheet newspaper is distributed to readers both at
home and abroad. With its annual circulation growth rate of 30%, an unmatchable rate in
press circles, the Beijing Youth Daily, now enjoys a daily circulation of 600,000 (Beijing
Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com; Zhang, 2006), almost four times the circulation
reported in1994 (Rosen, 2000). Street sales and private subscriptions account for the
majority of its circulation, while office subscriptions are much lower than for other
official organ papers (Zhao, 1998). A single issue of the paper during regular week days
is currently 68 full-size pages. Headquartered in Beijing, the Beijing Youth Daily has five
printing sites in China. 82 It has incorporated data-transfer via satellite link in its
production, which is instrumental in helping the paper to achieve its goal of covering all
of China and the world. Within a decade, the newspaper has grown from a four-page
weekly tabloid into a conglomerate that publishes ten newspapers and one magazine, and
runs one website and more than 10 businesses, such as an advertising company, a book
store, an arts center, a high-tech firm, a public relations firm, a grocery store, a medical
clinic, a resort, and so on, in a wide range of areas (Beijing Youth Daily acquires
Qianlong.com; Wang, 2005; Zhao, 1998). It has evolved into the second-largest
newspaper group after the Guangzhou Daily Group by revenue (Hui & Bei, 2004).
The Beijing Youth Daily is seen as the most interesting case of an organ paper that
has transcended its origin (Rosen, 2000), not only in terms of its readership, but also its
content and business management. As the organ of the Beijing Youth League, the Beijing
Youth Daily was exclusively targeted at youth in the past. With its introducing a series of
reforms, the Beijing Youth Daily does not limit its audience to youth any more. Instead,
82

The paper began printing in color in 1999.
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the newspaper covers all fields of public interest, according to its editor-in-chief Zhang
Yanping (Zhang, 2006). Its readers consist of business employees (23.2%), government
employees and office workers (20.3%), university students (13.3%), and educational,
cultural, scientific and health workers (10.4%) (Pu, 1994, as cited in Zhao, 1998). 83
Among them, only 1.8 percent are leading cadres, compared to 13.4 percent of the
People’s Daily readers (Zhao, 1998).
As a part of its strategy for success in a crowded marketplace, the Beijing Youth
Daily pays special attention to stories with wide public interest or concern, and puts
forward the motto: “use news values to push the main paper to the market” (Zhao, 1998).
It is not uncommon for the paper to raise important questions and generate heated debates
about contentious issues and the new phenomena that have arisen under the impact of a
market economy (see Rosen, 2000). The paper won high praise in public opinion polls for
its emphasis on investigative reporting and consumer issues. Its approval rate among the
public was “far higher” than the average of national papers, according to a survey
conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of Chinese People’s University
(Rosen, 2000). On January 1st, 2004, the China Dominant-Journalism Development
Center (CDDC) 84 published The 2003 Report of the Influence and Credibility of
Newspapers and Magazines in Mainland China, which lists the Beijing Youth Daily as
the most influential newspaper in Beijing. 85
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As the author observed in the 1990s, many newsrooms at the elite media, such as the Xinhua News
Agency, the People’s Daily, the CCTV, the China Daily, and other organ newspapers subscribed to the
Beijing Youth Daily, and occasionally took it as an example of reform to learn.
84
A non-profit website for journalism and communication research in mainland China. See the website
http://www.cddc.net.
85
Part organ papers were excluded from the report. The most credible newspaper in Beijing was the Beijing
Evening News.
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Since the 2000s, the Beijing Youth Daily has taken big steps to commercialize its
operation management, further enhancing the feeling of its readers that the newspaper is
more like a commercial one instead of an organ paper. Its advertising company, Beiqing
Chuanmei (Beijing Media Corporation Limited, HK$1000), 86 formed from the
newspaper’s non-editorial operations, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s H share
market on December 22, 2004, at a value of HK$4 billion (US$512 million), which made
the newspaper the first mainland media enterprise to list overseas. In 2005, the Beijing
Youth Daily succeeded in purchasing 51 percent of stock shares of a fashion magazine in
mainland China, which cost RMB ¥2 million (about US$240,964). Soon after its
announcement of planning to use RMB¥200 million (about US$24.1 million) in the way
of entire capital cash purchase to merge a national capital morning newspaper into its
media group, the paper officially began on August 31, 2005, its expansion strategy of
“kua meiti, kua hangye, kua quyu” (cross-media, cross-industry, cross-region), which
covers print media, online media, radio broadcast stations and television stations, by
successfully acquiring a controlling stake in Qianlong.com, a Beijing-based popular news
portal (Beijing Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com; Wang, 2005).
Yet the newspaper’s market-oriented taste and defense of the interests of common
people against corrupt officials and businesses does not suggest it is free from political
boundaries. Despite its seeking public sales, as Zhao (1998) pointed out, the newspaper
still works hard on a balance between the Party line and the bottom line. Although it is
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According to its annual report issued in April, 2005, the Beiqing Chuanmei, the main advertising
company for the Beijing Youth Daily and its subsidiaries, realized a business income of RMB ¥1.1 billion
(about US$132.5 million), increased by 2.9% compared to the previous year. The advertising revenue
amounted to RMB ¥814 million (about US$98 million). The net profit grew by 26.8% to RMB ¥194
million (about US$23.4 million, Wang, 2005).
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not unusual that contradictions between appealing to its readers and being politically
correct come up in daily operations, 87 there is no overall contradiction between being
commercialized and promoting the official ideology, which is what most Chinese
newspapers do in China. As a matter of fact, the Beijing Youth Daily has perfected the
“art of propaganda” to make both “masters” happy (Zhao, 1998). 88 Within the
overarching framework of government policies, and political and cultural ideology,
Rosen (2000) found that the debates and discussions of public interest sponsored by the
newspaper did not fall outside the parameters of Party initiatives.

4.6. Conclusion
The Chinese press, now facing the challenges to meet the needs of both the leader
and the led, has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function, while it is
undergoing a process of conglomeration (Huang, 2001; Zhao, 2000). As a reflection of
the broad changes of economic reform since 1978, especially the 1990s, there has been a
steep rise of various publications other than Party organ papers, ranging from evening
newspapers, city newspapers, targeted-population papers, enterprise newspapers, and
special-subject newspapers, in terms of both the number of titles and the volumes of
circulation and advertising revenue. Because of the government’s different expectations
and different structural and financial policies towards them, the newspapers
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The newspaper is also famous for frequently getting into trouble and being subject to leadership changes
as a result of its challenges against the authorities. Yet such challenges are big enough to get readers’
attention but inconsistent enough to avoid being closed down (Zhao, 1998). The paper’s low official status
in terms of administrative hierarchy also provides its safety margin to “play the edge ball,” which is
mentioned in Footnote 43.
88
See more examples in Zhao (1998) about how the newspaper repackages the official ideology, sometimes
even using sensationalism.
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place differential weights to propaganda and objective content (Guo & Chen, 1997),
while they all face the challenges of serving the state and the market, and commonly have
the responsibility of promoting economic modernization, a new official line in reform
China, as part of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).
In the scheme of Chinese newspapers unevenly developed within the Party-state
sphere and the market sphere (Figure 4.1), Party organ papers particularly distinguish
themselves from the other two groups for their dominating position in the Party-state
sphere, thus enjoying most editorial priority and privileges while suffering the tightest
control of the CCP. As the flagship mouthpiece of the CCP, the People’s Daily is at the
top level of Party authorities; therefore, its role as a propaganda tool to facilitate
government policies and promote Party ideology are emphasized more at this paper than
at other Party organs at lower levels, other organ papers, and non-organ papers. In
contrast, the Beijing Youth Daily, which has undergone the transcendent process from a
typical organ paper targeted at youth to a hybrid of an official organ and a mass appeal
newspaper, are much more market-oriented in terms of both editorial tendency and
operation management. The paper’s financial autonomy and marginal official status make
it possible to stretch its editorial boundaries. Yet it is still limited within the overall
framework of political and cultural ideology.
The literature review suggests that the content presented in the Chinese
newspapers might differ, to a more or less degree, across the sectors of news
organizations, even if the news organizations are under the same umbrella of political and
cultural systems. For instance, the study of Luther and Zhou (2004) presents the
differences of valences [positive, negative and neutral] of frames between the People’s
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Daily, and the China Daily, the only daily newspaper published in English with a major
target of foreign readers. Although this is a very good starting point to detect whether
differences in media content exist across the structural levels of the Chinese press, more
systematic research needs to be done to see how such influences might interact with other
macro factors such as the political system and cultural traditions. The selection of the
People’s Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily for this study is a result of a thorough
literature review of the emerging commercialized media market and uneven structures of
newspapers in China.
Unlike their peers in other societies, such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore, where the media are largely privately owned and
government controls are exerted through laws, regulations, licenses, and taxes
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), the media in China are primarily government-owned with
government control exerted through media financing in addition to the control
mechanisms above. Therefore, it is acceptable to select two newspapers with different
financial statuses, such as the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily to represent the
Chinese press as a whole for the cross-cultural analysis to avoid the bias toward neither
type of newspaper. It is also meaningful to separate the two newspapers for the purpose
of testing the impacts of the factors at the extramedia level, such as government control
and the marketplace.
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CHAPTER V.
OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES

5.1. Research Objectives and Study’s Significance
The literature review of research on the Internet in China and factors influencing
the construction of media content suggests a good opportunity to study the media
treatment of the Internet in China. As discussed before, the research on the Internet and
China’s Internet is very productive. Yet only one study has approached the Internet in
China from the perspective of news media coverage. Moreover, the pictures of China’s
Internet in media have not fully been drawn in terms of framing. Comparisons of the
treatment could be done both within a country, where the factors at the first four levels in
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model are examined, and across societies, where the
broadest level regarding socio-political, ideological and cultural factors are paid
particular attention.
The Internet has been at the forefront of the information revolution in China. It is
an integral part of the overall information and communications technology (ICT) sector,
which is high on the Chinese government’s new policy agenda for creating a national
information infrastructure. Yet for China, the only large communist country, the Internet
is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Chinese government is trying to realize
informatization (xinxihua) over the country through Internet development, which is
viewed by the state as critical to China’s future growth and international competitiveness
(Zhou, 2004a); on the other hand, it has attempted to exert its own control of this
information infrastructure by means of heavy regulation and technical measures to reduce
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the “undesirable” political impact of the global computer network (Zhou, 2004b). This is
contrary to the idea emphasized in countries such as the United States that the Internet is
in nature free of control and a force for democracy. The topic of China’s Internet, which
involves multiple aspects of a society, has drawn intensive attention from governments,
media, and academic circles both inside and outside China. Therefore, such a topic is
very suitable for a cross-cultural study. The intrinsic antinomy of China’s Internet
policies and the contradiction between the Chinese government’s political control of the
Internet and the principles of the free flow of information provide a good opportunity for
a framing study, since power and ideology have been articulated from the very beginning
of framing research.
As far as the literature on media content is concerned, research tends to examine
the factors at the lower levels in the Shoemaker and Reese model, such as gate keeping of
individuals, media routines, and organizational elements. Few studies have virtually
moved onto the higher level, especially empirically, although scholars have to a great
degree been aware of the importance of the factors, such as ideology, political system,
and culture, in shaping media content.
The literature review has also mentioned that considerable research on media
framing has been carried out exploring the relationship between media frames and
individual frames, and how media frames influence the way in which individuals
perceive and construct reality. The first part of the framing process, that is, how reality is
constructed, how media frames are formed or the types of frames that result from this
process, and how various factors at both micro and macro levels – especially those at the
macro level – play a role in this process, has largely been ignored. Carragee and Roefs
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(2004) criticize that recent framing research “have neglected the relationship between
media frames and broader issues of political and social power” (p.214). Particularly, in
previous empirical studies of media framing, questions of power and ideology, which are
usually inquired in the context of critical analysis, typically have not been raised. As
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) put it, scholars concerned with ideology typically have
adopted a critical approach, emphasizing “more general, abstract theorizing than testing
specific hypotheses with empirical data” (p.223).
The current study set out with three primary objectives: 1) To identify the patterns
of newspapers’ treatment of the Internet in China; 2) To empirically test the influence of
factors at two broadest levels, such as the extramedia and ideology levels, in Shoemaker
and Reese’s model on media content by incorporating the framework of framing studies;
3) To make a contribution to the literature of framing research by introducing Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions as independent variables to explain the variations of the presentations
of generic news frames.
There are some studies being done cross-culturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, &
Semetko, 2001). However, such studies do not present clear relationships between media
frames and certain factors influencing content, in that the focus of such studies tends to
only present the differences of media frames and the researchers tend not to empirically
correlate the factors influencing media content to the presentations of media frames.
Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that most studies in
this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by singling out one
factor. As a result, the interactions between factors are easily ignored.
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This study may fill those gaps by looking at news frames of the Internet and
China’s Internet in the newspapers published in five societies, and empirically testing the
relationship between news frames and the factors at the higher level in the Shoemaker
and Reese model. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect patterns among countries
and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences between an arbitrary pairing
of two countries.
Last but by no means least important, the comparisons between the national Party
Organ newspaper, the People’s Daily, and its local counterpart, the Beijing Youth Daily,
with relative institutional and financial autonomy in China will serve as a preliminary
investigation of whether news frames vary along with the changing structure of media in
China.

5.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Major goals in this study include identifying and outlining the issues related to the
Internet in China, which issues more frequently appeared in news stories, how the issues
were framed, and what the dominant frames and their variations were. Several research
questions are raised to address these concerns:
RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most
frequently taken as the primary subject of a given story within each society?
RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one
another in reporting the issues? If so, how?
RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the
newspapers of each society?
RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with
the societies? If so, what variations of the presentations existed across the
societies?
89

A second goal is to examine how much variations in media framing could be
explained by such factors at the macro levels as political systems, social norms and
cultural values, and their interactions, by comparing the newspapers published in
different countries. The variations were examined quantitatively by measuring the
frequencies of generic news frames, and running seven logistic regression models for
seven generic news frames.
RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered,
how much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could
be explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found?
Particular attention is paid to such issues as the Internet use in China, the issues of
Internet censorship and/or regulations, and the political and social impact and
consequences of the Internet in China, since all these three issues are controversial with
political and cultural implications, and most frequently discussed in the literature of
China’s Internet. Therefore, it will be very interesting to see how the newspapers across
the societies used news frames to report these issues.
RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often
associated with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and
regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet as primary
subjects?
RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be
associated with societies?
In addition, the variations of framing stories across societies were also measured
by the political tendency and/or tolerance index (PTI) scores of news stories, which were
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counted based on the information regarding the three issues. 89
RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the
newspapers’ coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly
differ from one another?
RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly
contribute to the differences?
The Internet has begun to permeate into China, especially in cities. While
bringing numerous benefits to people’s daily lives, the Internet has also been perceived as
a challenge to the political authorities of the CCP in China because of its potential to
provide an alternative channel for the voices of dissent. I would assume that the media
from societies with more political freedom might be more likely to discuss such
controversial issues as China’s control of the Internet than in the media from societies
with less political freedom. To marginalize such issues, the media from societies such as
China and Singapore might be more likely to devote more space to those issues such as
Internet diffusion and use, and the socio-cultural impact of the Internet, which are closely
tied to daily life. Also, as discussed above in the literature review of generic news frames,
the conflict frame has commonly been used in Western media in storytelling. Compared
to the factual frame, the conflict frame “with two clearly polarized parties,” as Richards
and King (2000) suggest, “brings an element of drama.” The effects of storytelling in
such a news frame are assumed to be much stronger than the factual frame. Therefore, the
researcher assumed that even though such controversial issues as Internet censorship and
regulations were mentioned, the media from societies with less political freedom might
have presented them in factual frames so as to understate their importance. Also they
might have interpreted such issues from the perspective of morality to justify censoring
89
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content, such as pornography, which is socially and culturally controversial. With the
above assumptions and the assumptions underlying Hofstede’s (1980, 1983) cultural
value dimensions, the following hypotheses were proposed:
H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of
Internet censorship and regulations in China will more likely to be mentioned or
discussed.
H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of
Internet use in China will more likely to be mentioned or discussed.
H2: Among those news stories concerning the Internet use in China, there will be
more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from
societies with more political freedom.
H3a: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations in China, the factual frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with less political freedom.
H3b: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations in China, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in
the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.
H3c: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations in China, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with less political freedom.
H3d: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations in China, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.
H3e: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations in China, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with more political freedom.
H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and
implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political
aspects in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.
H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in
the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of
power distance.
H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of
individualism vs. collectivism.

92

The third goal of the current study is to see whether the news coverage and frames
in the Party organ dailies would differ from the local newspapers with more financial
autonomy.
RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China’s Internet
appear to exist between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily?
RQ7: Was the presentation of each generic news frame associated with the types
of Chinese newspapers?
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CHAPTER VI.
METHODOLOGY
A content analysis was conducted to identify the issues related to the Internet in
China and the news frames used to cover these issues during the period of 2000 to 2004
in the newspapers of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. Samples of news stories drawn from ten selected newspapers were analyzed to
compare the thematic choices or news frames used to depict the Internet in China.

6.1. Selection of Societies
Five societies, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, were selected in this study. Among them, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore
belong to “Greater China” (Harding, 1993; Shambaugh, 1993), or “cultural China” (Frith,
1996). They are joined by a set of cultural values that includes collectivism,
modernization, authoritarianism and relative noncompetitiveness (Martin, 1996). One
might assume that with increased affluence, population growth and increased trading
activity with Western nations, some of the unique cultural characteristics of these
societies have diminished. Yet much of Chinese culture remains and exerts a strong
influence over everyday life. It would be meaningful to compare Eastern culture and
Western culture, especially between China and the United States. China is regarded as
typical of Eastern culture while the United States is typical of Western culture (Porter &
Samovar, 1997). Based on the indexes of cultural dimensions, China is more
collectivistic, higher in power distance, and more long-term oriented, whereas the United
States is more individualistic, lower in power distance, and more short-term oriented
94

(Hofstede, 2001). 90 The United Kingdom was added into this study in order to expand the
scope of cultural comparison. Chinese communication differs from its Western
counterpart. Hall’s (1976) differentiation between low and high-context cultures is a
dimension of socio-cultural variability that is used to explain cultural differences in
communication-related processes, especially between Eastern and Western societies. It
would be of significance to determine how wide, if any, the “culture lag” exists in these
differing societies in terms of perceiving the Internet, the so-called fourth medium.
Cultural values are assumed to have influences on the perceptions of the Internet
presented in the media. For instance, the Singapore government has drawn up a list of
“good” and “bad” Asian and Western values (Stravens, 1996) shared in its country.
Among the Western values perceived as “good” for Singapore are “a political system
based on democracy,” the “rule of law” and the “egalitarian belief in affording equality of
opportunity to all.” Among the values perceived to be “bad” for Singapore are “excessive
materialism and hedonism,” “living beyond one’s means,” “too much emphasis on the
rights and interests of the individual and too little emphasis on the rights and interests of
the community and the state,” and “inability to make sacrifices in the short-term for longterm benefits” (p.277). Compared to Americans, these shared values may prompt in
Singaporeans a stronger belief in the role of government and less emphasis on symbols
and actions that glorify individual identity. Such differences are assumed to have impacts
on media frames.
Although the selected Chinese societies have their own unique aspects of history,
culture, and consumption patterns, including variations in personal values and interest,
90

They are relatively close in terms of uncertainty avoidance.
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they seem to have similar cultural backgrounds influenced by Confucius culture. One of
the reasons for selecting these societies of Confucius culture is based on the assumption
that if the media frames presented in the newspapers in these societies with close cultural
traditions vary along the cultural dimensions, then we will be more confident to
generalize such conclusions to the comparisons between those societies with very
different cultural backgrounds. By looking at several culturally different societies, we
may be able to see a more dynamic process in which positive and negative effects of
different factors or dimensions might offset one another. This process cannot be
examined in the comparative study only between two societies.

6.2. Selection of Newspapers
Two newspapers published in either Chinese or English in each of the selected
societies, were purposely selected. Two English newspapers were chosen respectively for
the United States and the United Kingdom, where only English is the official language.
Because of the bilingual nature of official language policy in Singapore and Hong Kong,
two newspapers, each representing Chinese or English, were chosen for these two
societies. For China, where Chinese is the only official language, two Chinese
newspapers, the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily were selected based on the
literature presented in Chapter 4.
The New York Times and Los Angeles Times were selected for the United States,
because they both rank among the national leaders, covering international news widely,
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and geographically representing the East and West Coast. 91 For the newspapers
published in the other societies, the reliable Newslink list of newspapers
(http://newslink.org/), which contains the links to major newspapers over the world, was
used to locate only national daily newspapers, either Chinese or English. Those specialty
newspapers such as the Commercial Daily, Asian Business News, and Financial Times,
and non-daily newspapers were excluded. The final list included the South China
Morning Post 92 and Sing Tao Daily 93 in Hong Kong, the Lianhe Zaobao 94 and Straits
Times 95 in Singapore, and the Times and Guardian in the United Kingdom. All these
newspapers are influential in their home societies.

6.3. Time Frame for the Study
The time frame, from 2000 through 2004, was chosen for the comparison study
across societies, because for the first time in history, the growth of international
connection bandwidth outstripped the increase of user population in the second half of
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For the New York Times, the Lexis-Nexis Academic database was used to locate the relevant articles.
Because of copyright laws, the database does not include stories written by freelance reporters, which
might be a potential limitation of this study. Refer to the section of data collection for the collection of the
articles in the Los Angeles Times.
92
Founded in 1903, the leading English language newspaper in Hong Kong is currently published by the
SCMP Group. The newspaper, with a total readership of 322,040 in 2005, has the highest percentage of
readers being business decision makers and opinion leaders among all major Hong Kong newspapers
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Morning_Post).
93
Published in 1938, the newspaper enjoys one of the longest publishing histories among Chinese
newspapers in Hong Kong. With 9 overseas bureaus, the paper, positioning itself for the middle class,
circulates over 100 cities around the world (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sing_Tao_Daily).
94
As the most-read Chinese daily in Singapore, the Lianhe Zaobao, with subscribers in Southeast Asia,
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United Nations, is regarded as an important source of political and
economic news on East Asia, especially China. It was established in 1983, following the merger of two of
Singapore’s oldest Chinese newspapers – Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh.
(http://www.zaobao.com.sg/pages/lianhe.html).
95
First published in 1845, the Straits Times is the oldest newspaper of any kind in Singapore. With 11
bureaus in major cities over the world, it is the only broadsheet English-language newspaper with general
news coverage in the country (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straits_Times).
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year 2000. The bandwidth capability for international connection in China made a
quantum leap from 351 Mbps in January 2000 to 1234 Mbps in July 2000, increasing
almost tenfold, while the number of computers connected to the Internet, only 747,000 in
January 1999, had surpassed 6,500,000 by July 2000 (see Table 2.1). Also, the world
began in 2000 to be more aware of the development of the Internet in China. A
preliminary search in the LexisNexis database found only a few related articles available
in each year before 2000.

6.4. Data Collection
Only news stories were collected for this study. Editorials, opinions, readers’
letters, etc., were excluded. The Lexis-Nexis database was used for consistency to locate
the related news stories for the newspapers published in English, the New York Times,
Times, Guardian, 96 and Strait Times. The Los Angeles Times is unavailable in this
database. The archive index of the Los Angeles Times’ online version was used to locate
the related news articles; then the microfilm copies of the newspaper were used for full
texts. 97 The Factiva database was used to find news stories from the Chinese newspapers
published in Hong Kong and Singapore. For the newspapers in China, the online archives
of the two Chinese newspapers were used.
In all the searching, the following combination of key words “‘China’ AND
‘Internet’ OR ‘network’ OR ‘Web’” (with a Chinese version “‘zhongguo dalu’ OR
96

The Times does not file any stories with the Lexis-Nexis database unless it is written by its employees.
No articles from the Reuters, AP and other wire services are included in the database. The Guardian is
published only six days. These might have been the reasons for the few numbers of the relevant articles in
the two newspapers, thus introducing some bias in sampling.
97
The Home Edition was used.
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‘neidi’ (mainland China) AND ‘yintewang’ OR ‘hulianwang’ OR ‘wangluo’ OR
‘wangye’”) was used to search for full texts. Eliminated from the sample were articles in
which the key words were mentioned, but were unrelated to the main topic concerning
the Internet in mainland China. 98 The procedure resulted in a total population of 6,088
news stories with the Internet in mainland China as primary subject (1148 for the
People’s Daily, 3,574 for the Beijing Youth Daily, 485 for Hong Kong, 662 for
Singapore, 153 for the United States, and 66 for the United Kingdom), 99 and a total
population of 1,994 non-primary stories, in which China’s Internet-related issues were
mentioned in one or several sentences, but the primary subject of a given story was not
about the Internet in China (645 for the People’s Daily, 183 for the Beijing Youth Daily,
353 for Hong Kong, 385 for Singapore, 246 for the United States, and 182 for the United
Kingdom). 100

6.5. Sampling
The sample strata were determined based on the origin of the newspaper and the
differentiation between primary and non-primary stories. 101 A simple random sampling
method was used to draw samples from each stratum. The statistics software JMP was
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Those discussing the Internet in Hong Kong were also excluded.
To examine the differences between the People’s Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily, the sub-population
of China was divided up into two separate groups.
100
Primary stories and non-primary stories were treated in this study differently. Non-primary stories in
were primarily coded for the theme of the related sentence(s) in question (see APPENDIX A for the
detailed instructions about how to differentiate primary stories and non-primary stories). Therefore, the
sub-population of each society was also separated varying with the groups of primary or non-primary
stories.
101
Because one of the goals was to compare the two newspapers from China, the sample strata were further
determined by the population of the relevant stories of each newspaper within China.
99

99

used to obtain the random numbers. In order to determine a desirable sample size for my
research project, several decisions involving my judgment were made step by step.
The present study primarily involved a series of binary variables (presenting or
not presenting a type of frame), which was the most important attribute of the outcome
variables. Because of the exploratory nature, this study took the estimate of the
proportion of the population possessing that attribute (presenting or not presenting a type
of frame) as 50%. Then the margin of error in estimating the proportion was determined.
That is an assessment made as to how accurate or representative a sample was needed.
Since the current study did not involve some crucial considerations of factors such as
fatal diseases, where a very small variance may cause serious effects, the confidence
interval ± 10% was used, which means the sample would possess the attribute in question
within ± 10% of the population value, e.g., 50% ± 10%. This way, the sample size could
also be reduced substantially. The next step was to determine the confidence level. While
a sample size that would prevent the researcher from carrying out this study in a timely
fashion was avoided, a large enough sample size was used so that the proportion
possessing the attribute could fall within the specified margin of error. It is customary to
choose the 99% confidence level for extreme confidence; the 95% level for reasonable
confidence; and the 90% level for a slightly less level of confidence. The 95% confidence
level was chosen. Thus, in this study, randomly drawn samples from a population will
possess the outcome attribute – presenting a type of news frame – within a range of error
of ± 10%, 95 times out of 100. The last step was to use the formula “n = (pq)/SE2” and its
adjusted version with a corrected factor “n = (pq)/( SE2 +pq/N)” to determine the
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Table 6.1. Sample Sizes of Primary & Non-Primary Stories in Newspapers
in Each Society
People’s
Daily
Primary Stories
Non-primary
Stories

Population
Sample
Population
Sample

Beijing Youth
Daily

1148
96
645
96

3574
96
183
63

Hong
Kong
485
96
353
75

Singapore

U.S.

662
96
385
77

U.K.

153
59
246
69

66
39
182
63

sampling sizes for the newspapers in each society based on the knowledge about the
population sizes involved in the study. 102
As a result, a full list of the sample sizes for both primary and non-primary stories
was obtained (see Table 6.1). The total sample was 925, 482 for primary stories and 443
for non-primary stories. To reduce the bias that might be introduced by the year of
articles, I further stratified the sample based on the proportion of each year of articles
within each society. 103

6.6. Unit of Analysis and Coding
The process of identifying the frequently appearing issues related to China’s
Internet and the presentations of generic news frames were carried out through a
102

If the population is large such that the sample will not be more than 20% of the population, it is not
necessary to introduce a correction factor. In this study, p = .5 (the estimate of the proportion of the
population possessing the attribute), q = 1 – p = 1 - .5 = .5, SE = (10%)/1.96 = 0.051. Therefore, for the
case where the population was large enough, the sample size was: n = 0.25/0.002601 = 96. This was the
case for China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. For the United States and the United Kingdom, where the
populations were relatively small, a correction factor was introduced, and the second formula was used. In
the formula, N represents the population size. For detailed information on the application of the formulae,
see http://www2.uta.edu/sswmindel/S6324/Class%20Materials/Sampling/sampsize.pdf. See also Tamhane
and Dunlop (2000).
103
Again, within China, the samples for the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily were separately drawn.
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quantitative content analysis. The correlations between the news frames and the issues in
questions and the variances of such correlations and the presentations of news frames
across the societies were quantitatively examined. The comparisons of the newspapers in
China were also conducted quantitatively.
The unit of analysis was the individual news article. A coding book was designed
based on three primary research interests (see Appendix B(I) and Appendix B(II)). In
coding, the first set of questions asked what issue(s) related to the Internet in China
was(were) mentioned or discussed in a given article, and which issue was the primary
subject of the article. The second set concerned the extent to which the article in question
framed a given issue from a political perspective and/or presented tolerance to political
views that were not favorable to the Chinese government. This part, called “Political
Tolerance Index” (PTI), included a series of questions, such as whether the Internet use
discussed in the article stressed the political aspect, whether dissident content or users
were mentioned, whether the discussion regarding China’s Internet control, if any,
stressed the necessity of regulating the Internet or the position unfavorable to the
regulation, whether the discussion stressed the Chinese government’s ability or success in
regulating the Internet or its impossibility or failure in regulating the Internet, and so
on. 104 The third set of questions asked whether the article presented a certain type of
news frame, and whether the frame was associated with the primary subject. Under
several questions, some further questions were developed regarding the primary agent(s)
or actor(s) involved in Internet-related practice.
104

See the coding forms in APPENDIX B for detailed information. Two additional categories, “not
ascertainable” and “not applicable,” were set for the stories with no value judgment or neutral judgment
and those that have nothing to do with these questions. Refer to APPENDIX C for the guidelines for these
two categories.
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In order to establish intercoder reliability figures, two trained bilingual coders 105
coded a random sample of 10 percent of the English newspaper articles and the same
percentage of articles from the Chinese newspapers. 106 Detailed instructions used to
categorize different Internet-related issues, and determine which Internet-related issue
was the primary subject of a given article and whether a certain type of news frame was
present, were given in the coding guidelines (see Appendix C). Before coding, discussion
of the meanings of the PTI questions and the generic news frames took place. With all of
the Internet-related issues and the news frames listed in the coding sheet, the coders had
the opportunity to code for more than one issue and one frame, but only one primary
subject within each article. Scott’s pi, a reliability measurement approach stricter than
Holsti’s coefficient, was used for calculating the reliability figures. To take account of the
probability of agreement by chance, Scott (1955) developed the pi index, which corrects
for the number of categories used and also for the probable frequency of use:
% observed agreement - % expected agreement
Reliability = ————————————————————
1 - % expected agreement
The coefficients for the key variables generated from such calculation were well
beyond the generally accepted .70 for content analysis. For the English newspapers, the
intercoder reliability figures for several of the main variables were as follows: 1.00 (the
Internet-related issue taken as the primary subject of a story), .74 (the Internet-related
issues mentioned or discussed other than the primary subject), .88 (the PTI questions),

105

Cultural bias might have been introduced because both coders were native Chinese fluent in English.
The sample used for calculating intercoder reliability figures were all primary stories, because the
categories designed for non-primary stories were consistent with those for primary stories.

106
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1.00 (the presence of a factual frame), .93 (the presence of a human interest frame), 1.00
(the presence of a conflict frame), .93 (the presence of a responsibility frame), 1.00 (the
presence of a morality frame), .94 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), and
.94 (the presence of a leadership frame). For the Chinese newspapers, the intercoder
reliability figures for the same variables were as follows: 1.00 (the Internet-related issue
taken as the primary subject of a story), .89 (Internet-related issues mentioned or
discussed other than the primary subject), .92 (the PTI questions), 1.00 (the presence of a
factual frame), .95 (the presence of a human interest frame), .97 (the presence of a
conflict frame), .95 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), .97 (the presence
of a morality frame), 1.00 (the presence of a responsibility frame), and .93 (the presence
of a leadership frame).

6.7. Independent and Dependent Variables
As discussed in the literature review of media framing, the frame-building process
concerns the relationships between media frames and the factors influencing media
content. In this study, the focus was on how political systems, and cultural dimensions,
the independent variables, might impact on the presentations of the issues and the news
frames covering the Internet in China in the newspapers across cultural societies, the
dependent variables.
The variable of political systems was operationalized based on the ratings of
Freedom House (Table 6.2). Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual
assessment of the state of freedom in all countries (and territories), now known as
Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2004). It measures freedom according to two
104

Table 6.2. Five Year Ratings Timeline of Freedom House
(Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)

China
Hong Kong
Singapore
U.S.
U.K.

2000
7,6,NF
5,3,PF
5,5,PF
1,1,F
1,2, F

2001
7,6,NF
5,3,PF
5,5,PF
1,1,F
1,2, F

2002
7,6,NF
5,3,PF
5,4,PF
1,1,F
1,2, F

2003
7,6,NF
5,3,PF
5,4,PF
1,1,F
1,1, F

2004
7,6,NF
5,3,PF
5,4,PF
1,1,F
1,1, F

(Source: Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls 107 )

two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights include the right
to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact
on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law,
and personal autonomy without interference from the state. It is claimed that the country
and territory ratings “generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both
governmental and nongovernmental.” In this study, the overall status was used, with 1, 2
and 3 respectively taking on the values “not free,” “partly free,” and “free,” as one of the
independent variables representing variance in political systems across the five selected
societies.
Freedom House does not maintain a cultural-bound view of freedom. For
comparisons of cultural impacts, the index scores of cultural dimensions presented in
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Each country or territory is assigned a numerical rating, which is calculated based on the methodology
described below, on a scale of 1 to 7. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least
amount of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an
overall status of “Free (F),” “Partly Free (PF),” or “Not Free (NF).” Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5
are considered “Free,” 3.0-5.0 “Partly Free,” and 5.5-7.0 “Not Free.”
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Hofested’s study (Table 6.3) was adopted, when the set of logistic regression models was
built (see the next section) and the hypotheses related to the dimensions were tested.
The scores of Political Tolerance Index (PTI), which were calculated from the
answers to the series of PTI questions, measured the extent to which the newspapers were
predisposed to reporting the political aspect of the Internet in China, and presented
certain tolerance to the content or views unfavorable to the Chinese government. The
scores were obtained following two steps: 1) A score scale was set up for each checked
PTI question. A score of “0” was assigned to the non-political aspect of a given issue
(e.g., non-political use of the Internet, non-political aspect of Internet regulation, etc.), or
the position favorable to the Chinese government (e.g., it is necessary to regulate the
Internet, or it is possible for the government to control the Internet, or the Internet
development will strengthen the current regime), which was taken as the reference point.
A score of “+1” was assigned to the opposite of the reference. Those “unascertainable”

Table 6.3. Index Scores of Cultural Dimensions

China a
Hong Kong
Singapore
U.S.
U.K.

Power Distance
(PDI)

Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI)

80
68
74
40
35

30
29
8
46
35

a

Individualism/
Collectivism
(IDV)
20
25
20
91
89

Long-/ ShortTerm Orientation
(LTO)
118
96
48
29
25

Unlike the others, China was not included in the IBM database of Hofstede’s 1980 seminal work.
(Source: Scores from Exhibit A5.1 and A5.3 in Hofestede, 2001.)
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answers for the articles mixed with both political and non-political, or favorable
and unfavorable sides, were given a score “0.5.” 2) The sum of scores for all PTI
questions yielded the total PTI score for each article.

6.8. Statistics Methods
Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and percentages, I× J contingency
tables, and Chi-square tests, were used to address the first two sets of research questions,
the fourth set of questions, and the first four sets of hypotheses. For RQ3, a set of logistic
regression models were built to predict whether a type of news frame occurs or not:
logit(π) = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5 X5, 108 where X1 stands for the status of
freedom, X2 for Power Distance, X3 for Uncertainty Avoidance, X4 for Individualism vs.
Collectivism, and X5 or Long-/Short-Term Orientation. Similar approaches were adopted
when the two newspapers published in mainland China were compared. To address the
fifth set of RQs regarding the PTI scores, ANOVA and the forward stepwise method for
regression models were used. Regression models were also built to address the fifth set of
hypotheses.
Two statistical software programs, SPSS and JMP, were used in this study.

108

This is a main effect model. The interaction terms between the factors were considered when all of the
potential models were run and the best fitted one was selected.
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CHAPTER VII.
ANALYSES AND RESULTS

7.1. What Issues Were Reported and Highlighted?
RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most frequently taken
as the primary subject of a given story within each society?
RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one another
in reporting the issues? If so, how?
Table 7.1 shows the frequencies of Internet-related issues appearing in the sample
of both primary and non-primary stories. Among all issues in question, the issue of
Internet diffusion and use in China was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers
from two Chinese societies, mainland China (61.54%, 216 of 351 articles) and Singapore
(48.55%, 84 of 173), and one Western society, the United Kingdom (53.92%, 55 of 102).
The newspapers from Hong Kong paid most attention to events about e-commerce,
Internet business and industry in mainland China (46.2%, 79 of 171), closely followed by
the issue of Internet diffusion and use (45.03%, 77 of 171). In Singapore, the issue of
Internet economy, with a percentage ranked second (40.46%, 70 of 173) drew much
attention. In the United States, the issue most frequently appearing in the newspapers was
Internet censorship and regulations in China, accounting for 55.47% (71 of 128 articles).
The percentage of the issue was also relatively high in the U.K. newspapers, ranked
second (39.22%, 40 of 102).
When the five societies were compared, Chi-square tests indicated that significant
within-issue differences existed across societies in terms of whether an article mentioned
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Table 7.1. Percentages of Articles with Internet-Related Issues
Mentioned within Each Society a
Internet
diffusion &
use

Internet
censorship &
regulations

E-commerce,
Internet
business &
industry

Consequences
& implications
of the Internet

Others

b

China
(N = 351)

216
61.54% c

49
13.96%

102
29.06%

21
5.98%

57
16.24%

Hong
Kong
(N = 171)

77
45.03%

36
21.05%

79
46.20%

5
2.92%

19
11.11%

Singapore
(N = 173)

84
48.55%

40
23.12%

70
40.46%

24
13.87%

21
12.14%

U.S.
(N = 128)

55
42.97%

71
55.47%

40
31.25%

20
15.63%

3
2.34%

U.K.
(N = 102)

55
53.92%

40
39.22%

25
24.51%

10
9.80%

8
7.84%

Both primary and non-primary stories were included. Each article was allowed to have more than one
issue checked.
b
The issues, such as Internet technologies, Internet security and other cybercrimes, and other issues listed
in the coding sheet were combined into one category for analysis. Same in the tables below.
c
% of N. Same for all percentages in the table.
a
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a certain type of issue. The differences came most from three societies, mainland China,
Hong Kong, and the United States, which had high cell Chi-square values for most issues
(see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3). 109 The newspapers from mainland China were significantly
more likely to mention the issue of Internet diffusion and use (61.54%, 216 of 351), and
other issues (16.24%, 57 of 351). The observed frequency counts of these two issues
were significantly larger than the expected counts, especially with regard to the first issue
(216 vs. 184.8). The issues, such as Internet censorship and regulations (13.96%, 49 of
351), e-commerce, Internet business and industry (29.06%, 102 of 351), and the
consequences and implications of the Internet (5.98%, 21 of 351), were less likely to be
mentioned in China’s newspapers. Their observed frequency counts were all significantly
smaller than the expected, particularly the issue of Internet censorship and regulations (49
vs. 89.6). In contrast, the U.S. newspapers presented the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations (55.47%, 71 of 128) and the consequences and implications of Internet
(15.63%, 20 of 128) much more often than China and the other societies. Their observed
frequency counts were significantly larger than the expected. The observed count of the
articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was more than twice
as many as the expected (71 vs. 32.7). Hong Kong stood out for its significantly greater
likelihood of discussing e- commerce, Internet business and industry in mainland China
(46.2%, 79 of 171), and less likelihood of mentioning the issues of Internet diffusion and
use (45.03%, 77 of 171), and the consequences and implications of the Internet (2.92%, 5
of 171). Their observed counts were significantly smaller than the expected, especially in
109

Each cell Chi-Square value represents how much contribution the given cell has made to the total ChiSquare statistics. A high cell value means the difference between the observed and expected counts in the
cell is substantial. Most of the association between variables, if any, comes from the cells with a high value.
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Table 7.2. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in
Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies
(Issues of Internet Diffusion & Use, Internet Censorship & Regulations,
and E-Commerce, Internet Business & Industry) a
Internet diffusion &
use
(χ2 = 21.15, df = 4,
p < .001)

Yes

No

Internet censorship
& regulations
(χ2 = 97.48, df = 4,
p < .0001)

Yes

No

E-commerce,
Internet business &
industry
(χ2 = 22.84, df = 4,
p < .001)

Yes

No

China
(N = 351)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

216
184.797
61.54%
5.269

135
166.203
38.46%
5.858

49
89.552
13.96%
18.364

302
261.448
86.04%
6.290

102
119.909
29.06%
2.675

249
231.091
70.94%
1.388

Hong Kong
(N = 171)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

77
90.029
45.03%
1.886

94
80.971
54.97%
2.097

36
43.628
21.05%
1.334

135
127.372
78.95%
0.457

79
58.417
46.20%
7.252

92
112.583
53.80%
3.763

Singapore
(N = 173)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

84
91.082
48.55%
0.551

89
81.918
51.45%
0.612

40
44.138
23.12%
0.388

133
128.862
76.88%
0.133

70
59.101
40.46%
2.010

103
113.899
59.54%
1.043

U.S.
(N = 128)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

55
67.390
42.97%
2.278

73
60.610
57.03%
2.533

71
32.657
55.47%
45.018

57
95.343
44.53%
15.420

40
43.728
31.25%
0.318

88
84.272
68.75%
0.165

U.K.
(N = 102)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

55
53.702
53.92%
0.031

47
48.298
46.08%
0.035

40
26.024
39.22%
7.506

62
75.976
60.78%
2.571

25
34.845
24.51%
2.782

77
67.155
75.49%
1.443

The cell Chi-Square values with a significantly large difference between the observed and expected
counts are highlighted in the table. Standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to determine whether
such differences were significant. If the absolute value of a residual was more than two, the difference
between the observed and expected counts was significant. Same in the tables below. Refer to Simonoff
(2003, pp.215-218) for the explanation on the formula used to calculate standardized residuals and an
example. The formula is as follows:

a

rij =

nij − eij

eij (1 − ni. / n)(1 − n. j / n)
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Table 7.3. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in
Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies
(Issues of Consequences & Implications of the Internet, and Other Issues)
Consequences &
implications of the Internet
(χ2 = 24.28, df = 4, p < .0001)

Yes

No

Other issues
(χ2 = 19.44, df = 4,
p < .001)

Yes

No

China
(N = 351)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

21
30.357
5.98%
2.884

330
320.643
94.02%
0.273

57
40.982
16.24%
6.261

294
310.018
83.76%
0.828

Hong Kong
(N = 171)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
14.789
2.92%
6.480
24
14.962
13.87%
5.459
20
11.070
15.63%
7.203
10
8.822
9.80%
0.157

166
156.211
97.08%
0.614
149
158.038
86.13%
0.517
108
116.930
84.38%
0.682
92
93.178
90.20%
0.015

19
19.965
11.11%
0.047
21
20.199
12.14%
0.032
3
14.945
2.34%
9.547
8
11.909
7.84%
1.283

152
151.035
88.89%
0.006
152
152.801
87.86%
0.004
125
113.055
97.66%
1.262
94
90.091
92.16%
0.170

Singapore
(N = 173)

U.S.
(N = 128)

U.K.
(N = 102)
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regard to the latter issue (5 vs. 14.8).
Unlike these three societies, Singapore and the United Kingdom with relatively
small cell Chi-Square values showed little deviations from the expected counts in many
issues. Singapore significantly contributed to the total Chi-Square statistics in only one
issue. What made Singapore different from its Eastern peers was its newspapers’ greater
likelihood of discussing the consequences and implications of the Internet in China, with
the observed count significantly larger than the expected (24 vs. 15). The percentage of
such articles (13.87%, 24 of 173) in Singapore’s newspapers was very close to the one in
the U.S. newspapers, and even higher than that in the U.K. newspapers. The United
Kingdom was distinctive in two issues. In the U.K. newspapers, the observed count of the
issue of Internet censorship and regulations was about twice as many as the expected (40
vs. 26). The percentage of the articles mentioning the issue in the U.K. newspapers
(39.22%, 40 of 102) was second-ranked after the United States, much higher than the
Eastern societies, with a percentage ranging from 13.96% to 23.12%. In addition, like
China, the frequency of mentioning the issue of e-commerce and Internet business in the
U.K. newspapers was significantly smaller than the expected count.
In terms of primary subjects, the Internet-related issues were unequally
highlighted in the newspapers within each society (see Table 7.4). In China, the observed
frequency of the issue of Internet diffusion and use as the primary subject of a given story
was more than twice as many as the expected frequency, much more than those of the
other issues. In the other two Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the issue of ecommerce, Internet business or industry, with a positive high value of frequency residual
for both societies, was the most salient concern of the newspapers. This issue was the
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Table 7.4. Comparisons of Internet-Related Issues as Primary Subject
in Newspapers within Each Society a

China
(χ2 = 135.74,
df = 4,
p < .0001)
Hong Kong
(χ2 = 82.33,
df = 4,
p < .0001)
Singapore
(χ2 = 59.1,
df = 4,
p < .0001)
U.S.
(χ2 = 41.59,
df = 4,
p < .0001)
U.K.
(χ2 = 13.16,
df = 4,
p < .005)
a

E-commerce,
Internet
business &
industry
45

Observed

96

Internet
censorship
&
regulations
17

Expected

37.8

37.8

37.8

37.8

37.8

Residual

58.2

-20.8

7.2

-33.8

-10.8

Observed

13

18

53

1

11

Expected

19.2

19.2

19.2

19.2

19.2

Residual

-6.2

-1.2

33.8

-18.2

-8.2

Observed

19

20

46

1

10

Expected

19.2

19.2

19.2

19.2

19.2

Residual

-.2

.8

26.8

-18.2

-9.2

Observed

4

32

20

2

Expected

14.5

14.5

14.5

14.5

Residual

-10.5

17.5

5.5

-12.5

Observed

6

19

8

5

Expected

9.5

9.5

9.5

9.5

Residual

-3.5

9.5

-1.5

-4.5

Internet
diffusion
& use

The articles with primary subject as unascertainable were excluded.
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Consequences
& implications
of the Internet

Others

4

27

second most prominent issue in the newspapers from mainland China. Unlike their
Eastern counterparts, the U.S. and U.K. newspapers made the issue of Internet censorship
and regulations most prominent by frequently highlighting it as the primary subject. The
issue of the consequences and implications of Internet was less profiled in all Eastern
newspapers. The issue did not exist as a primary subject in any of the U.S. and U.K.
samples.
Significant differences also existed across the societies in terms of the prominence
of the Internet-related issues (χ2 = 141.77, df = 16, p < .0001; see Table 7.5). The main
differences appeared to occur in the issue of Internet censorship and regulations. The
subtotal of the five cell Chi-Square values of the issue (57.02) accounted for 40.22
percent of the total Chi-Square statistics. The cell Chi-Square values for China, the
United States and the United Kingdom were particularly high. Compared to their Eastern
counterparts, China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the two Western countries were much
more likely to highlight the issue as the primary subject of a given story. Particularly in
the United States, the observed count was almost three times as many as the expected (32
vs. 12.9). 55.17 percent of the articles in the U.S. newspapers took this issue as primary
subject with a cell Chi-Square value as high as 28.34, more than twice as many as those
in Hong Kong (18.75%) and Singapore (20.83%), and almost seven times as many as that
in China (8.99%). In China’s newspapers, the observed count was much smaller than the
expected count (17 vs. 42).
The United States, together with the United Kingdom again, was distinct for its
newspapers’ less frequently taking Internet diffusion and use in China, the second issue
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Table 7.5. Comparisons of Primary Subjects in Newspapers across Societies a

a

China
(N = 189)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

96
54.679
50.79%
31.226

17
42
8.99%
14.881

Ecommerce,
Internet
business &
industry
45
68.151
23.81%
7.864

Hong
Kong
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

13
27.774
13.54%
7.859

18
21.333
18.75%
0.521

Singapore
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

19
27.774
19.79%
2.772

U.S.
(N = 58)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

U.K.
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Internet
diffusion
& use

Internet
censorship
&
regulations

Consequences
& implications
of the Internet

Others

4
2.377
2.12%
1.108

27
21.793
14.29%
1.244

53
34.616
55.21%
9.763

1
1.208
1.04%
0.036

11
11.069
11.46%
0.001

20
21.333
20.83%
0.083

46
34.616
47.92%
3.744

1
1.208
1.04%
0.036

10
11.069
10.42%
0.103

4
16.780
6.90%
9.733

32
12.889
55.17%
28.337

20
20.914
34.48%
0.040

0
0.7296
0.00%
0.730

2
6.688
3.45%
3.286

6
10.994
15.79%
2.268

19
8.444
50.00%
13.194

8
13.702
21.05%
2.373

0
0.478
0.00%
0.478

5
4.382
13.16%
0.087

χ2 = 141.77, df = 16, p < .0001. The articles with more than one primary subjects were excluded.
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mainly causing the across-society differences, as the primary subject of a given story.
The observed count of the issue was less than one fourth as many as the expected value.
The percentage of the issue (6.9%) was less than half as many as Hong Kong (13.54%),
Singapore (19.79%) and the United Kingdom (15.79%), and only one eighth as China. In
contrast, the newspapers from China had 50.79 percent of the sample articles taking the
issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject, which enjoyed the highest cell ChiSquare value across issues and societies.
China was also in a sharp contrast to Hong Kong because of their newspapers’
treatment of events in China’s e-commerce and Internet business. Compared to the
others, the newspapers in Hong Kong made the issue more salient by frequently taking it
as its primary subject, with a percentage as high as 55.21%, more than twice as many as
China (23.84%). The observed count was much larger than the expected (53 vs. 34.6).
Singapore was also more likely to highlight the issue as its primary subject, with the
observed count significantly larger than the expected (46 vs. 34.6). Like China, the
percentage of the issue in the U.K. newspapers was relatively low (21.05%).
In terms of the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet, there
seemed to be no significant differences across societies, although the observed frequency
in the newspapers from China was a little larger than the expected one (4 vs. 2.4). As far
as other unspecified issues are considered, only the United States was found to differ
from the other societies in that its percentage of the article taking the issue as primary
subject, 3.45%, was much lower than all the others ranging from 10.42% to 14.24%. The
observed frequency count was even less than one third of the expected count.
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7.2. How and Why Were the Issues Framed in Certain Ways, If Any?
RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the newspapers
of each society?
RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with the
societies? If so, what variations of the presentations existed across the societies?
Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 summarize the frequency counts of different
types of news frames used in primary stories about the Internet in China in the selected
newspapers across societies. It is not surprising to see the factual frame, accounting for
more than 80 percent of articles in every single society, dominated in all newspapers. In
addition to the factual frame, the dominating type of news frame in the newspapers of
each society was respectively the human interest frame in China (33.16%), Singapore
(22.92%) and the United Kingdom (33.33%), the economic consequences frame in Hong
Kong (25.00%), and the conflict frame in the United States (47.46%). The three types of
news frames, such as the leadership, morality, and responsibility frames, were rarely used
in most newspapers.
As shown in Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, significant differences existed in
the presentation of each type of news frame. The main differences appeared to occur in
Hong Kong and mainland China, which differed from the other societies in many aspects.
Besides the leading percentage of the factual frame, news articles from Hong Kong
reported the highest percentage (25%, 24 of 96) of the articles with the economic
consequences frame presented, which was significantly higher than the other societies
with a percentage ranging from 6.67% to 18.64%. In contrast, the percentages of the
human interest, responsibility, morality and leadership frames present in the Hong Kong
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Table 7.6. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames
in Newspapers across Societies
(Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Conflict Frame) a
Factual Frame
(χ2 = 17.46,
df = 4, p < .005)

China
(N = 189)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Yes
151
159.15
84.36%
0.418

Hong
Kong
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

96
85.356
100.00%
1.327

0
10.644
0.00%
10.644

3
23.6
3.13%
17.98

93
72.4
96.88%
5.861

8
14.441
8.33%
2.873

88
81.559
91.67%
0.509

Singapore
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

83
85.356
86.46%
0.065

13
10.644
13.54%
0.522

22
23.6
22.92%
0.109

74
72.4
77.08%
0.035

14
14.441
14.58%
0.013

82
81.559
85.42%
0.002

U.S.
(N = 59)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

54
52.458
91.53%
0.045

5
6.542
8.47%
0.363

17
14.504
28.81%
0.430

42
44.496
71.19%
0.140

28
8.875
47.46%
41.213

31
50.125
52.54%
7.297

U.K.
(N = 39)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

33
34.676
84.62%
0.081

6
4.324
15.38%
0.650

13
9.588
33.33%
1.215

26
29.413
66.67%
0.396

12
5.867
30.77%
6.413

27
33.134
69.23%
1.135

a

No
28
19.847
15.64%
3.350

Conflict Frame
Human Interest
(χ2 = 73.98,
Frame
2
(χ = 33.7,
df = 4, p < .0001)
df = 4, p < .0001)
Yes
No
Yes
No
63
127
9
173
46.708
143.292 27.377 154.623
33.16%
66.84%
4.95%
95.05%
5.683
1.852 12.334
2.184

Only primary stories were coded for the presence of news frames.
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Table 7.7. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames
in Newspapers across Societies
(Economic Consequences Frame and Responsibility Frame)
Economic
Consequences Frame
(χ2 = 20.48,
df = 4, p < .001)
Yes
No
12
168
24.511
155.489
6.67%
93.33%
1.007
6.386

Responsibility
a
Frame
2
(χ = 8.846, df = 4,
p < .05)
Yes
No
12
168
11.106
168.89
6.67%
93.33%
0.072
0.005

China
(N = 189)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Hong
Kong
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

24
13.072
25.00%
9.135

72
82.928
75.00%
1.440

1
5.923
1.04%
4.092

95
90.077
98.96%
0.269

Singapore
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

14
13.072
14.58%
0.066

82
82.928
85.42%
0.010

10
5.923
10.42%
2.806

86
90.077
89.58%
0.185

U.S.
(N = 59)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

11
8.034
18.64%
1.095

48
50.966
81.36%
0.173

5
3.640
8.47%
0.508

54
55.360
91.53%
0.033

U.K.
(N = 39)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

3
5.311
7.69%
1.005

36
33.689
92.31%
0.159

1
2.406
2.56%
0.822

38
36.594
97.44%
0.054

a

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
was used for each type of news frame.
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Table 7.8. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames
in Newspapers across Societies
(Morality Frame and Leadership Frame) a
Morality Frame
Leadership Frame
(χ2 = 17.44, df = 4,
(χ2 = 7.834, df = 4,
p < .0001)
p < .05)
Yes
No
Yes
No
12
168
16
164
7.277
172.723
8.043
171.96
6.67%
93.33%
8.89%
91.11%
0.129
0.368
3.066
7.873

China
(N = 189)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Hong
Kong
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
4.289
0.00%
4.289

96
91.711
100.00%
0.201

0
3.881
0.00%
3.881

96
92.119
100.00%
0.164

Singapore
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
4.289
5.21%
0.118

91
91.711
94.79%
0.006

3
3.881
3.13%
0.200

93
92.119
96.88%
0.008

U.S.
(N = 59)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
2.636
0.00%
2.636

59
56.364
100.00%
0.123

3
2.385
5.08%
0.159

56
56.615
94.92%
0.007

U.K.
(N = 39)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
1.743
0.00%
1.743

39
37.257
100.00%
0.082

1
1.577
2.56%
0.211

38
37.423
97.44%
0.009

a

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
was used for each type of news frame.
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newspapers, compared to the other newspapers, were significantly lower, respectively
accounting for 3.13%, 1.04%, 0% and 0%. China differentiated itself from the others in a
different way. Its newspapers were more likely to use the human interest (33.16%, 63 of
189), morality (8.89%, 16 of 189) and leadership frames (6.67%, 12 of 189), respectively
with a percentage significantly higher than the others, but less likely to present a conflict
frame with a percentage (4.95%, 9 of 189) much lower than the others ranging from
8.33% to 47.46%. The observed count of the articles with a conflict frame in China was
significantly low, less than one third as many as the expected count (9 vs. 27.377).
By contrast, both the U.S. and U.K. newspapers were particularly likely to
provide a conflict frame for their news treatment of the Internet in China. 110 In addition
to the factual frame, the conflict frame had the highest percentage respectively in the two
countries, 47.76% (28 of 58) and 30.77% (12 of 38), much higher than their Eastern
counterparts. The U.S. newspapers posting a cell Chi-Square value as high as 41.213,
accounting for 55.71 percent of the total Chi-Square statistics, were particularly
distinctive in presenting a conflict frame. Except for the conflict frame, the U.K.
newspapers seemed to be normal in the presentations of the other types of news frames.
Singapore was the one least contributing to the total Chi-Square statistics. It
appeared to be the benchmark for comparing two opposite sides in each frame except for
110

Detailed investigations found that a large number of the articles with a conflict frame in the U.S. and
U.K. newspapers involved the Chinese government or people representing government, accounting for 80.5
percent of all conflict accounts in total (see Table D.1 in APPENDIX D). Among them the conflicts
between the two groups, the government or people representing government and individual(s) as ordinary
people, were most salient, accounting for 56.1 percent alone. The U.S. newspapers especially highlighted
this type of conflict, which had a dominant percentage, 58.6% (see Table D.2 in APPENDIX D). The
percentages of this type of conflict in the newspapers from three Eastern societies were relatively low,
especially China (0.00%) and Hong Kong (11.1%) (see Table D.4, Table D.5, and Table D.6 in Appendix
D).
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the responsibility frame. The newspapers from Singapore had the greatest likelihood to
present a responsibility frame with the highest percentage, 10.42% (10 of 96), among all
newspapers.

RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered, how
much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could be
explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found?
Table 7.9 shows the results from running logistics regression models with the
parameters identified by the forward stepwise method. Among the examined factors,
freedom status was the leading significant one in predicting whether such four news
frames as the factual, human interest, economic consequences and leadership frames
were presented in newspapers.
Compared to the others, the difference between the not-free society, China, and
the partly-free and free societies contributed most to the variations of the presentation of
the factual frame. The newspapers in the not-free society were less likely to present a
factual frame than the societies at the second and third levels of freedom status. Two
cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance (UAI)111 and long-/short-term orientation
(LTO), were significantly associated with the presentation of the frame. A society with a
higher score on UAI and LTO was more likely to provide a factual frame. Without the
influence of any other factors, a society with a UAI score one unit more was 1.057 times
more likely to present a factual frame as much as its reference society. Such a chance for

111

The abbreviations in Hofstede (2001) are used: PDI stands for power distance; UAI stands for
uncertainty avoidance; IVD stands for individualism vs. collectivism; LTO stands for long-/short-term
orientation.
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Table 7.9. The Effects of Political Systems and Cultural Dimensions
on the Overall Presence of News Frames
Wald χ2

βa

Unit Odds Ratio b

2

Factual Frame (R = .084, χ2 = 27.239, df = 3, p < .0001)
Intercept

-5.753

Freedom Status (1- 2&3)
UAI

-3.394**

4.645**

.032

**

**

1.057

**

1.081

.056

**

LTO

.078

4.317
4.267

2

Human Interest Frame (R = .081, χ2 = 43.437, df = 3, p < .0001)
4.769***

Intercept
Freedom Status (2-1)

-3.757****

18.55****

.023

Freedom Status (3-2)

-.562

1.37

.570

***

***

.955

LTO

-.046
2

12.42

2

Conflict Frame (R = .158, χ = 63.335, df = 3, p < .0001)
Intercept

.278

IVD

-.032

1.228

.969

LTO

**

**

.958

*

1.085

-.043

*

UAI
Responsibility Frame

.082

6.196

2.897

c

Morality Frame c
2

Economic Consequences Frame (R = .047, χ2 = 19.514, df = 2, p < .001)
-3.084****

Intercept
Freedom Status (1-2&3)
LTO

-.887****

16.043****

.412

**

**

1.011

1.954**

3.916**

7.058

*

*

.962

.011

4.658

2

Leadership Frame (R = .060, χ2 = 9.518, df = 2, p < .01)
Intercept
Freedom Status (1-2&3)
LTO

.012
-.039

2.742

The equation for a simple logistic regression model is as follows: log [p/(1- p)] = α+ βx, where p denotes
the probability of presenting a type of news frame when an explanatory variable Х, e.g., a cultural
dimension, takes value x; α is the intercept and β is the parameter of the explanatory variable. The order of
parameter estimates is based on the one of entering the model in the step history of stepwise regression.
b
For log odds of Yes/No.
c
No parameters were selected when the forward stepwise method was conducted with the probability to
enter set as .10. There was evidence showing the results were unstable. It might be caused by the fact that
the numbers of articles with the frame in question in the newspapers from the societies other than China
and Singapore were few.
*
p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .001, **** p< .0001
a
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a society with a LTO score one unit more was 1.081 times as much as for the
reference. 112
Whether an article provided a human interest frame was significantly associated
with freedom status and long-/short-term orientation. In the model, the difference
between the partly-free societies and the not-free society was the one contributing most to
the variations of presenting the human interest frame. Without the impacts of other
factors, the newspapers from the partly-free societies were less likely to provide a human
interest frame than those from the not-free society. Yet whether a society was a partlyfree or free society did not make a big difference in predicting the possibility of
presenting the human interest frame, which was also negatively associated with the
cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation. The higher scores on LTO a society
had, the less likely the newspapers in the society were to present a human interest frame.
The presentation of the conflict frame was associated with three cultural dimensions,
individualism vs. collectivism (IVD), long-/short-term orientation, and uncertainty
avoidance. Yet the association with the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism was
not significant in the model. The dimension of long-/short-term orientation negatively
predicted whether an article provided a conflict frame, whereas the dimension of
uncertainty avoidance, which was significant only at the level of α = 0.1, was positively
112

Because of the reversed order of the scores of the two dimensions assigned to some societies, the
interaction between the two dimensions was detected. Take the comparison between Hong Kong and the
United States as an example. With 17 more units of scores on UAI (see Table 6.3), the probability of
presenting a factual frame in the U.S. newspapers theoretically should be 17.96 (17×1.057) times as much
as in the Hong Kong newspapers (see Table 7.9). Yet, with 67 more units on the LTO score, the probability
in the Hong Kong newspapers should be 72.43 (67×1.081) times as much as in the U.S. newspapers. Such
an interaction at least partially explained why the percentage of presenting this type of frame in the Hong
Kong newspapers was actually significantly higher than in the U.S. newspapers. The positive association
between the dimension of long-/short-term and the presence of the factual frame might be because instead
of being interested in arguing about what is true, people in a long-term oriented culture stress what has been
done, as Hofstede (1991) suggested.
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associated with the presence of the frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on
LTO and a higher score on UAI, such as the United States, were more likely to present a
conflict frame.
Freedom status, specifically the difference between the non-free society and the
partly-free and free societies, was significant in predicting the presentations of both the
economic consequences frame and the leadership frame. The dimension of long-/shortterm orientation was significant at the level of α = 0.1. The effect directions of the two
factors were different. A society at a higher level of freedom status and a higher score on
LTO was more likely to present an economic consequences frame, but less likely to
present a leadership frame. Yet a free society did not differ much from a partly-free
society in predicting the presence of these two frames.

RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often associated
with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and regulations, and the
consequences and implications of the Internet as primary subjects?
RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be associated
with societies?
Among the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject,
the most frequently used news frame was the factual frame in the newspapers in China
(58.14%, 75 of 96), Hong Kong (100%, 13 of 13), Singapore (78.95%, 15 of 19), and the
United Kingdom (83.33%, 5 of 6), and the human interest (100%, 4 of 4) and conflict
frames (100%, 4 of 4) in the U.S. newspapers (see Table 7.10). The second-ranked
frames were respectively the economic consequences frame in Hong Kong (15.38%, 2 of
13), and the human interest frame in all other societies, China (33.33%, 32 of 96),
Singapore (42.11%, 8 of 19), and the United Kingdom (50%, 3 of 6). There were no
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Table 7.10. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories
with Internet Diffusion and Use as Primary Subject
Factual
Frame

Human
Interest
Frame

Conflict
Frame

Economic
Consequences
Frame

Leadership
Frame

Morality
Frame

Responsibility
Frame

China
(N = 96)

75
78.13% a

32
33.33%

0
0%

4
4.17%

10
10.42%

6
6.25%

2
2.08%

Hong
Kong
(N = 13)

13
100%

1
7.69%

0
0%

2
15.38%

0
0%

0
0%

0
0%

15
78.95%

8
42.11%

5
26.32%

1
5.26%

1
5.26%

2
10.53%

3
15.79%

U.S.
(N = 4)

1
25%

4
100%

4
100%

0
0%

1
25%

0
0%

1
25%

U.K.
(N = 6)

5
83.33%

3
50%

1
16.67%

0
0%

0
0%

0
0%

0
0%

Singapore
(N = 19)

a

% of N. Same for all percentages in the table.

articles with Internet diffusion and use as its primary subject that used the conflict frame
in the newspapers from mainland China and Hong Kong. In the Hong Kong newspapers,
three other frames such as the leadership, morality and responsibility frames were also
missing. These frames, together with the economic consequences frame, were missing in
the U.K. newspapers. The news frames missing from the stories with Internet diffusion
and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers were the economic consequences and
morality frames.
Chi-Square tests suggested that significant across-society differences were found
in the presentations of the factual (χ2 = 10.594, p < .05), human interest (χ2 = 12.857, p <
.005), and conflict frames (χ2 = 70.789, p < .0001), especially the conflict frame, which
had the highest total Chi-Square statistics. No significant differences were found in the
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other frames. 113 As shown in Table 7.11, the U.S. newspapers were particularly singled
out from the others for its significantly higher percentages in the presentations of the
human interest and conflict frames, which both were 100 percent. Both frames had a
significant difference between the observed and expected counts. The U.S. newspapers
had a lower percentage in presenting a factual frame (25%, 1 of 4), significantly lower
than those in the other societies, ranging from 78.13% to 100%. Hong Kong was the
second distinctive society, different from the others in the factual and human interest
frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong were more likely to use the factual frame with
the observed count significantly more than the expected count, and less likely to provide
a human interest with the observed count significantly less than the expected. The
percentage of the related articles with a human interest frame (7.69%, 1 of 13) was much
lower than the others ranging from 33.33% to 100%. In contrast to the United States and
Singapore, where the newspapers used the conflict frame in framing the issue of Internet
diffusion and use significantly more often than what were expected, the newspapers from
China did not present such a frame even once, leaving the observed count zero,
significantly less than the expected count of 6.957. The U.K. newspapers did not present
any unusual patterns on all the news frames.
In terms of the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject, the
most frequently used frame was still the factual frame in all societies (Hong Kong, 100%,
18 of 18; the United States, 93.75%, 30 of 32; Singapore, 90%, 18 of 20; the United
Kingdom, 84.21%, 16 of 19; and China, 82.35%, 14 of 17; see Table 7.12). Particularly

113

The count number of each cell was so few, and the p value for testing the responsibility frame was
0.068, larger than 0.5. It was considered insignificant.
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Table 7.11. Comparisons of News Frames for Stories with Internet Diffusion and
Use as Primary Subject across Societies
Factual Frame
Human Interest Frame Conflict Frame
(χ2 = 10.594, a
(χ2 = 70.789, b
(χ2 = 12.857, a
df = 4, p < .005)
df = 4, p < .0001)
df = 4, p < .05)
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
0
96
64
32
21
75
6.957
89.044
62.609
33.391
20.174
75.826
0.00% 100.00%
66.67%
33.33%
21.88%
78.13%
0.544
0.031
0.058
0.034
0.009
6.957

China
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Hong
Kong
(N = 13)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

13
10.268
100.00%
0.727

0
2.732
0.00%
2.732

1
4.522
7.69%
2.743

12
8.478
92.31%
1.463

0
0.942
0.00%
0.942

13
12.058
100.00%
0.074

Singapore
(N = 19)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

15
15.007
78.95%
0.000

4
3.993
21.05%
0.000

8
6.609
42.11%
0.293

11
12.391
57.89%
0.156

5
1.377
26.32%
9.535

14
17.623
73.68%
0.745

U.S.
(N = 4)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

1
3.159
25.00%
1.476

3
0.841
75.00%
5.548

4
1.391
100.00%
4.891

0
2.609
0.00%
2.609

4
0.290
100.00%
47.490

0
3.710
0.00%
3.710

U.K.
(N = 6)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
4.740
83.33%
0.014

1
1.261
16.67%
0.054

3
2.087
50.00%
0.400

3
3.913
50.00%
0.2130

1
0.435
16.67%
0.735

5
5.565
83.33%
0.057

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
was used.
b
50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher’s exact test was used.
a
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Table 7.12. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories
with Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject

a

Factual
Frame

Human
Interest
Frame

Conflict
Frame

Economic
Consequences
Frame

Leadership
Frame

Morality
Frame

Responsibility
Frame

China
(N = 17)

14
82.35%

1
5.88%

0
0.00%

1
5.88%

1
5.88%

4
23.53%

5
29.41%

Hong
Kong
(N = 18)

18
100.0%

0
0.00%

1
5.56%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

1
5.56%

Singapore
(N = 20)

18
90.00%

3
15.00%

6
30.00%

1
5.00%

1
5.00%

2
10.00%

3
15.00%

U.S.
(N = 32)

30
93.75%

9
28.13%

16
50.00%

2
6.25%

2
6.25%

0
0.00%

2
6.25%

U.K.
(N = 19)

16
84.21%

5
26.32%

7
36.84%

1
5.26%

1
5.26%

0
0.00%

1
5.26%

% of N. Same for all percentages in the table.
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in Hong Kong, the frame dominated in the newspapers with the other types of news
frames rarely used. The second frequently used frame varied with societies. The
newspapers in the two Western societies, U.S. (50%, 16 of 32) and U.K. (36.84%, 7 of
19), together with one Eastern society, Singapore (30%, 6 of 20), used the conflict frame
most often after the factual frame. In the newspapers from China, the responsibility frame
(29.41%, 5 of 17) was used most often in addition to the universal one, the factual frame,
closely followed by the morality frame (23.53%, 4 of 17), in framing the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations.
According to Chi-Square tests, no significant differences in the presentations of
the factual, economic consequences, leadership and responsibility frames in framing the
issue of Internet censorship and regulations existed across societies. Differences were
found only in three types of news frames, the human interest frame (χ2 = 13.758, p < .05),
the conflict frame (χ2 = 19.463, p < .001), and the morality frame (χ2 = 15.011, p < .0001;
see Table 7.13). Hong Kong and the United States were vastly different in their usage of
the human interest frame. None of articles in the Hong Kong newspapers used it to frame
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, with the observed count significantly less
than the expected. In contrast, the U.S. newspapers used the frame significantly more
often than what was expected, enjoying the highest percentage (28.13%, 9 of 32) among
all societies. The U.S. newspapers also had the highest percentage of the related articles
(50.00%, 16 of 32) in presenting a conflict frame, with the observed count almost twice
that of the expected count. This was in a sharp contrast to the cases in mainland China
(0.00%) and Hong Kong (5.56%, 1 of 18). In addition to the distinctive pattern of
presenting the conflict frame, China was also separated from the others for its
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Table 7.13. Comparison of News Frames for Stories with Internet Censorship and
Regulations as Primary Subject across Societies
Conflict Frame
Human Interest
Morality Frame
b
(χ2 = 19.436,
Frame
(χ2 = 15.011,
2
a
(χ = 13.758
df = 4, p < .001)
df = 4, p < .0001)
df = 4, p < .05)
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
1
16
0
17
4
13
2.887
14.113
4.811
12.189
0.962
16.038
5.88%
94.12%
0.00% 100.00%
23.53%
76.47%
1.233
0.252
0.575
4.811
1.899
9.590

China
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Hong
Kong
(N = 18)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
3.057
0.00%
3.057

18
14.943
100.00%
0.625

1
5.094
5.56%
3.291

17
12.906
94.44%
1.299

0
1.019
0.00%
1.019

18
16.981
100.00%
0.061

Singapore
(N = 20)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

3
3.396
15.00%
0.046

17
16.604
85.00%
0.010

6
5.660
30.00%
0.020

14
14.340
70.00%
0.008

2
1.132
10.00%
0.665

18
18.868
90.00%
0.040

U.S.
(N = 32)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

9
5.434
28.13%
2.340

23
26.566
71.88%
0.479

16
9.057
50.00%
5.323

16
22.943
50.00%
2.101

0
1.811
0.00%
1.811

32
30.189
100.00%
0.109

U.K.
(N = 19)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
3.226
26.32%
0.975

14
15.774
73.68%
0.199

7
5.377
36.84%
0.490

12
13.623
63.16%
0.193

0
1.076
0.00%
1.076

19
17.925
100.00%
0.065

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
was used.
b
50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher’s exact test was used.
a
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newspapers’ usage of the morality frame to interpret its Internet censorship and
regulations, which was significantly more often than the expected and had a high
percentage, 23.53% (4 of 17), far more than the others, ranging from 0.00% to 10%.
As far as the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet in China is
concerned, very few articles were found to take it as primary subject (see Table 7.14).
There were only four in the newspapers in China, and one in both the Hong Kong and
Singapore newspapers. No such articles were found in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. It
is interesting to see the percentage of articles from China’s newspapers using the
leadership frame was very high. Yet a Chi-Square test could not be conducted with such
few counts across societies.
RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the newspapers’
coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly differ from one another?
RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly contribute
to the differences?
The U.S. newspapers enjoyed the highest mean of the Political Tolerance Index
scores (M = 1.959, SD = 1.781), followed by the United Kingdom (M = 1.263, SD =
1.428), Singapore (M = .745, SD = 1.245), Hong Kong (M = .623, SD = 1.111), and
China (M = .155, SD = .385). 114 As shown in Table 7.15, China was singled out for its
mean significantly lower than the other societies. In contrast, the average PTI score
reported by the U.S. newspapers was significantly higher than China (MD = 1.804), Hong
Kong (MD = 1.337), Singapore (MD = 1.214), and the United Kingdom (MD = .697). 115
In addition to China and the United States, Hong Kong also significantly differed from
114
115

A high mean indicates more political tolerance.
The group sizes were unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes was used.
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Table 7.14. Percentages of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames among Stories
with the Consequences and Implications of the Internet as Primary Subject
Factual
Frame

Human
Interest
Frame

Conflict
Frame

Economic
Consequences
Frame

Leadership
Frame

Morality
Frame

Responsibility
Frame

China
(N = 4)

3
75.0% a

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

3
75.0%

1
25.0%

0
0.0%

Hong
Kong
(N = 1)

1
100.0%

0
0.0%

1
100.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.00%

Singapore
(N = 1)

1
100.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

0
0.0%

U.S.
(N = 0)
U.K.
(N = 0)
a

% of N. Same for all percentages in the table.
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Table 7.15. Multiple Comparisons of PTI Means across Societies a

(I) Society1
China
(N = 261)

Hong
Kong
(N = 102)

Singapore
(N = 108)

U.S.
(N = 98)

U.K.
(N = 80)

(J) Society2

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Hong Kong

-.4674**

.1126

-.7890

-.1458

Singapore

-.5902***

.1221

-.9387

-.2417

U.S.

-1.8040***

.1815

-2.3236

-1.2844

U.K.

-1.1073***

.1614

-1.5715

-.6432

China

.4674**

.1126

.1458

.7890

Singapore

-.1228

.1626

-.5830

.3374

U.S.

-1.3366***

.2109

-1.9353

-.7379

U.K.

-.6400*

.1939

-1.1910

-.0889

China

.5902***

.1221

.2417

.9387

Hong Kong

.1228

.1626

-.3374

.5830

U.S.

-1.2138***

.2162

-1.8269

-.6007

U.K.

-.5171

.1995

-1.0838

.0495

China

1.8040***

.1815

1.2844

2.3236

Hong Kong

1.3366***

.2109

.7379

1.9353

Singapore

1.2138***

.2162

.6007

1.8269

U.K.

.6967*

.2405

.0147

1.3786

China

1.1073***

.1614

.6432

1.5715

Hong Kong

.6400*

.1939

.0889

1.1910

Singapore

.5171

.1995

-.0495

1.0838

U.S.

-.6967*

.2405

-1.3786

-.0147

The PTI score scale is as follows: 0, assigned for the articles stressing the non-political aspect of a given
issue, or the position favorable to the Chinese government; 1, for the articles stressing the political aspect of
a given issue, or the position unfavorable to the Chinese government; 0.5, for the articles mixed with both
aspects, or two sides above. The Levene’s Test (F = 60.63, df1 = 4, df2 = 644, p < .0001) suggested that the
error variances across societies were not equal. Therefore, Tamhane’s T2 that does not assume equal
variances was used.
* p < .05, ** p < .001, *** p < .0001.
a
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the United Kingdom, with a negative mean difference. No differences were found
between two peers, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Singapore and the United Kingdom.
As a result of the forward stepwise regression model, 116 three independent variables,
freedom status (F = 17.730, p < .0001) and two cultural dimensions, power distance (F =
17.435, p < .0001) and individualism vs. collectivism (F = 7.934, p < .005), were selected
(see Figure 7.1). 117 The other two dimensions were dropped out. The difference between
the not-free society, China, and the partly free societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the
first one entering the model, contributed most to the variations of the PTI scores,

*

Freedom Status: 1 = not free, 2 = partly free, 3 = free; PDI: power distance; IDV: individualism vs.
collectivism

Figure 7.1. PTI Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method
116

For the stepwise regression control, both the probabilities to enter and to leave were set as .10.
In the effect tests, for freedom status, F = 17.730, df = 2, p< .0001; for power distance, F = 17.435, df =
1, p< .0001; and for individualism vs. collectivism, F = 7.934, df = 1, p= .005.
117
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followed by the dimensions, power distance and individualism vs. collectivism. Based on
the stepwise results, a regression model with these three predictors was generated (R2
=.245, F = 52.104, df = 4, p < .0001, see Table 7.16). Specifically speaking of freedom
status in this model, the partly-free and free societies did not significantly differ from
each other in predicting the variations of PTI scores. Yet China, the only country with
freedom status not free in this study, really made a difference for its significant
association with a low PTI score. The two cultural dimensions, power distance (PDI) and
individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), positively predicted PTI scores. Higher scores on
the dimensions led to higher PTI scores, which means the more tolerant to inequality of
power and the more individualistic a society, the more likely newspapers in the society
would be to report events about the Internet in China from a political perspective and/or
present content unfavorable to the government. 118

Table 7.16. Parameter Estimates of PTI Predictors
Term
Intercept

β

Std Error

t Ratio

-9.8352***

2.3711

-4.15***

Freedom Status[2-1]

1.1949***

0.2113

5.66***

Freedom Status[3-2]

-2.2023

2.0050

-1.10

PDI

0.1008***

0.0241

4.18***

IDV

0.0964**

0.0342

2.82**

** p < .005, *** p < .0001

118

Since the variable, freedom status, was the most significant predictor and had a much larger parameter
estimate, the positive effect of the two cultural dimensions was relatively reduced, particularly on the notfree society, China.
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7.3. Results from Testing Hypotheses
H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed.
H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of Internet
diffusion and use in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed.
H1a was strongly supported. Significant differences existed across the levels of
freedom status (χ2 = 90.394, df = 2, p < .0001). With the increasing freedom, the
percentage of the articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations
increased from 14.81% in the not-free society to 22.03% in the partly-free societies and
to 49.34% in the free societies (see Table 7.17). For both the not-free and partly-free
societies, the frequencies of the articles with the issue were significantly less than the
expected. The case for the free societies was opposite. The logistic regression model
generated with freedom status as the predictor suggested that the variable was positively
associated with the probability for an article to mention or discuss the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations (see Table 7.18). Each level of freedom status was
significantly different from one another in predicting the probability of the issue being
mentioned. The odds of the issue being mentioned in the newspapers from the partly-free
societies were 1.748 times as much as that in the newspapers from the not-free society.
The odds in the newspapers from the free societies were 3.289 times as much as that from
the partly-free societies. Fishers’ exact tests showed that the probability of mentioning
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China was greater for the partly-free
societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free societies, and
for the free societies than the not-free societies.
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Table 7.17. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet
Censorship and Regulations Mentioned in Newspapers

Freedom
Status

Whether the Issue Was
Mentioned
Yes
No
52
299
91.450
259.55
14.81%
85.19%
17.018
5.997

Not Free
(N = 351)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Partly Free
(N = 345)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

76
89.887
22.03%
2.145

269
255.114
77.97%
0.756

Free
(N = 229)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

113
59.664
49.34%
47.680

116
169.336
50.66%
16.800

Table 7.18. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Censorship
and Regulations in Logistic Regression Model a
β
-1.8186***

Std Error
0.1540

χ2
139.44

Freedom Status[2-1]

0.5584**

0.2015

7.68

1.7478

Freedom Status[3-2]

1.1907***

0.1852

41.33

3.2893

Term
Intercept

Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ2 = 92.976, p < .0001.
** p < .005, *** p < .0001

a
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Odds Ratio
.

H1b was partially supported. Significant differences were found across societies
with different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 13.371, df = 2, p = .0012; see Table 7.19).
Yet, differences mainly existed between the not-free and partly-free societies, and
between the not-free and free societies. In the newspapers from the not-free society, the
observed count was significantly larger than the expected. In contrast, the difference
between the observed and expected counts was significantly negative in the newspapers
from the partly-free societies. Although the observed frequency count was also less than
the expected in the newspapers from the free societies, such a difference was not
statistically significant. Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the probability of mentioning
the issue of Internet diffusion and use in China was greater for the not-free society than
the partly-free societies, and for the not-free society than the free societies. Generally, the
newspapers from the not-free society had a greater likelihood of mentioning the issue of

Table 7.19. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet
Diffusion and Use Was Mentioned in Newspapers

Freedom
Status

Whether the Issue Was
Mentioned
Yes
No
209
142
182.141
168.859
59.54%
40.46%
3.961
4.272

Not Free
(N = 351)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Partly Free
(N = 345)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

161
179.027
46.67%
1.815

184
165.973
53.33%
1.958

Free
(N = 229)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

110
118.832
48.03%
0.657

119
110.168
51.97%
0.708
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Table 7.20. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Diffusion
and Use in Logistic Regression Model a
Term
Intercept

χ2
Odds Ratio
18.35
.

β
0.4700***

Std Error
0.1097

Freedom Status[2-1]

-0.5980***

0.1540

15.08

0.5499

Freedom Status[3-2]

0.0410

0.1706

0.06

1.0419

Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ2 =13.287, p < .005.
*** p < .0001

a

Internet diffusion and use than the partly-free societies (see Table 7.20). The partly-free
and free societies did not significantly differ from each other.
H2: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing Internet use in China, there will
be more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from societies
with more political freedom.
H2 was strongly supported. Whether an article mentioned dissident users and/or
content was very significantly associated with the levels of freedom status (χ2 = 152.829,
df = 2, p < .0001). The percentage of the articles with the issue mentioned dramatically
increased with the increasing level of freedom status, from 2.29% to 25.20% to 73.26%
(see Table 7.21). In the newspapers from the not-free society, the observed frequency
count of such articles was significantly small, only one eleventh of the expected count (4
vs. 44.652). In contrast, the observed count in the newspapers from the free societies, the
observed count was about three times as many as the expected (63 vs. 21.943). The
logistic regression model generated with freedom status as the predictor shows that the
odds of mentioning dissident users and/or content for the newspapers from a society at a
higher level was much higher than from societies at a lower level (see Table 7.22). For
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Table 7.21. Association between Freedom Status and Whether Dissident Users
and/or Content Mentioned in Newspapers

Freedom
Status

Whether the Issue Was
Mentioned
Yes
No
4
171
44.652
130.348
2.29%
97.71%
37.010
12.678

Not Free
(N = 175)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Partly Free
(N = 127)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

32
32.405
25.20%
0.005

95
94.595
74.80%
0.002

Free
(N = 86)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

63
21.943
73.26%
76.817

23
64.057
26.74%
26.315

Table 7.22. Freedom Status and the Presence of Dissident Users and/or Content
in Logistic Regression Model
β
-3.7554***

Std Error
0.5058

χ2
55.12

Freedom Status[2-1]

2.6672***

0.5455

23.90

14.4000

Freedom Status[3-2]

2.0958***

0.3180

43.43

8.1318

Term
Intercept

2

Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ =87.954, p < .0001.
*** p < .0001

a
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Odds Ratio
.

instance, the odds for newspapers from the partly-free societies were 14.4 times as much
as that for the newspapers from the not-free society. The odds for the free societies were
8.13 times as much as that for the partly-free societies. Fishers’ exact tests also showed
that the probability of mentioning dissident users and/or content was greater for the
partly-free societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free
societies, and the free societies than the not-free society.

H3b: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as
primary subject, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with less political freedom.
H3c: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in
China as primary subject, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with less political freedom.
H3d: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in
China as primary subject, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.
H3e: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in
China as primary subject, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the
newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H3a was not supported. No significant differences were found in using the factual
frame to present the issue of Internet censorship and regulations across societies with
different freedom status.
H3b was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with
different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 7.068, p < .005). Yet, such differences mainly
came from the difference between the not-free society, China, which contributed most to
the total Chi-Square statistics (see Table 7.23), and the free societies (χ2 = 6.8, p < .01;
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Table 7.23. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the
Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship
and Regulations as Primary Subject a
Responsibility Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
1.924
29.41%
4.915

12
15.076
70.59%
0.627

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

4
4.302
10.53%
0.021

34
33.698
89.47%
0.003

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

3
5.774
5.88%
1.332

48
45.226
94.12%
0.170

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
was used (χ2 = 7.068, p < .005).

a

see Table 7.24). 119 The newspapers from China presented an unusual pattern in using the
responsibility frame, with an actual count significantly larger than the expected. Fisher’s
exact tests showed that the likelihood of presenting a responsibility frame in a story with
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was greater for the not-free society than
for the free societies. There were no differences between the not-free society and the
partly-free societies, and between the partly-free and free societies.
H3c was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with
different levels (χ2 = 13.237, p < .0001). The not-free society, China, used the morality
119

Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each
pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s exact tests.
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Table 7.24. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the
Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship
and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)
Responsibility Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

5
2
29.41%
4.500

12
15
70.59%
0.600

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

3
6
5.88%
1.500

48
45
94.12%
0.200

frame in framing the issue of Internet censorship and regulations significantly more often
than what was expected statistically (4 vs. 0.962; see Table 7.25). The percentage of the
related articles with a morality frame was much higher than the societies at the other two
levels. In contrast, societies at the free level had a zero observed count, significantly less
than the expected count. Yet, significant differences existed only between this pair (χ2 =
12.75, p < .001; see Table 7.26). 120 Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the probability of
presenting a morality frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and
regulations as primary subject was greater for the not-free society than the free societies,
and there were no differences between the not-free and partly-free societies, and the

120

Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each
pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s exact tests.
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Table 7.25. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject a
Morality Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

a

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

4
0.962
23.53%
9.590

13
16.038
76.47%
0.575

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

2
2.151
5.26%
0.011

36
35.849
94.74%
0.001

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
2.887
0.00%
2.887

51
48.113
100.00%
0.173

50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fishers’ exact test was used.

Table 7.26. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary
Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)
Morality Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

4
1
23.53%
9.000

13
16
76.47%
0.563

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
3
0.00%
3.000

51
48
100.00%
0.188
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partly-free and free societies.
H3d was partly supported. Although significant differences were found across
different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 8.043, p < .05; see Table 7.27), only the
differences between the free and not-free societies (χ2 = 4.210, p < .05; see Table 7.28),
and between the free and partly-free societies were significant (χ2 = 5.389, p < .05; see
Table 7.29). Fisher’s exact tests indicated that the probability of presenting a human
interest frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary
subject was greater for the free societies than the partly-free societies and the not-free
society, China. No significant difference existed between the not-free and partly-free
societies.

Table 7.27. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject a
Human Interest Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

a

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

1
2.887
5.88%
1.233

16
14.113
94.12%
0.252

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

3
6.453
7.89%
1.848

35
31.547
92.11%
0.378

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

14
8.660
27.45%
3.292

37
42.340
72.55%
0.673

20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio was used.
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Table 7.28. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)
Human Interest Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

1
3.75
5.88%
2.017

16
13.25
94.12%
0.571

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

14
11.25
27.45%
0.672

37
39.75
72.55%
0.190

Table 7.29. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)

Partly Free
(N = 38)
Freedom
Status

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

Human Interest Frame
Yes
No
3
35
7.258
30.742
7.89%
92.11%
0.590
2.498
14
37
9.742
41.258
27.45%
72.55%
0.440
1.862
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H3e was supported. Chi-Square test suggested significant differences existed
across societies with different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 15.629, p < .001; see Table
7.30). The percentage of the articles presenting a conflict frame increased with the level
of freedom status, from 0.00% in the not-free society to 18.42% in the part-free societies,
and to 45.10% in the free societies, where the frequency number of such articles in the
newspapers was significantly more than the expected count. The observed count in the
newspapers from the not-free society was zero, significantly less than the expected.
Because of the zero number, it caused the unstable result regarding the comparison
between the not-free and free societies when the logistic regression model was run.

Table 7.30. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject
Conflict Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
4.811
0.00%
4.811

17
12.189
100.00%
1.899

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

7
10.755
18.42%
1.312

31
27.245
81.58%
0.517

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

23
14.434
45.10%
5.084

28
36.566
54.90%
2.007
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Therefore, each pair of different levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s
exact tests, which suggested the newspapers in the free societies were more likely to
present a conflict frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as
primary subject than the partly-free (χ2 = 6.935, p < .001; see Table 7.31) and not free
society (χ2 = 11.585, p < .001; see Table 7.32). So were the newspapers from the partlyfree societies than the not free society (χ2 = 5.622, p < .05; see Table 7.33).

H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and
implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political aspects in
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.
The hypothesis was strongly supported. Significant differences were found across

Table 7.31. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)
Conflict Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

7
12.809
18.42%
2.634

31
25.191
81.58%
1.340

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

23
17.191
45.10%
1.963

28
33.809
54.90%
0.998
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Table 7.32. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)
Conflict Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
5.75
0.00%
5.750

17
11.25
100.00%
2.939

Free
(N = 51)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

23
17.25
45.10%
1.917

28
33.75
54.90%
0.980

Table 7.33. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Partly Free)
Conflict Frame
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 17)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
2.164
0.00%
2.164

17
14.836
100.00%
0.316

Partly Free
(N = 38)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

7
4.836
18.42%
0.968

31
33.164
81.58%
0.141
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different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 24.293, p < .0001). As shown in Table 7.34, the
percentage of the articles with an emphasis on the political aspects of the issue of the
consequences and/or implications of the Internet in China increased from 0.00% in the
not-free society to 31.03% in the partly-free societies and to 66.67% in the free societies.
Particularly, in the not-free society, the frequency count of such articles was significantly
less than the expected (0 vs. 7.613), which was in a contrast to the free societies, where
the count was significantly more than the expected (20 vs. 10.875). Significant
differences also existed between each pair of the three levels of freedom status (χ2 =
7.948, p < .005, for the comparison between the not-free society and the partly-free
societies; χ2 = 7.491, p < .01, between the partly-free and free societies; χ2 = 23.032, p <
.0001, between the not-free society and the free societies, which had the largest
difference; see Table 7.35, 7.36 and 7.37). Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the
probability of giving an emphasis on the political aspects of the related issue in an article
was greater for the partly-free societies than the not-free society, and for the free societies
than the partly-free societies and the not-free society.

H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in the
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of power distance.
H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of individualism vs.
collectivism.
H5a was supported. Significant differences existed across societies with different
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Table 7.34. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of
the Consequences and Implications of the Internet
Political Aspects
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 21)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
7.613
0.00%
7.613

21
13.388
100.00%
4.329

Partly Free
(N = 29)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

9
10.513
31.03%
0.218

20
18.488
68.97%
0.124

Free
(N = 30)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

20
10.875
66.67%
7.657

10
19.125
33.33%
4.354

Table 7.35. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the
Consequences and Implications of the Internet
(Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Partly Free)
Political Aspects
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 21)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
3.78
0.00%
3.780

21
17.22
100.00%
0.830

Partly Free
(N = 29)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

9
5.22
31.03%
2.737

20
23.78
68.97%
0.601
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Table 7.36. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the
Consequences and Implications of the Internet
(Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)
Political Aspects
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Partly Free
(N = 29)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

9
14.254
31.03%
1.937

20
14.746
68.97%
1.872

Free
(N = 30)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

20
14.746
66.67%
1.872

10
15.254
33.33%
1.810

Table 7.37. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the
Consequences and Implications of the Internet
(Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)
Political Aspects
Yes

Freedom
Status

No

Not Free
(N = 21)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

0
8.235
0.00%
8.235

21
12.765
100.00%
5.313

Free
(N = 30)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

20
11.765
66.67%
5.765

10
18.235
33.33%
3.719

154

scores on the dimension of power distance (χ2 = 55.63, p < .0001; see Table 7.38). The
percentage of the articles mentioning the role played by the government increased with
the increasing score on power distance (PDI), from 6.78% at the lowest level, the United
Kingdom, to 37.04% at the highest level, China. The probability of mentioning the
government role in articles was positively associated with PDI scores. Yet it was not a
simple linear association (see Figure 7.2). The exponential regression model 121 suggested
that the increasing tendency was miniscule when PDI scores were lower than 70. The

Table 7.38. Associations between Country and Government Role
Presented in Newspapers
Government Role
Yes
U.K.
(PDI = 35;
N = 59)
U.S.
(PDI = 40;
N = 58)
Hong Kong
(PDI = 68;
N = 79)
Singapore
(PDI = 74;
N = 99)
China
(PDI = 80;
N = 243)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2
Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

No

4
13.379
6.78%
6.575
4
13.152
6.90%
6.369
7
17.915
8.86%
6.650
17
22.450
17.17%
1.323
90
55.104
37.04%
22.099

121

55
45.621
93.22%
1.928
54
44.848
93.10%
1.868
72
61.086
91.14%
1.950
82
76.550
82.83%
0.388
153
187.896
62.96%
6.481

The equation for the exponential regression model is as follows: p = 0.0990617 + 4.9e-36 Exp(PDI); R2
= 0.8915; F = 24.6477, p < .05; t Ratio for Exp(PDI) = 4.96, p < .05.
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Figure 7.2. Bivariate Fit to Exponential Regression Model of
the Government-Role Probability by Power Distance

probability linearly changed with PDI scores. When PDI scores were at a high level, the
probability increased at an exponential rate.
H5b was not supported. Although the probability of mentioning the individual
role played in the Internet in China significantly changed with different societies (χ2 =
34.092, p < .0001), no particular association was found with the dimension of
individualism vs. collectivism. In fact, the stepwise regression method suggested that
freedom status, particularly the not-free societies and the partly-free and free societies,
and the dimension of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were two significant predictors (see
Figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.3. Significant Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method
Associated with Mentioning the Individual Role in Articles

7.4. The Differences between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily
RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China’s Internet appear to
exist between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily?
Table 7.39 shows that the issue of Internet diffusion and use received most
attention in both Chinese newspapers. The articles mentioning the issue accounted for
51.81 percent and 64.15 percent of the total respectively in the People’s Daily and
Beijing Youth Daily. Both newspapers also frequently reported events of e-commerce and
Internet business in China, which enjoyed the second-highest percentage respectively,
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Table 7.39. Articles with Internet-Related Issues Mentioned
in Each Newspaper in China a

People’s Daily
(N = 192)

111
57.81%

Internet
censorship
&
regulations
45
23.44%

Beijing Youth Daily
(N = 159)

102
64.15%

9
5.66%

Internet
diffusion &
use

E-commerce,
Internet
business &
industry
53
27.60%
48
30.19%

Consequences
& implications
of the Internet

Others

16
8.33%

28
14.58%

4
2.52%

31
19.50%

Both primary and non-primary stories were included. Each article was allowed to have more than one
issue checked.

a

27.60% in the People’s Daily, and 30.19% in the Beijing Youth Daily. Chi-Square
analyses found no between-newspaper differences in these two issues and other
unspecified issues. However, the newspapers were significantly associated with the
presence of two issues, Internet censorship and regulations (χ2 = 21.114, df = 1, p <
.0001) and the consequences and implications of Internet (χ2 = 5.478, df = 1, p = .019;
see Table 7.40). According to Fisher’s exact tests, the probabilities of mentioning these
two issues were both greater for the People’s Daily than the Beijing Youth Daily. The
percentages of the articles with the issues mentioned in the People’s Daily (23.44%,
5.66%) were both issues. 122 Significant differences were found only in the issue of
Internet censorship and regulations (χ2 = 11.076, df = 1, p < .001; see Table 7.41). In the
People’s Daily, the observed count of the articles taking the issue as primary subject was
significant more than the expected. The case in the Beijing Youth Daily was opposite.

122

The differences in other unspecified issues between the two newspapers was significant at the level α =
0.1.
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Table 7.40. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in Both Primary
and Non-Primary Stories between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily
Internet censorship &
regulations
(χ2 = 21.114, df = 1,
p < .0001)

Yes

No

Consequences &
implications of the
Internet
(χ2 = 5.478, df = 1,
p = .019)

Yes

No

People’s
Daily
(N = 192)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

45
29.539
23.44%
8.093

147
162.462
76.56%
1.472

16
10.940
8.33%
2.340

176
181.06
91.67%
0.141

Beijing
Youth Daily
(N = 159)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

9
24.462
5.66%
9.773

150
134.538
94.34%
1.777

4
9.060
2.52%
2.826

155
149.94
97.48%
0.171

Table 7.41. Comparison of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject
between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily a
Internet censorship &
regulations
(χ2 = 11.076, df = 1,
p < .001)

a

Yes

No

People’s
Daily
(N = 94)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

15
8.455
15.96%
5.066

79
85.545
84.04%
0.501

Beijing
Youth Daily
(N = 95)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

2
8.545
2.11%
5.013

93
86.455
97.89%
0.496

The articles with primary subject unascertainable were excluded.
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Fisher’s exact test also suggested that the People’s Daily was more likely to use the issue
as primary subject than the Beijing Youth Daily.

RQ7: Was the presentation of each generic news frame associated with the types of
Chinese newspapers?
Chi-Square tests found significant differences in the presentations of many types
of news frames between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily (see Table 7.42 and
Table 7.43). Regardless the types of Internet-related issues, the People’s Daily was more
likely to present the factual (χ2 = 10.575, df = 1, p = .0015), responsibility (χ2 = 8.889, df
= 1, p = .0029), morality (χ2 = 9.818, df = 1, p = .0017) and leadership frames (χ2 =
11.669, df = 1, p = .0006) than the Beijing Youth Daily. The percentages of the articles

Table 7.42. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between
the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily
(Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Responsibility Frame)
Factual Frame
(χ2 = 10.575, df =
1,
p = .0015)

Yes

Human Interest
Frame
(χ2 = 9.199, df = 1,
p = .0024)

No

Yes

No

Responsibility
Frame
(χ2 = 8.889, df = 1,
p = .0029)

Yes

No

People’s
Daily
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

89
81
92.71%
0.790

7
15
7.29%
4.267

18
27.5
18.75%
3.282

78
68.5
81.25%
1.318

11
6
11.46%
4.167

85
90
88.54%
0.278

Beijing
Youth Daily
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

73
81
76.04%
0.790

23
15
23.96%
4.267

37
27.5
38.54%
3.282

59
68.5
61.46%
1.318

1
6
1.04%
4.167

95
90
98.96%
0.278
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Table 7.43. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between
the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily (Morality Frame and Leadership Frame)
Morality Frame
(χ2 = 9.818, df = 1,
p = .0017)

Yes

No

Leadership Frame
(χ2 = 11.669, df = 1,
p = .0006)

Yes

No

People’s
Daily
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

14
8
14.58%
4.500

82
88
85.42%
0.409

11
5.5
11.46%
5.500

85
90.5
88.54%
0.334

Beijing
Youth Daily
(N = 96)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

2
8
2.08%
4.500

94
88
97.92%
0.409

0
5.5
0.00%
5.500

96
90.5
100.00%
0.334

with these frames in the former newspaper were respectively much higher than those in
the latter. Yet, the Beijing Youth Daily, with a higher percentage, was distinctive for its
greater probability of providing a human interest frame than the People’s Daily (χ2 =
9.199, df = 1, p = .0024). No significant differences in the conflict frame and the
economic consequences frame were found between these two newspapers.
In addition to the overall presenting of different types of news frames, this study
also looked at how each type of news frame was associated with the issue of Internet
diffusion and use as primary subject. 123 As shown in Table 7.44, significant associations
were found in the presenting of four types of news frames, such as the factual (χ2 = 5.275,

123

Two other issues focused upon in this study, Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences
and implications of the Internet, were not examined, because the numbers of the articles with these issues
as primary subject were few, which caused difficulties in Chi-Square tests for each type of news frame.
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df = 1, p < .05), human interest (χ2 = 4.155 df = 1, p < .05), morality (χ2 = 5.77, df = 1, p
< .05), and leadership frames (χ2 = 10.746, df = 1, p = .001). The People’s Daily was
more likely to use the morality and leadership frames in framing the issue of Internet
diffusion and use, with the observed counts significantly more than the expected ones and
the percentages much higher than the Beijing Youth Daily (13.56% vs. 1.72%; 16.95% vs.
0.00%), which in contrast was more likely to present a human interest frame. Chi-Square
tests found no differences in the presenting of the factual, conflict, economic
consequences, and responsibility frames.

Table 7.44. Differences in the Presentations of News Frames between the People’s
Daily and Beijing Youth Daily in Framing the Issue of Internet Diffusion and Use
Human Interest
Frame
(χ2 = 4.155, df = 1,
p < .05)

Yes

Morality Frame
2

(χ = 5.77, df = 1,
P< .05)

Leadership
Frame

(χ2 = 10.749,
df = 1, p = .001)

No

Yes

No

Yes

People’s
Daily
(N = 59)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

14
19.162
23.73%
1.391

45
39.838
76.27%
0.669

8
4.539
13.56%
2.640

51
54.462
86.44%
0.220

10
5.043
16.95%
4.873

49
53.958
83.05%
0.455

Beijing
Youth Daily
(N = 58)

Count
Expected
Row %
Cell χ2

24
18.838
41.38%
1.415

34
39.162
58.62%
0.681

1
4.462
1.72%
2.686

57
53.539
98.28%
0.224

0
4.958
0.00%
4.957

58
53.043
100.00%
0.463
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CHAPTER VIII.
DISCUSSION
Framing theory is one way to investigate what Gamson and Modigliani (1989)
called an “issue culture,” providing interpretations and meaning for relevant events (pp.12). The theory provides two relevant, commonsense understandings of what it means to
“frame.” First, the media can be said to frame events and issues in the same way as a
photographer frames a photograph, choosing what aspects to highlight or draw attention
to, and what parts to leave out (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Similarly, a media frame
can be likened to the frame of a house, providing the structure around which everything
else fits, and influencing the overall style of the construction (Tankard, 2001). Framing
studies typically begin with an attempt to identify issues and characterize frames. This
current research considered media framing in such terms – a construction of reality,
specifically the Internet in China, under the influence of the overarching socio-cultural
factors in five societies with different political systems and cultural dimensions. It was
created through absorbing not only what information was presented in the selected
newspapers but, more importantly, how it was presented. The content analysis reveals
that the presentations of the Internet in China were distinct in different newspapers across
societies in terms of both the salience of issues and the use of news frames.
This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis and considers the contributions
of the present research to the scholarly literature, as well as the study’s limitations.
Opportunities for future research are also discussed.
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8.1. Issue Salience and Its Implications
One of the goals of the current study was to examine the salience of issues related
to the Internet in China. The concept of salience was understood in the study as the extent
to which an issue stood out from other issues in terms of its relation to other issues, or
media awareness of a certain issue. It was gauged by the percentage of news articles
dedicated to mentioning or discussing a given issue. Another instrumental part of media
salience was prominence, which was measured in the study by the percentage of news
articles taking a certain issue as the primary subject of a given story.
In terms of the first way to measure issue salience, the issue of Internet diffusion
and use was given greater coverage and dominated over the other issues in China,
Singapore and the United Kingdom, especially in China. Although the issue also received
attention in Hong Kong and the United States, the dominant issues were different. The
newspapers from Hong Kong showed more interest in events about e-commerce, Internet
business and industry, whereas the U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the issue of
Internet censorship and regulations in mainland China. The U.K. newspapers also
devoted a relatively large volume of articles to reporting that subject.
Internet censorship and regulations, a controversial subject matter with great
political, social, and cultural meanings, was frequently highlighted as the primary subject
of a given story in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers, especially in the U.S. newspapers. In
contrast, their Eastern peers gave prominence to two other issues, e-commerce and
Internet business in Hong Kong and Singapore’s newspapers, and Internet diffusion and
use in the newspapers from mainland China, which also highlighted the economic issue.
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Differences in the newspapers’ issue salience across societies could be as a result
of the differences of True vs. Virtue in long-/short-term orientation cultures. People in
low-LTO countries, such as the U.S. and the U.K., believe that there are absolutely clear
guidelines about what is good and evil, and feel less satisfied with their efforts at doing
good (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). Thus, journalists in such a society might have been more
concerned about the problems in a given system. The search for truth and respecting for
“musts” led U.S. and U.K. journalists to pay more attention to the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations. In contrast, among people in high-LTO cultures, such as
mainland China and Hong Kong, what is considered good and evil depends on the
circumstances. They do not feel a strong need to do more to correct social injustice
(Hofstede, 2001, p.363); therefore, journalists in such a society might have switched their
attention to the pragmatic practices with long-term benefits, such as Internet diffusion
and use, and Internet business. Specifically for the newspapers from China, the attention
paid to the issues of Internet diffusion and use, and e-commerce and Internet business
might be also a natural result of the fact that what was covered was the Internet in its
home country, which is in a nationwide process of adopting the new technology and
promoting Internet economy.
The differences found in the presentation of issue salience across societies have
important implications in terms of the role of news media in political life (Reese, 2001)
and the effects of framing information on the audience’s attitudes, perceptions, and
choices. According to Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992), the character of the topic of
communication is critical to the effectiveness of the communication, which is what the
constructionist perspective emphasizes. Their study demonstrated that issue salience is
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critical to understanding the dynamics of political learning. It is assumed that most people
will not read all of the articles and often will not read to the end of the articles selected.
Therefore, it is logical to surmise that high salience issues would be likely to draw a high
level of attention from readers. On the other hand, it makes sense to write stories
addressed to those already “in the know.” It should come as no surprise that newspapers
are less likely to “grab attention” on low salience stories.
Along with Goffman’s (1974) argument that the framing of an event or activity
establishes its meaning, Gamson (1989) pointed out that “facts have no intrinsic meaning.
They take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes
them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring
others.” Thus, those issues being consistently emphasized could be more meaningful to
audience members. As discussed in Chapter 3, an important distinction is between the
frames that media use to portray different events or phenomena and the frames that
individuals use to sort information and make sense of the world (Scheufele, 1999). The
relation between the two has been intensively studied, usually in experimental settings, in
order better to understand the effects of media frames. Studies suggest that news frames
influence public opinion by making certain aspects of a story more salient, thereby
activating specific thoughts and ideas for audience members (e.g., Iyengar, 1990a; Price
& Tewksbury, 1997). These thoughts and ideas are likely to be applied when audience
members evaluate groups, issues, and other story elements (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers,
1997).
Scholars employ the cognitive accessibility theory to explain this process, in
which people have the inclination to use cognitive economic short-cuts or heuristics in
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information processing (Iyengar, 1990b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Price & Tewksbury,
1997). The “accessibility bias” (Iyengar, 1990b), or the “availability heuristic” (Schrum
& O’Guinn, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), occurs automatically and simplifies the
cognitive tasks of making judgments and interpretations. This means that when a subset
of relevant information about issues regarding a given topic are consistently salient in
news media, they are likely to be activated and remain accessible to audiences and,
consequently, affect subsequent judgments and opinions. Applying this to the case of
reporting the Internet in China, it can be inferred that the issue of Internet censorship and
regulations, a high salient issue in the U.S. newspapers but a low salient issue in China,
would be activated in a different way to audiences in these two countries, when people
are called upon to make judgments or decisions with regard to Internet policies in China.
For instance, when China’s Internet is considered, the first issue coming to the minds of
U.S. audiences might be the issue of censorship. The Chinese government’s other policy,
promoting public Internet access, might be ignored. Chinese audiences, unlike
Americans, might not realize how serious the issue of censorship is in China and how
important it is to the public life.

8.2. Use of Generic News Frames and Behind the Presentations
In terms of generic news frames, this current research found that some frames
were presented more often than other frames, and were more often evident for certain
issues in a given society.
Based on common sense, it is not surprising to see that the factual frame, a
universal journalistic practice with presenting facts as one of its important principles,
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predominated in all the newspapers from the five societies selected in the study.
Regardless of it, the researcher’s attention was drawn to the unique patterns of the U.S.
newspapers in using the frame in the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as
primary subject. Like the newspapers from the other societies, the U.S. newspapers used
the factual frame most in general. In fact, the percentage of the articles presenting the
frame in the U.S. newspapers ranked second among the societies. Yet, the percentage for
the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject was the lowest
one, significantly lower than the others, which otherwise exhibited similar patterns to
their overall use of the frame, significantly predicted by a society’s political system and
two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and long-/short-term orientation.
The inconsistent patterns for particular stories shown in the U.S. newspapers
inspired the researcher to take a more qualitative look at the stories in question. Detailed
investigations found that instead of providing general information or discussing the
determinants of Internet diffusion in China, the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion
and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers focused on individuals’ use of the
Internet, which were all framed as human interest and conflict stories (see APPENDIX E
for the examples of stories). Both the human interest frame and the conflict frame, as
explained in previous research on news values, are of great newsworthiness and are more
effective in attracting readers’ attention (e.g., Altheide & Snow, 1979; Neuman, et al.,
1992). It might not have been interesting enough to tell a story about how the Internet is
used in China to Americans if it had not been framed in such a way. This might also
relate to idea of journalistic training in the United States. U.S. journalists try to show how
individuals are affected by something instead of emphasizing only the big picture or
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abstract ideas. The U.S. case suggests that further research needs to be done to investigate
the factors contributing to those residuals that the factors at the macro socio-cultural level
cannot explain how the use of news frames is associated with specific issues. These could
be the effects of the lower levels in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, such as
personal orientations of media workers, notions of newsworthiness and media routines.
In addition to the factual frame, the second dominant type of generic news frame
was respectively the conflict frame in the U.S. newspapers, the human interest frame in
the newspapers from China, Singapore and the United Kingdom, and the economic
consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong.
The conflict frame was a salient feature in the Western newspapers’ treatment of
the Internet in China. Particularly, the U.S. newspapers were most likely to present a
conflict frame, a result consistent with what Luther and Zhou (2005) found and what has
been emphasized in Western news media coverage (e.g., Neuman, et al., 1992; Richards
& King, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). As pointed out by Neuman, et al. (1992),
in the communication literature many references to the media’s emphasis on conflict as a
means of attracting attention and readership and defining it as a good journalistic practice
exist. Scholars have also given reasons for this. While Richards and King (2000)
acknowledged the element of drama lies in the conflict frame, other scholars specifically
addressed how well the conflict frame fits with the media’s game interpretation of the
political world as an ongoing series of contests, each with a set of winners and losers
(Gans, 1979; Patterson, 1980). Along this line of reasoning, the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations, which were more often taken as the primary subject in a
given story in the Western newspapers, compared to their Eastern peers, should become
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even more salient to U.S. and U.K. readers, when it was frequently presented in a conflict
frame.
Although the communication literature has seen the frequent presence of conflict
stories in Western news media, no studies examined the presence of the conflict frame
and other types of news frames within the context of cultural comparisons to see their
correlations with socio-cultural differences across societies. Previous research has shown
the inclination to downplay any conflict frame in Asian newspapers (e.g., Luther & Zhou,
2005; Massey, 2000) and to accentuate harmony in the interpersonal communication
practices in many of Confucian-based cultures (e.g. Chen & Chung, 1994; Kirkbride,
Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1997; Leung, 1987; Merkin, 2004; Oliver, 1971; Peng
& Nisbett, 1999). For instance, Merkin (2004) found that members in societies with a
cultural long-term orientation were more likely to use harmonious and cooperative
facework strategies than their short-term oriented counterparts. Yet there is no empirical
evidence for the linkage between the presence of the conflict frame and cultural
traditions. Making a contribution to it, this current study found that cultural factors,
instead of political systems of societies, played an important role here.
Two of Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions, long-/short-term orientation and
uncertainty avoidance, were found to be significant in predicting the presence of the
frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on long-/short-term orientation (LTO)
and a higher score on uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were more likely to present a conflict
frame. This is exactly the case for the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. According to Hofstede
(2001), tolerance and respect for other people, and fulfilling social obligations have
higher priority in short-term orientation societies than long-term orientation societies. In a
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society with a low score on LTO, quick results and immediate gratification of needs are
expected. People are less satisfied with daily human relations but more satisfied with
making efforts to correct social inequality and injustice (pp.356-367). Therefore, we can
assume that to journalists in such a society, controversy and/or confrontation in thoughts,
opinions or views, and different parties and groups are tolerable. Being able to see and
willing to present social problems and different interests, instead of sacrificing pursuing
the absolute truth so as to maintain social stability and harmonic relationships between
individuals, should be desirable. In addition, uncertainty-avoiding cultures, like the
United States with the highest score on UAI among the examined societies, further
strengthen the belief in an absolute truth (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). On the other hand,
using a conflict frame to tell a story can more easily satisfy immediate gratification of
needs of readers in such a society.
Another type of news frame frequently addressed in the literature is the human
interest frame. An article is considered belonging to the human interest frame when a
particular individual, family or group of people is brought forward, or an emotional angle
is brought to, as an illustration of a larger phenomenon or a wider issue (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999). The media emphasize
human interest stories as a natural technique to attract the attention of their audiences,
getting at the idea that personalization of news report plays an important role (Altheide &
Snow, 1979). In the present study, all the newspapers, except for the ones from Hong
Kong, exhibited a strong tendency to use the human interest frame.
Overall, the newspapers from mainland China were particularly likely to use the
frame, which enjoyed a frequency count significantly higher than the expected. Yet, it is
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interesting to see the use of the frame in the Chinese newspapers had different patterns in
treating stories with two different primary subjects, Internet diffusion and use, and
Internet censorship and relationships. The overall likelihood of presenting the human
interest frame was mirrored in the stories with the issues of Internet diffusion and use. 124
Yet, Chinese journalists rarely used this frame to report a story mainly concerning the
issue of Internet censorship and regulations, a highly sensitive topic in China. On the
surface, this seems to be contradictory to the finding that the not-free society was more
likely to present a human interest frame than a society with freedom status at the partlyfree or free level. However, it is explainable when we take into account the nature of the
human interest frame, together with the political economic backdrops in a home-nation to
the issues in question.
Experimental research has shown that stories using exemplars are effective since
they are more easily remembered than stories with abstract or logic reasoning. They “tend
to form judgments on the basis of vividness instead of validity” (Brosius, & Bathelt,
1994). The “newsworthiness” of a human interest story depends partly on the possibilities
to visualize it. Visual images in news are effective in conveying emotional meaning
(Boholm, 1998, p.127; Ferreira, Boholm, & Löfstedt, 2000; Graber, 1996, p.90). Using
such a frame is assumed to evoke general sympathy or affections for the ones involved in
a given event. Therefore, practically, it is hard for journalists in China, a politically
restricted country, to apply such a frame to a highly politically sensitive issue. Instead, it
is more reasonable to imagine that Chinese journalists would more likely tell a human
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In an additional examination, the human interest frame was frequently found in the stories with the issue
of e-commerce, Internet business and industry as primary subject in the Beijing Youth Daily.

172

interest story about those issues, such as Internet diffusion and use, and e-commence,
which more fit into the state-centric agenda to promote informatization and
modernization, as discussed in Chapter 2. By using the human interest frame focusing on
individual experiences to highlight such issues, the Chinese media would be able to divert
the audience’s attention away from the problems of the system in place, as Iyengar and
Kinder (1987) suggested. In addition, the uneven patterns of two Chinese newspapers
might also explain the disparities in using the frame (see the discussion in the section
below). The case of the human interest frame in China, like the case of the factual frame
in the United States, suggests again that besides the overall presentations of news frames,
it is important to look at how a certain type of news frame is associated with a given issue
in framing research, which may give us more information on the interplay between
factors at the macro level and variables at the micro level that both influence media
content.
Hong Kong stood out for its newspapers’ significantly less likelihood of using the
human interest frame. As a matter of fact, its newspapers mainly relied on the factual and
economic consequences frames in their coverage. It could be a typical example to see
how the cultural dimension, long-/short-term orientation (LTO), came to play in the
presence of news frames. In general, the patterns of influence of cultural dimensions
varied with different types of news frames with one or two dimensions specifically
significant. Yet, the dimension of long-/short-term orientation was found to be the only
one significant in each of the logistic regression models, which indicates that this
dimension is the most important cultural factor in predicting the presence of a generic
news frame. The regression models show that without other factors being taken into
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account, a society with a high score on LTO was more likely to use the factual and
economic consequences frames, but less likely to use the human interest, conflict and
leadership frames. This was exactly the case for Hong Kong, whose newspapers showed
special interests in the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and industry and the
economic consequences frame.
The economic consequences frame not only considers the actual, perceived, or
future economic consequences, but also refers to the possible gains or losses. A careful
reading following the quantitative study found that most of the Hong Kong articles with a
distinct economic perspective referred to the actual or possible gains or losses. It can be
assumed that the positive association of long-term orientation, which emphasizes events
with effects in the future, with using the economic consequences frame perhaps has been
strengthened by the business tradition in Hong Kong and its subtle connections with
mainland China. This might be why the coverage of the issue of e-commerce and Internet
business and the use of the economic consequences frame were particularly more often
present than was expected statistically in the newspapers from Hong Kong. It is well
known that Hong Kong is the least traditional of all provinces and territories of China.
Hong Kong has long been the immediate center for trade between mainland China and
the rest of the world. Its business community’s embrace of China is “largely pragmatic”
(Alexander, 2001, p.6). Given the exposure of Hong Kong’s inhabitants to Western
capitalist social values, and its economic relationships with mainland China, it is not
surprising to see the intensive concerns about Internet business in mainland China and the
frequent use of the economic consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong.
As Neuman et al. (1992) put it, the economic consequences frame reflects “the
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preoccupation with ‘the bottom line,’ profit and loss, and wider values of the culture of
capitalism” (p.63). They found that the application of the economic frame by the media
tended to reinforce dominant capitalist social values. In addition, considering the political
climate after the 1997 handover, we may reason that the protocol that “no one speaks ill
of the Chinese government publicly” (Alexander, 2001, p.6) might have caused
journalists in Hong Kong to downplay those politically sensitive issues, such as Internet
censorship in mainland China, by switching their attention to the pragmatic issues of
Internet diffusion and use, and Internet business, and mainly relying on the factual and
economic consequences frames.

8.3. Freedom Status and Beyond It
If the way that an issue or event is framed affects the way public policy is formed,
then it is critical that we understand what factors influence framing. In the present
analysis, in addition to the presence of Internet-related issues and news frames, the
researcher also examined the correlations between the media’s use of framing and the
political and socio-cultural factors, specifically freedom status and cultural dimensions.
As shown in the previous sections, differences in the use of news frames existed across
societies, and the differences in the newspapers’ usage of news frames were predictable
on some dimensions but not on others. This section focuses on the effects of freedom
status, while pointing out cautions that need to be considered in interpreting and
generalizing the effects.
In general, freedom status was found to be significantly associated with how
stories were framed, such as whether a certain type of news frame was presented, whether
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a certain type of politically sensitive issue or content was mentioned, and whether a
certain type of news frame was associated with a certain type of Internet-related issue.
The differences across the levels of freedom status were particularly exhibited in
reporting politically sensitive issues or content, such as the issues of Internet censorship
and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, and dissident users
and/or content. The presence of such an issue or content significantly increased with the
increasing level of freedom a society enjoyed, from not-free to partly-free to free. Yet the
implications of the differences of framing stories associated with freedom status could
not be overestimated, given the following points:
First, it should be noticed that much evidence attributed the functions of freedom
status mainly to the not-free society, China, which differed from the societies at the other
two levels in many aspects, particularly the free societies. The partly-free and free
societies did not differ much in terms of the presence of each type of news frames, and
the associations between the presence of news frames and Internet-related issues, except
for the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject.
Such patterns could be true in general, saying that differences across the levels of
freedom status mainly mirror in not-free societies. Yet this generalization has to be
proved by taking a more representative sample from different levels of societies,
especially from not-free societies, because there was only one sample from not-free
societies in the current study. We may also attribute the disparities between China and the
other societies to factors other than freedom status. For instance, the subject matter
concerned in this study, the Internet in China, was a home-nation one for Chinese
journalists.
176

Second, even if we had had a representative sample, we might still not be
confident in establishing a causal relationship mainly based on the information on various
associations without taking into account confounding variables and controlling variables
which might have influences. For instance, this study found that the presence of the
conflict frame in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as
primary subject was significantly associated with freedom status. Yet, freedom status was
not selected in the logistic regression model to predict the overall presence of the conflict
frame. There could be at least two ways to explain. First, both the overall and specific
presence of the conflict frame had nothing to do with freedom status. The association
found in the stories regarding Internet censorship and regulations could be a result of the
function of the cultural dimension of long/short-term orientation, which was found to be
significant in predicting the presence of the conflict frame, or the combined effect of the
dimension with other variables. The increasing direction of LTO scores that the examined
societies had was consistent with that of freedom status. Another explanation could be
that freedom status might have different functions in predicting the overall presence of
the conflict frame and its presence in certain types of stories under the combined
influences with other variables.
As a matter of fact, the present study shows that the presentations of news frames
rarely were a result of the influence of one single factor. The interaction effects between
variables were also detected (see Footnote 112 for an example). In addition, it should be
noticed that: 1) There were only five samples in terms of country; and 2) the predicting
variables were limited at the broadest level in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model,
and the best combined effects of different variables might have not been found.
177

All these suggest that important information might be missing if a cross-cultural
study involves only two countries and singles out only one factor, such as country. Such
studies may easily produce inconsistent results because the interaction effects of multiple
factors are not taken into account together. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect
patterns among countries and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences
between an arbitrary pairing of two countries. Although the current study brought five
cultural societies in, it would be even better to have more cultures involved so that the
test of the influences of political system and cultural dimensions on media content could
be leading to more confident and valid conclusions.

8.4. The Chinese Press: How Far Is It Pushing the Ideological Limits?
Another goal of the current study was to investigate extramedia influences in
Shoemaker and Reese’s model, specifically the influences of the changing structure of
media in China, if any, by comparing the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily, which
are at different administrative levels and enjoy institutional and financial autonomy in
different degrees.
In terms of issue salience, it was found that compared to the People’s Daily, the
Beijing Youth Daily was significantly less likely to present and highlight those issues
particularly with political implications, such as the issues of Internet censorship and
regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. Although no
significant differences in the presentations of the issue of Internet diffusion and use were
found between the newspapers, they differed in the use of news frames for telling stories
about the issue. The People’s Daily used more often the morality and leadership frames,
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whereas the Beijing Youth Daily was more likely to rely on the human interest frame to
highlight personal uses of the Internet. In general, the People’s Daily was more likely to
use the responsibility frame, especially in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship
and regulations.
The findings in issue salience seem to be a little confusing at the first look,
because it might be hard to understand why the People’s Daily tightly controlled by the
Chinese Communist Party, discussed the politically sensitive issues, Internet censorship
and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, even more often
than the Beijing Youth Daily with more institutional autonomy. On the surface, the
People’s Daily appeared to inform the public more of issues important to public political
life, which seemed to be similar to what its Western counterparts did. Yet, the picture
becomes clearer after we take a look at the stories regarding the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations in the People’s Daily.
The examples included in APPENDIX E show that the emphasis of the stories
about Internet censorship and regulations in the People’s Daily was different from those
in the Western newspapers, or the newspapers from Singapore, which were more
concerned with Internet censorship in terms of individuals’ political use of the Internet,
such as blocking websites, monitoring online messages, and arresting Internet dissidents.
The stories in the People’s Daily mainly reported events about regulating Internet content
such as pornography and copy right, or business such as Internet cafés and online
advertising, which are less politically sensitive. Also, they were mostly framed from the
point of view of morality or responsibility. Among 15 articles with such a primary
subject, six presented a responsibility frame and five presented a morality frame. The
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purposes for shutting down porn websites and regulating Internet cafés (Wangba) were
reported to protect adolescents from bad impacts so as to keep their morality standards.
Individual businesses were taken on responsibilities for the social problems, such as
safety violations and students’ Internet addiction and playing truant, which were claimed
to come with Internet cafés. In such a way, the stories presented in the People’s Daily,
the CCP’s flagship mouthpiece, justified the government’s censorship, such as shutting
down websites and clearing up Internet cafés, which was consistent with the central
theme of the Party’s concerns with minimizing harmful political and social impacts of the
Internet. By doing this, the paper was on the right track within the boundaries of the
state’s power and ideological control to propagate the Party line and maintain its political
loyalty.
Unlike the People’s Daily, which is at a higher political ranking and enjoys more
editorial privileges than local newspapers, the Beijing Youth Daily presented its
inclination to marginalize politically sensitive issues, such as Internet censorship and
regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet. The inclination chimed
with what the literature review presented in Chapter 4 suggests regarding the unevenly
developed media in China: 1) Politically sensitive content is more subject to ideological
control by the CCP; and 2) newspapers at the political periphery have greater autonomy
than their peers at the center. Yet such autonomy is very limited. The Beijing Youth Daily
could choose to stay away from helping the government to propagate its control of the
Internet and its interpretation of Internet control within the context of socialist spiritual
civilization. It might still not be able to push the ideological limits further to challenge the
legitimacy of maintaining “public morality” in cyberspace by clearing up what the
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government views as bad. Instead, the newspaper focused on individuals’ use of the
Internet and stories of individual businesses, which were frequently presented in a human
interest frame, so as to meet the needs of another master of the Chinese media, readers.
In terms of the presence of the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and
industry and the economic consequences frame, the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth
Daily did not show significant differences from each other. This might indicate that both
of them were subject to the responsibility of promoting economic modernization as part
of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).
The literature has seen the diversified structure of the Chinese media. Yet studies
on how the diversification is reflected in Chinese media content and to what extent the
diversification has brought liberality to the Chinese media in terms of the media’s serving
for public political life are few. The comparison of the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth
Daily shows that differences existed in issue salience and use of different types of news
frames. Yet in terms of those political sensitive issues (e.g., the issue of Internet
censorship and regulations), the comparison suggests that we might need to be
conservative to draw an inference that the Chinese media would enjoy more political
liberality with its increased diversified structure. However, such a suggestion is based on
the comparison conducted between only two papers. It should be more informative to
include more local newspapers, especially those in the areas far away from Beijing, the
center of politics and power.
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8.5. Implications of the Research
This research set out to determine how certain issues and news frames were
consistently presented in news articles from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United
States and the United Kingdom within the context of the Internet in China. It was
expected that differences would exist because of the political and socio-cultural
conditions under which the newspapers operate. It was anticipated that the generic news
frames (i.e., factual, human interest, conflict, economic consequences, responsibility,
morality and leadership) identified in previous studies would come to light. How these
frames were presented, however, was expected to vary as a result of the papers’ differing
cultural environment. It is hoped that this research has contributed to the literature of
media content and framing by introducing freedom status and cultural dimensions as
independent variables into a cross-cultural analysis of explaining the different patterns of
using news frames across societies.
Going beyond the descriptive level of measuring the number of times that the
types of Internet-related issues were mentioned and news frames were implemented, as
much past research has done, the study added to both method and theory in two ways: 1)
investigating certain issues with comprehensive implications to the public’s political and
social life, such as the issues of Internet use and censorship, through their associations
with the presentations of news frames; and 2) empirically introducing national-level
variables, such as freedom status and cultural dimensions, into the procedure of
establishing a variety of regression models to predict the presence of news frames and the
ways to frame a story, and explicitly building the variables into the across-society
comparison, as Przeworski and Teune (1981) suggested.
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These approaches allowed the researcher to discover important links between the
variables that previously were either assumed or were not investigated, as suggested in
Shoemaker and Reese’s model, and provide a more thorough understanding of macrosocial influences on news construction so as to remedy the deficiencies of the tradition of
framing research, which has focused on the effects of news frames on individuals’
attitudes and perceptions of media content, and has largely neglected how factors at the
macro level, such as political and cultural values, play a role in the process of media
framing. From this point of view, the present study made a contribution to our further
knowledge of how media frames are formed.
In addition, the current research also helped build the body of the literature in
cross-culture studies on media content. There are some studies being done crossculturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, such studies may not be
able to present clear relationships between media frames and certain factors influencing
content, in that the focus of such studies tends to present the differences of media frames
and the researchers tend not to empirically correlate the factors to the presentations of
media frames. Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that
most studies in this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by
singling out one factor. As a result, differences in specific aspects, political systems or
cultural values, are hidden under the cover of simple between-country differences. The
interplay between factors and how positive and negative effects of different factors might
offset one another are thus not detected. For instance, when significant differences were
observed between two or three countries, it becomes problematic to determine whether
the differences are attributable to political systems, cultural values, economic conditions,
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or some combination of these. By introducing five different societies, the present research
was able to make a good try to go beyond such limitations.

8.6. Limitations of the Study
A significant shortcoming of this study is the sampling of societies. The sample
consisted of only five purposely selected societies. Although it is meaningful to compare
typical Western and Eastern societies, and attempts were made to expand the scope of
cross-cultural comparisons, as discussed in Chapter 6 and the previous section, the
number of samples was still few, which might have caused some problems
methodologically. One of the limitations could be that the wide range of scores of each
cultural dimension with many intervals missing might have biased the results. As
mentioned in previous sections, this could be one of the reasons why many of the
regression models generated in this study could not explain much variations of the
presentations of news frames. In addition, this study empirically considered only the
influence of ideological values varying with political systems and cultural dimensions
across societies. Also, due to the non-representative samples, we have to be very cautious
in generalizing the results to other societies.
Another concern is the limits brought by a quantitative content analysis in framing
research. First, a content analysis cannot determine causality due to its lack of inference
power. Although some predicting variables were introduced into the study and as
discussed in previous sections, informed speculation and reasoning were provided, causal
relationships still cannot be established. Second, the quantitative analysis was founded on
the repetition of issues, news frames, or certain characteristics of content. Yet, many
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powerful concepts central to framing do not necessarily have to be repeated often to have
a great impact. Without a qualitative analysis, concepts implied between the lines of
words, the connections between concepts, and what is more latently among the
connotative levels of meaning cannot be revealed so as to further offer some insight and
understanding about how these concepts might have influenced in framing a story, and
how ideology plays out through the language. Furthermore, the content analysis provided
no information on how the stories were perceived and interpreted by readers.
In addition, the current study focused on the presentations of generic news frames
from the point of view of journalists, leaving room for other future studies to look at how
framing is taken as a strategic action and acted out by multiple social actors by looking at
news sources and frame sponsorship in news. Scholars also view framing as a part of a
discursive process in which strategic actors, such as political actors, organizations, and
social movements, use symbolic resources to participate in collective sense-making about
public policy issues (Gamson, 1992, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 2001), and to work to
“sponsor” the frames that appear in news (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989). By relating news sources to types of news frames, we might be able to
determine whether media’s maintaining the status quo in framing contests (Carragee &
Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978) interplay with
political systems and cultural values, and if so, how.

8.7. Opportunities for Future Research
This study analyzed newspaper frames about the Internet in China over a fiveyear period by selecting two newspapers from each of five societies, China, Hong Kong,
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Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. As discussed in previous sections,
bringing more societies into a more systematic study that combines variables at different
levels in the hierarchical model of Shoemaker and Reese could give us more confidence
in the predicting power of regression models for the presence of generic news frames. For
instance, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) argued that the influences on media content not
only come from the journalists who write stories, but also from interest groups, news
organizations themselves and their policies, e.g., political endorsements, editorial
positions, and corporate procedures. Perhaps it is difficult to measure quantitatively; yet it
is not entirely impossible. Meanwhile, research using a more qualitative approach could
offer more insight into the procedure of frame building. In addition, a more complicated
comparative research involving different social units at two different time periods could
be considered to examine whether the influence of national-level variables would change
over the time, although Chang et al (2001) pointed out such a comparison is “empirically
less feasible” (p.418).
Further research is suggested that includes more titles of newspapers and a variety
of news media, including television, radio, and the Internet, to gain a more complete
understanding of mass media portrayals of China’s Internet. This would be particularly
meaningful in terms of comparative purposes for examining to what extent the influences
of political and cultural values in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model on the
patterns of news coverage could go beyond the boundaries of different types of news
media. For instance, will news stories carried on the Internet, a universal medium more
open to ordinary people to discuss political issues, exhibit less differences across
societies?
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In terms of media content, an avenue of research to broaden the scope of the
current study, focusing on only news articles, would be including editorials and
commentaries in news media, which could provide more precise knowledge of and
insight into a newspaper’s leanings toward such controversial issues as Internet use,
Internet censorship, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. A
qualitative analysis could provide greater understanding of whether frames in editorial
content reflect the power structure in a given society, and if so, how. Besides this, further
research could include non-news sources that people rely on in daily life to construct
meaning about topics in the public arena.
Another question can be raised about the extent to which journalists’ individual
frames may influence the procedure of media framing. As indicated in Figure 3.2,
constructed reality plays a role in shaping individual frames in the long term, which in
turn takes a function in how journalists, also as individual audiences who accept
information from media sources, frame stories. Yet, the current study only examined a
part of the process of frame building, from objective reality through media, leaving the
interactions between media frames and individual frames and the roles of constructed
reality unconsidered. If these functions are included, more residuals or variations could
be explained. For instance, if a certain issue has been reported in a salient way over time,
journalists could pick up this type of issue easily because of its availability and
accessibility, as discussed in the first section. Therefore, further research should combine
a variety of methods, such as content analysis, surveys, interviews, and experimental
designs to capture alternative meanings constructed by journalists.
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AND NON-PRIMARY STORIES
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1. Primary stories vs. non-primary stories
1) Does the headline of the story contain any key word(s), such as Beijing and Web,
directly referring to China AND Internet-related object(s)? Examples:
China Lists Controls To Restrict the Use Of E-Mail and Web
Tracking the Web Across China
Beijing Blocks Access to Google
Such stories definitely are primary stories.
2) If the headline of the story does not clearly suggest that the primary subject of the
story is related to the Internet in China, then, does the lead in the story primarily present
or discuss an issue/event/problem related to Internet in China? In some cases, it is very
easy to answer the question as “Yes.” Then, such stories should be coded as primary
stories. In some cases, it is more complicated. For example:
From the headline “China's New Culture Starting To Take Shape,” it is not clear whether
or not the primary subject of the story is related to the Internet in China. You should then
look at the lead:
For Sun Jiazheng, the Chinese culture minister, the emergence of a global culture
wears many faces. On the one hand, moviegoers in Beijing can swoon at
screenings of “Titanic.” On the other, computer jockeys in Shanghai might surf
Web sites that carry “unhealthy” material.
The lead suggests that the story could be the one with the primary subject related to the
Internet in China, in which the cultural implications of the Internet in China might be
discussed. Yet, it is still not clear whether or not such an issue would be the primary
subject of the story. In such a case, you should consider the following question:
3) Does the content related to the Internet in China, overall, dominate over other content
in the story? If yes, then the story should be coded as a primary story.
2. Other general rules concerning primary or non-primary stories
1) Stories mainly discussing the Internet in Hong Kong are excluded from primary
stories.
2) The activities of foreign Internet companies in the Internet market of mainland China
are considered to be related to the Internet in China.
3) The oversea activities of China’s Internet companies are also considered to be related
to the Internet in China.
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4) Stories discussing the Internet in a broader area, such as Asia, with China as a part of
it, are coded non-primary stories.
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APPENDIX B (I)
CODING FORM FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS – 1
PRIMARY STORIES
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Section 1: Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China’s Internet
in the story.
Variable 01: Newspaper Title
1) People’s Daily
2) Beijing Youth Daily
3) Singtao Daily
4) South China Morning Post
5) Lianhe Zaobao
6) The Straits Times
7) The New York Times
8) The Los Angeles Times
9) The Guardian
10) The Times
Variable 02: Date of the story: ____________ (dd/mm/yy)
Variable 03: The country/territory with which the newspaper is associated:
1) Mainland China
2) Hong Kong
3) Singapore
4) The United States
5) The United Kingdom
Variable 04: What issue is taken as the primary subject in the story? Please check ONLY
ONE.
1) Internet technologies
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 05 through
Variable 08]
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09
through Variable 11]
4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO
Variable 12 through 12a]
7) Other (If other, please specify here: ______________________________)
8) Not ascertainable [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 13]
If check 2) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the
mention of online content stresses more:
1) political use/content
2) non-political use/content
3) Not ascertainable
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4) Not applicable
Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations,
mentioned?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive
content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to
project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme
nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
6) Not applicable
If check 3) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): Does the discussion regarding regulating
the Internet in the story, if any, stress:
1) the necessity of regulating the Internet
2) the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): Does the discussion related to regulating
the Internet in the story, if any, stress:
1) Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the
Internet
2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak
impact on Internet use
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet,
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:
1) the political aspect
2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
3) Not ascertainable
220

4) Not applicable
If check 6) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication
is more emphasized?
1) political
2) social/cultural
3) commercial
4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:
1) strengthening the current government or regime
2) weakening the current government or regime
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 13: Other than the primary subject, what issues related to China’s Internet are
mentioned or discussed in the story? Please check as MANY as you can:
1) Internet technologies
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 14 through
Variable 17]
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 18
through Variable 20]
4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO
Variable 21 through 21a]
7) Other(s) (If other(s), please specify here:
______________________________)
8) Not applicable
If 2) for Variable 13 is checked, then,
Variable 14 (PTI Question-01a): The discussion of Internet use or the
mention of online content more stresses:
1) political use/content
2) non-political use/content
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
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Variable 15 (PTI Question-02a): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations,
mentioned?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 16 (PTI Question-03a): Is dissident content or politically
sensitive content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does
not want to project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption,
extreme nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials,
mentioned/discussed?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 17 : Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
6) Not applicable
If 3) for Variable 13 is checked, then,
Variable 18 (PTI Question-04a): The discussion regarding regulating the
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:
1) the necessity of regulating the Internet, or
2) the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 19 (PTI Question-05a): The discussion related to regulating the
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:
1) Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the
Internet, or
2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak
impact on Internet use
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 20 (PTI Question-06a): The concern over regulating the Internet,
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:
1) the political aspect
2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
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If 6) for Variable 13 is checked, then,
Variable 21(PTI Question-07a): What type of consequence or implication
is more emphasized?
1) political
2) social/cultural
3) commercial
4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
Variable 21a (PTI Question-08a): If the political
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:
1) strengthening the current government
2) transforming China into a new society
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable

Section 2: The presence of frame.
Variable 22: Is a factual frame present in the story?
1) Yes
2) No
If checked YES, then,
Variable 22a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 23: Is a human interest frame present in the story?
1) Yes
2) No
If checked YES, then,
Variable 23a: Who is(are) the agent(s)/actor(s) involved in the frame?
(Check as MANY as you can.)
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not applicable
Variable 23b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
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Variable 24: Is a conflict frame present in the story?
1. Yes
2. No
If checked YES, then
Variable 24a: Who are the counterparts involved? (Check as MANY as
you can.)
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
4) Government/people representing government vs.
Government/people representing government
5) Government/people representing government vs. individual(s)
as ordinary people
6) Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
7) Others (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
8) Not applicable
Variable 24b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 25: Is a responsibility frame present in the story?
1. Yes
2. No
If checked YES, then
Variable 25a: Who is suggested in the story being responsible for or
having ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question?
(Check as MANY as you can.)
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/ people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not applicable
Variable 25b: Who is given credit? (Check as MANY as you can.)
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not applicable
Variable 25c: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
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1) Yes

2) No

3) Not applicable

Variable 26: Is a morality frame present in the story?
1. Yes
2. No
If checked YES, then
Variable 26a: Who provides the moral message/interpretation? (Check as
MANY as you can.)
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business man(men)/ corporate(s)
3) Government/ people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not applicable
Variable 26b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 27: Is an economic consequence frame present in the story?
1. Yes
2. No
If checked YES, then
Variable 27a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 28: Is a leadership frame present in the story?
1. Yes
2. No
If checked YES, then
Variable 28a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the
story?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
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NON-PRIMARY STORIES
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Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China’s Internet in the
story.
Variable 01: Newspaper Title
1) People’s Daily
2) Beijing Youth Daily
3) Singtao Daily
4) South China Morning Post
5) Lianhe Zaobao
6) The Straits Times
7) The New York Times
8) The Los Angeles Times
9) The Guardian
10) The Times
Variable 02: Date of the story: ____________ (dd/mm/yy)
Variable 03: The country/territory that the newspaper is associated:
1) Mainland China
2) Hong Kong
3) Singapore
4) The United States
5) The United Kingdom
Variable 04: What issue(s) related to China’s Internet is(are) mentioned in the story?
Please check as MANY as you can.
1) Internet technologies
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked for Internet use, GO TO
Variable 05 through Variable 08]
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09
through Variable 11]
4) E-commerce & Internet business
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO
Variable 12 through 12a]
7) Other (If other, please specify here: ______________________________)
If check 2) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the
mention of online content more stresses:
1) political use/content
2) non-political use/content
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
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Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations,
mentioned?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive
content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to
project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme
nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Not applicable
Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
3) Government/people representing government
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
6) Not applicable
If check 3) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): The discussion regarding regulating the
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:
1) the necessity of regulating the Internet, or
2) the opposite
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): The discussion related to regulating the
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:
1) Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the
Internet, or
2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet,
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:
1) the political aspect
2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
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If check 6) for Variable 04, then,
Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication
is more emphasized?
1) political
2) social/cultural
3) commercial
4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________)
5) Not ascertainable
Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:
1) strengthening the current government or regime, or
2) weakening the current government or regime
3) Not ascertainable
4) Not applicable
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Part – 1: Identifying the primary subject and the issue(s) related to the Internet in
China in a story.
1. Identifying the primary subject of a PRIMARY story
The issues related to China’s Internet in the coding sheet are not mutually exclusive but
may be combined in the same story. Follow the steps to determine which one is the
primary subject of a primary story:
1) Content contained in headlines and leads is the important key. If the content is
consistent in both the headline and lead of a story, then it should be taken as the primary
subject of the story. For example:
Headline: Web Sites' Merger Signals Consolidation of China's Internet Industry
Lead: China's Internet industry, serving one of the most promising markets, is about to
undergo a sweeping consolidation after the first major merger of the industry's short life.
Then the primary subject of the story is coded as “e-commerce & Internet business.”
2) If the consistency of the content in the headline and lead of a story is not very clear,
then, a careful reading of the entire story is desired. For example:
Headline: Complaints and Concern Rise Over Poor Policing in China
Lead: The first boy disappeared in March 2001, then others went missing, all teenage
boys, all regulars at the Internet cafes near the schools. Suspicious parents went to the
police, who were not impressed. Maybe, the police said, the boys ran away.
If the content of the story is dominated by or mainly centers around a certain issue
included in the coding sheet, then the issue is the primary subject of the story.
3) If the identified issue is not specifically addressed in the list, code it as “other,” and
specify the issue.
4) If the story emphasizes equally two or more issues, then code it as “not
ascertainable/not applicable.”
2. Identifying the issue(s) related to the Internet in China
1) The category of “Internet technologies”
•

Includes:
The technological aspect of the Internet, such as the innovation and diffusion of
an emerging technology applied to the Internet, the features and applications of
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Internet technologies, such as e-platform, encryption software, Web browser, etc,
or technological problems of a Web site or network, and scientific research on the
solutions.
•

•

•

Excludes:
How Internet technologies benefit people and societies, which will be grouped
into the category of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.”
Specific cases:
Filtering/blocking software/technologies issue
If a story mainly discusses the software/technology itself, such as the
developer(s), and its advantages and applications, it will be grouped into this
category. If the story mentions the software in the context of discussing the issue
of Internet censorship in China, for instance, mainly discussing how the software
is used to censor the content online, then it will be grouped into the category of
“Internet censorship & regulations.”
Security issue
The rule similar to the one above applies. When the technology of online security,
such as encryption, firewall, etc., is mentioned or discussed, if the story
emphasizes more on the technology itself, it will be grouped into this category.
Otherwise, it will be grouped into the category of “hackers, Internet security &
other cybercrimes.”

2) The category of “Internet diffusion & use”
•
•

•
•

Includes:
General information on Internet diffusion and/or use in China, such as news
release of how many people are there on the Internet, who’s on the Internet, the
size of the Internet, how frequently people visit the Internet, etc.
Discussion of the determinants of Internet diffusion in China, such as Internet
backbone and/or network infrastructure, access to the Internet and/or constituent
technologies, perceived value of the Internet, demand for capacity and
connectivity, etc., and the issue of digital divide.
The Internet use of ordinary people, organizations, or institutions, such as
communicative interaction, message dissemination, e-learning, political
involvement, etc.
Government initiatives to use the Internet to spread information, disseminate
material, and provide channels for two-way communication, or use the Internet as
a tool for self-promotion, Party propaganda, and/or for public goods and services,
such as the launch of an official Web site for public use or e-governance, eeducation, or organizing a specific non-commercial online event getting ordinary
people involved.
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•

•
•

•
•

•

•

•

•

The Internet use of Internet-based companies/corporations for purposes other than
business, such as contributing to public goods, and organizing a specific noncommercial online event, e.g., collecting e-signatures to bid for Olympics.
Excludes:
Government’s involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet, which will be
grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.”
The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for
doing business, such as launching an e-commerce Web site, and providing
commercial services via Internet technologies, etc., which will be grouped into the
category of “e-commerce & Internet business.”
Discussion of how regulatory/legal framework affects/determines the Internet
diffusion/use in China, which will be grouped into the category of “Internet
censorship & regulations.”
The consequences and/or implications of Internet use, such as the implications of
using Web to disseminate dissent content, which will be grouped into the category
of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.”
Specific cases:
Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet
If the discussion is mainly from the perspective of the pervasiveness, geographic
dispersion and/or connectivity infrastructure of the Internet in China, it will be
grouped into the category “Internet diffusion & use.” If the discussion is mainly
from the perspective of how the Chinese government controls the Internet through
controlling access to the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet
censorship & regulations.”
Individuals’ online shopping activities
If such activities are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle of
personal online behavior, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet
diffusion & use.” If they are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle
of business, such as how commercial Web sites promote online shopping, it will
be grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.”
Discussion of perceived value of the Internet
If the discussion is more associated with how such perceptions determine the use
of the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”
If the discussion is more associated with social and/or cultural change, it will be
grouped into the category of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.”
Discussion of Internet cafe
If the discussion is centered on individual use of the Internet, such as who visits
Internet cafés, what users are look for on the Internet, and how users enjoy
Internet cafes, etc, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet diffusion &
use.” If the discussion is centered on the business operation of Internet cafes, it
will be grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.” If the
discussion is centered on regulations that cover the operation of Internet cafes,
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and lawsuits related to Internet cafes, it will be grouped into the category of
“Internet censorship & regulations.”
3) The category of “Internet censorship & regulations”
•
•

•

•
•
•

Includes:
Filtering/ blocking software and/or other technologies/methods used for censoring
the online content. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in
the category of “Internet technologies.”)
Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet as a part of
discussion of the strategies of controlling the Internet in China. (Refer to the
guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet
diffusion & use.”)
Specific steps or strategies taken by the Chinese government to control the
Internet, such as closing down or blocking a specific Web site, creating special
Internet police, etc., and individual anti-blocking methods or strategies, such as
using proxy servers to bypass official blocks.
Any policies, regulations and/or laws regarding all Internet-related aspects, such
as domain names, online content, online behaviors, and Internet industry.
Specific Internet-related lawsuits, such as intellectual property cases, and
prosecutions and imprisonment of Internet users, including dissidents, and/or
Internet-interested businessmen.
Discussion of Internet-interested policy bodies and/or the regulatory regime
governing the Internet.

4) The category of “e-commerce & Internet business”
•
•
•
•
•

•

Includes:
The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for
doing business and providing commercial services. (Refer to the guidelines above
concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”)
The government’s involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet. (Refer to the
guidelines above concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion
& use.”)
The trend of Internet industry in China.
Foreign companies/investors’ economic activities in Internet industry in China.
The government’s strategies for driving the information economy and Internet
business.
Excludes:
How e-commerce will transform China, which will be grouped into “the
consequences & implications of the Internet.”

5) The category of “hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes”
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•
•

•
•

•

•

Includes:
Domestic hacker activities in China and “cyberwars” against foreign countries,
such as Indonesia, America and Japan.
Technical discussions related to hacking, such as phony IPs, distant assaults,
backdoors, etc., and the technology of protecting online security discussed with an
emphasis on Internet security rather than the technology itself. (Refers to the
guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet
technologies.”)
Virus and protection
General information on other Internet-related crimes, such as copy right piracy,
theft of trade secrets, Internet fraud and spam, Internet harassment and threats,
trademark counterfeiting, etc.
Excludes:
Any specific law suits or cases involved in hacking, and other Internet-related
crimes, and associated with regulating or controlling the Internet in China, which
will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship and regulations.” (Refer
to the guidelines above concerning the category of “Internet censorship and
regulations.”)
Specific cases:
The encryption issue
If the discussion is more technologically oriented, it will be grouped into the
category of “Internet technologies.” If the discussion is centered on securing the
Internet in China, it will be grouped in the category of “hackers, Internet security
& other cybercrimes.” (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific
cases in the category of “Internet technologies.) If the discussion is more from the
perspective of regulations, such as the rules on the importation of encryption
software into China, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship &
regulations.”

6) The category of “other”
Any other issues, concerns or events related to China’s Internet, which are clearly
addressed in a story but not included in the categories above, will be grouped in this
category.
7) The category of “not ascertainable”
This category applies to the cases where there are more than one issue addressed in a
primary story and it is not easy to single out one as the primary subject of the story from
the others. Before checking this category, read the story very carefully to find out
whether or not the story gives more attention to a certain issue than the others. If that is
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not the case, and the story equally emphasizes two or more issues, the category is
checked.
For other questions, such as the PTI questions, if a given story is mixed with the two
opposite statements for a given question, and there is no way to weigh one over the other,
the category is checked.
8) The category of “not applicable”
This category applies when a given question is not applicable to a given story, that is, the
story has nothing to do with the subject matter or statement concerned in the given
question.
Part – 2: Identifying the frame(s) present in the story.
(The instrument to measure whether or not a certain type of frame is presented is
modified and created mostly based on the following research projects, such as Luther &
Zhou, 2005, Semetko & Valkenburg, 1998, Valkengurg, Semetko, & De Vreese, 1999,
and Zillmann, Chen, Knobloch, & Callison, 2004.)
1. Identifying the Factual Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the factual frame:
2. Does the story present the issue/event/problem in question mainly based on
facts and/or factual interpretation?
If yes, then,
3. Does the story present the facts in a straightforward fashion?
If yes, then a factual frame is presented.
2. Identifying the Human Interest Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the human interest frame:
1. Does the story provide a human example, a human face, a personal story or an
emotional angle?
If yes, then,
2. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups play a role in or are
affected by the issue/event/problem in question?
Or,
3. Does the story contain feelings of outrage, empathy or caring, or sympathy or
compassion?
If yes to any one of these two questions (#2 or #3), then a human interest frame is
presented.
3. Identifying the Conflict Frame:
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Questions to measure the presence of the conflict frame:
1. Does the story provide two parties, individuals, groups, or countries with
different interests?
Or,
2. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the issue/event/
problem/thoughts/arguments in question?
If yes to any one of these two questions (#1 or #2), then,
3. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties, individuals, groups, or
countries?
Or,
4. Does one party, individual, group, or country reproach another?
Or,
5. Does the story present a battle, confrontation, scuffle, clash, controversy etc.?
If yes to any one of these three questions (#3, #4, or #5), then a conflict frame is
presented.
4. Identifying the Responsibility Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the responsibility frame:
1. Does the story point out a specific problem/adversity/disaster?
If yes, then,
2. Does the story suggest that any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s),
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society
is responsible for the problem/ adversity/disaster in question?
Or,
3. Does the story suggest that individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s),
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society
has the ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question? Or does
the story give credit to any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s),
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society?
Or,
4. Does the story suggest that the problem adversity/disaster requires urgent action
from individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s),
some level of the government and/or the society?
If yes to any one of these three questions (#2, #3, and #4), then a responsibility frame is
presented.
5. Identifying the Morality Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the morality frame:
1. Does the story interpret an issue/event/problem in terms of moral prescription,
e.g., offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave?
Or,
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2. Does the story present an issue/event/problem for the sake of caring about the
state of social morality or to promote ethical education in the society?
If yes to any one of these two questions, then a morality frame is presented.
6. Identifying the Economic Consequence Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the economic consequence frame:
1. Is there a reference to the (actual, perceived, and future) economic
consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?
Or,
2. Is there a mention of the costs or the degree of expense involved?
If yes to any one of these two questions, then an economic consequence frame is
presented.
7. Identifying the Leadership Frame:
Questions to measure the presence of the leadership frame:
1. Does the story mention any leader(s) involved in an issue/event/problem?
Or,
2. Does the story mention the notion of leadership related to the Internet in China?
If yes to any one of these two questions, then,
3. Does the story specifically address leadership activities, reactions, effectiveness,
and/or roles played in the arena of the Internet in China?
If yes, then a leadership frame is presented.
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APPENDIX D
CONFLICT TYPES IN STORIES WITH CONFLICT FRAME
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Table D.1. Conflict Types in the U.S. and U.K. Newspapers
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count
0

0.0

6

14.6

1

2.4

1

2.4

23

56.1

9

22.0

6

14.6

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 41.

Table D.2. Conflict Types in the U.S. Newspapers
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 29.
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0

0.0

4

13.8

1

3.4

1

3.4

17

58.6

7

24.1

2

6.9

Table D.3. Conflict Types in the U.K. Newspapers
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count
0

0.0

2

16.7

0

0.0

0

0.0

5

41.7

2

16.7

4

33.3

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 12.

Table D.4. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from China
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 9.

241

1

11.1

4

44.4

2

22.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1

11.1

Table D.5. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Hong Kong
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count
0

0.0

2

22.2

1

11.1

0

0.0

1

11.1

1

11.1

4

44.4

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 9.

Table D.6. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Singapore
Conflict type
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary
people
Government/people representing government vs.
government/people representing government
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as
ordinary people
Government/people representing government vs. business
person(s)/corporate(s)
Other
a

Percent a

Count

Percentage of all conflict accounts, N = 14.
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1

7.1

4

28.6

2

14.3

1

7.1

5

35.7

1

7.1

3

21.4

APPENDIX E
EXAMPLES OF PRIMARY STORIES WITH INTERNET
DIFFUSION AND USE, AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND
REGULATIONS AS PRIMARY SUBJECTS
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1. Internet Diffusion and Use
Country

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The People’s Daily, January
23, 2000.
The People’s Daily, February
4, 2000.
The People’s Daily, March 2,
2000.
The People’s Daily, January
12, 2001.
The People’s Daily, February
16, 2001.

政府上网工程推出新举措 [Government
Online Project makes new moves]
农民上网找买家 [Peasants go online looking
for buyers]
中国人大新闻站点开通 [The news website of
the National People’s Congress is open]
山东省开发“电子邮政”
[Shangdong develops e-postal services]
全国农业网站达 2200 家 [Agricultural
websites amount to 2,200 throughout the
country]
西部大学校园网建设工程将启动 [The
project of building universities’ campus
networks in Western China will be launched]
给“新五类”网民画像 [Portraying “five new
types” of netizens]
中青网启用全新域名, CN 域名每月注册量超
过 1 万 [The Youth Net starts using a new
domain name; The number of registration for
“.cn” domain names is over 10,000 per mouth]
我国全面启动下一代互联网建设 [China
completely starts building next generation of
the Internet]
山东安丘市检察院—“网上监督”实现“在线
管理” [The Qiuan Procuratorate in Shandong:
“online supervision” realizes “online
management”]
王刚上网任人数落 [Wanggang goes online
letting people scold]
网上传递谢师礼 [Pass gifts on the Internet in
appreciation of teachers]
网络成为奥运新舞台 [The Net becomes the
new stage of Olympics]
新疆网民挑战网络生存 [Xinjiang Netizens
challenge being online]
大学生帮花农办网站 [College students help
flower peasants to launch websites]

The People’s Daily, May 10,
2002.
The People’s Daily, January
2, 2003.
The People’s Daily,
December 11, 2003.
China
The People’s Daily, March
20, 2004.
The People’s Daily,
December 22, 2004.

The Beijing Youth Daily,
February 1, 2000.
The Beijing Youth Daily,
September 5, 2000.
The Beijing Youth Daily, July
26, 2000.
The Beijing Youth Daily,
October 24, 2001.
The Beijing Youth Daily,
March 18, 2002.
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1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued)
Country

China

Hong
Kong

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The Beijing Youth Daily, June
13, 2003.

网驴不怵非典 [“Online donkeys” are not
fearful of SARS]
以个人名义 开通学雷锋网 [Personally
open a website of learning from Lei Feng]
中国三千万人曾上网 [China has 30
millions people with online experience]
网吧提供宽频上网 [Internet cafés provide
broadband access]
China Web surfers No 2 in the world; User
figures estimated to double every 12 to 18
months
中国首家 WAP 中文信息网开通 [China
opens the first Chinese WAP website]
北京市公务员 45.7%从未上过网 [45.7%
civil servants in Beijing never go online]
上 海“88547”服 务 热 线 添 婚 姻 网 [The
service hotline “88547” in Shanghai sets up
an additional website for marriage]
《死亡日記》吸引千万读者 上海著名网上
作家陆幼青病逝 [ Death Diary attracts
thousands and millions of readers; Shanghai
famous online writer Lu Youqing dies]
清明节即将到来 中国网上祭祀之风猛吹
[Tomb-Sweeping Day is coming; The wind of
online sacrifice is blasting in China]
42%中国网民愿为下载软件付费 [42%
Chinese Internet users willing to pay for
downloading software]
Dalian ports use PSA system

The Beijing Youth Daily, March
4, 2004
The Singtao Daily, January 9,
2001.
The Singtao Daily, April 3,
2001.
The South China Morning Post,
August 2, 2002.
The Lianhe Zaobao, March 18,
2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao, September
23, 2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao, September
29, 2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao, December
12, 2000.

The Lianhe Zaobao,
April 5, 2002.
Singapore
The Lianhe Zaobao,
February 17, 2003.
The Straits Times, September
22, 2000.
The Straits Times, February 14,
2002.
The Straits Times, March 19,
2003.
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SMS way to a Happy New Year;
A whopping two million messages flood
mobile phones and the Internet in Beijing in
the hour leading up to the New Year
Students in Beijing addicted to Internet;
Nearly 15% of secondary schoolchildren are
stuck on cyberspace and online games, and
the problem is expected to worsen

1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued)
Country

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The Straits Times, October 5,
2003.
The Straits Times, January 6,
Singapore
2004.

U.S.

U.K.

The New York Times, June 29,
2000.
The New York Times, January
16, 2004.
The New York Times,
December 06, 2004.
The Log Angeles Times, May
18, 2002.
The Times, June 10, 2000.
The Times, November 7,
2000.
The Guardian, January 15,
2001.
The Times, April 3, 2001.
The Guardian, July 8, 2002.

Online, China’s protesters are too loud to
ignore
Chinese Internet users wield clout;
Bombarded by thousands of furious online
postings, police reopen case of a woman who
got off lightly after causing a peasant’s death
In China, Web Revolution Means Games
Chinese go online in search of justice against
elite class
Beijing Loves the Web Until the Web Talks
Back
Chinese surfers see more of Net

Internet use in China has doubled
Beijing decides to paint town grey
China tries to snare Tibet’s web visitors
Chinese use the Net to speak out; Island a hub
of military activity
Mr Li’s diary reveals human dimension of the
crisis in China

2. Internet Censorship and Regulations
Country

China

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The People’ s Daily,
December 2, 2000.
The People’ s Daily,
December 18, 2000.
The People’ s Daily, July
12, 2001.

国内首例网站与传统媒体的版权案昨宣判 [The
first Internet copyright case was ruled yesterday]
网络广告，亟待游戏规则 [Online advertising
needs urgently game rules]
全国公安机关集中清理整治违法违规“网吧”
[Public security bureaus over the country clear up
and publish illegal “Wangba”] 125
昆明市网吧停业整顿 [Wangba in Kungmin City
are closed down and rectified]

The People’ s Daily, June
19, 2002.
125

Wangba, Internet café or cyber café.
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2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)
Country

China

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The People’ s Daily,
January 30, 2003.
The People’s Daily,
March 21, 2004.
The People’s Daily,
July 18, 2004.

网吧，请让未成年人止步！[Wangba, please let the
youth under age stop!]
安全文明上网 自觉远离网吧 [Go online in a safe
and civilized way; Consciously stay away from Wangba]
坚决拥护和支持打击淫秽色情网站专项行动 [Firmly
support the special action cracking down on obscene and
porn websites]
全国各大商业网站全面清理涉“黄”信息 [Main
commercial websites over the country completely clear
up porn messages]
上海：数百色情网 依法被关闭 [Shanghai: Hundreds
porn websites are closed according to law]
Rules hailed for adding clarity as shares falter

The People’s Daily,
August 7, 2004.

Hong
Kong

The People’s Daily,
October 31, 2004.
The South China
Morning Post,
October 4, 2000.
The South China
Morning Post,
December 6, 2000.
The South China
Morning Post, July
1, 2003.
The South China
Morning Post,
January 26, 2004.
The Singtao Daily,
September 14, 2002.
The Lianhe Zaobao,
May 18, 2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao,
June 4, 2000.

Singapore The Lianhe Zaobao,
June 10, 2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao,
November 3, 2000.
The Lianhe Zaobao,
June 24, 2001.

Beijing seeks tighter Net bulletin-board controls
Web sites told to clean up their content
Firms in uphill battle to stop porn
Google 网站部分解封 [Google is partly unblocked]
中国新闻网站管理法规今年半年或出台
[China will issue regulations on managing news websites
in the first half of this year]
主页点击率高达 145 万 上海查获首例网络色情案
[Homepage hits reach 14.5 millions: The first case of
porn websites is tracked down in Shanghai]
中国监管互联网广告 [China supervises Internet
advertising]
中国公安部：买卖电邮地址会受到法律制裁[China’s
ministry of public security: Buying and selling e-mail
addresses subject to punishment according to law]
“大陆多家网上论坛被关闭” [Many online forums in
mainland are shut down]
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2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)
Country

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The Lianhe Zaobao,
February 18, 2004.

网络异议作者杜导斌被控颠覆中国国家政权
[Internet dissident writer Du Daobing is charged
with subverting China’s state regime]
Beijing easing up on Internet control, says report
by think-tank
China fights losing battle to censor cyberspace

The Straits Times, June 21,
2000.
Singapore The Straits Times, January
22, 2001
The Straits Times, July 22,
2003
The Straits Times,
December 30, 2004

U.S.

The New York Times,
January 27, 2000.
The New York Times,
August 24, 2000.
The Los Angeles Times,
October 3, 2000.
The New York Times,
October 4, 2000.
The New York Times,
October 11, 2000.
The New York Times, April
21, 2001.
The New York Times, April
26, 2001.
The Los Angeles Times,
March 11, 2001.
The Los Angeles Times,
September 10, 2001.
The New York Times,
January 12, 2002.
The New York Times, June
17, 2002.
The New York Times,
September 4, 2002.
The New York Times,
December 4, 2002.
The New York Times,
December 19, 2002.

On patrol: 30,000 cybercops
No let-up in China’s crackdown on liberals;
Analysts say arrests are an attempt by govt to
assert control as social unrest increases
China lists controls to restrict the use of e-mail
and Web
China arrests owner of Internet café
China issues new rules on Internet content

Tough new rules don’t faze Chinese Internet
start-ups
China lays out investment rules
China detains and isolates liberal computer wiz
Punching holes in Internet walls
Talk of blast cleared from China Internet
Censors and surfers locked in a battle over Internet
access; China

Testing China’s censors with a gay love story
Beijing mayor cracks down on Internet cafes
after fatal fire
Beijing blocks access to Google
China has world’s tightest Internet censorship,
Study Finds
China: Internet publisher is detained

248

2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)
Country

U.S.

U.K.

Newspaper & Date

Headline

The New York Times,
January 28, 2004.
The New York Times, June
12, 2004.
The New York Times, June
27, 2004.
The Los Angeles Times,
June 12, 2004.
The Los Angeles Times,
February 26, 2004.
The Times, January 28,
2000.
The Times, February 19,
2000.
The Times, March 14,
2000.
The Times, March 27,
2000.
The Guardian, June 3,
2000.

China urged to free 54 jailed in Internet use

The Guardian, June 8,
2000.
The Times, April 13, 2001
The Guardian, September
27, 2001.
The Times, September 4,
2002.
The Guardian, September
5, 2002.

The Times, May 30, 2003.

China: Reprieve for Internet dissident
Despite an act of leniency, China has its eye on the
Web
Chinese Web activist gets suspended sentence
China clamps down on Web news discussion
Internet in China stifled by new rules
China to censor website news
China softens IT restrictions
Beijing to curb online trade in audio-visual
products
Beijing fails to hush Tiananmen whispers: 11 years
on, defiant protesters and victims’ families refuse
to let the massacre be forgotten
Beijing tries, but fails, to gag Internet hosts
Internet censors cut the Chinese chat
In the Chinese doghouse: Authorities lifted a ban
on the BBC, but not for long
Chinese block on Internet
Engine trouble: In the mid 1990s, two Stanford
university dropouts dreamed up a search engine
with a unique cataloguing system. Now Google is
the biggest on the Web. But not everyone is a fan some say it unfairly favours certain websites. The
latest critic is China, which has blocked it
completely. Oliver Burkeman investigates
Beijing jails online critics in crackdown
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VITA
Xiang Zhou, with an English name Julie, earned her bachelor of arts degree in
Chinese Language and Literature from the Wuhan University, mainland China, in July
1990 and was honored as one of the university’s top graduates. As an undergraduate at
the Wuhan University, she was awarded the Wen Yiduo Literature Prize and the top
paper in the Contest of Academic Theses at the Advancing Front in Sciences and Social
Science Research for her research on modern Chinese romantic poetry. She also won a
national prize for one of her creative poems. She was a four-year recipient of the Wuhan
University Scholarship and the honor of Excellent Undergraduate Student.
Because of her outstanding performance, she was waived from taking entrance
exams and was recommended to the master program of Chinese language at the Wuhan
University in September 1990. She majored in modern Chinese language with a
concentration on Chinese rhetoric. She was awarded the Huang Kan Language Prize for
her research on structural linguistics. Her master thesis won the Best Graduate Thesis
Award. While co-teaching courses in Chinese, she also co-authored a textbook on
traditional Chinese culture.
Before she received her Master’s of Arts degree in July 1993, she reported for
duty as a copy editor at the Xinhua News Agency, China’s state-run agency, in March,
1993. During the time at the agency, she received a series of national and local awards for
her professional achievements. She became a page principal in 1995, involved in taking
charge of the front page and several columns of the Reference News. She co-launched the
Wednesday Supplement of the digest daily newspaper, which was famous for its in-depth
news analysis and lively international news features. She also worked part-time as a
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special reporter/columnist for the Leisure Weekly, a weekly lifestyle newspaper published
by the Beijing Press and Publications Administration. As a journalist in international
news coverage, she specialized in U.S.-China relations and the Middle East, and
published three books, including two volumes of translation, and hundreds of research
papers and news articles in journalism and world affairs. Because of her achievements,
she was awarded a national scholarship from China’s Minister of Education in 1999.
With a goal to plunge herself into the course of journalism and communication
education in China, Zhou came to the United States on August 16, 2000, for graduate
studies. She first received a master’s degree in communications with an emphasis in
journalism in August 2002, from the University of Tennessee, and then started her
journey for a Ph.D. in communication with a primary concentration in new media and a
secondary concentration in statistics. During the six-year period at UT, she received the
Edward J. Meeman Fellowship in international communication for four years. In 2003,
she became a lifelong member of Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society
for the recognition of scholarship in mass communications because of her academic
achievement and character. She was also featured in the 2004-2005 edition of The
Chancellor’s List, a compendium recognizing the academic achievements of outstanding
graduate students in America. She received the top doctoral paper award at the 27th
annual College of Communication and Information Annual Symposium at the University
of Tennessee in 2005.
With primary research interests in the Internet, the Chinese media, international
news, and framing, Zhou has presented papers at several international and national
academic conferences, including the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
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Communications. Her research papers have appeared in the Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly and the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication. She
received a Scholarly Activity and Research Incentive Funds Grant from the Research
Office, the University of Tennessee, in 2005. She also received the GSS Travel Fund in
2003 and 2004 from the University of Tennessee Graduate Student Senate, and the
Montgomery-Howard Graduate Student Fund from the College of Communication and
Information at UT in 2003, 2004 and 2006, for presenting her research papers at scholarly
conferences.
Zhou had taught Chinese at various levels for four years as a graduate teaching
associate in the Department of Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures at the
University of Tennessee. She is currently a research assistant under the leadership of Dr.
Carol Tenopir, the interim director of the Center of Information Studies at UT. She will
leave the United States for her professorship at the Shantou University in Guangdong
Province, China, after she graduates.
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